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Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
| A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
200 |
| A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
959 |
| A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV / AIDS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
159 |
| A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
179 |
| A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
933 |
| A Rationalization of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference |
1 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
14 |
| A Rationalization of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference |
0 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
62 |
| A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
308 |
| A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
| A dynamic theory of fidelity networks with an application to the spread of HIV/AIDS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
281 |
| A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
78 |
| A normalized value for information purchases |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
| A normalized value for information purchases |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
| An Economic Index of Riskiness |
0 |
0 |
1 |
152 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
1,080 |
| An Economic Index of Riskiness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
236 |
| An Economic Index of Riskiness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
382 |
| An Economic Index of Riskiness |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
275 |
| An Economic Index of Riskiness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
340 |
| An Index of Unfairness |
1 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
133 |
| An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
542 |
| An economic index of riskiness |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
637 |
| Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
148 |
| Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
368 |
| Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
145 |
| Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
| Bargaining |
1 |
1 |
2 |
205 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
358 |
| Bargaining and Bargaining Sets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
431 |
| Bargaining and Competition Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
228 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
284 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
147 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,027 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
771 |
| Bargaining, coalitions and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
905 |
| Bargaining, coalitions and externalities: A comment on Maskin |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
190 |
| Cardinal Revealed Preference, Price-Dependent Utility, and Consistent Binary Choice |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
136 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
410 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
418 |
| Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
| Comment on Nomidis “Revisiting Cournot and Neoclassical Economics†|
1 |
1 |
10 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
12 |
| Comparative Performance of Cryptocurrencies through the Aumann and Serrano Economic Index of Riskiness |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
12 |
12 |
| Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design |
1 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
| Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
| Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
31 |
| Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value |
0 |
0 |
1 |
330 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
822 |
| Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value |
3 |
5 |
17 |
303 |
7 |
12 |
50 |
879 |
| Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
173 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
352 |
| Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome: A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
187 |
| Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome:A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
165 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
140 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
185 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ("Journal of Economic Theory", 2008, Vol.140,.No. 1, 328-338. ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
55 |
| Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
| Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
| El uso de sistemas dinámicos estocásticos en la Teoría de Juegos y la Economía |
0 |
0 |
1 |
165 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
808 |
| El uso de sistemas dinámicos estocásticos en la teoría de juegos y la economía |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
328 |
| Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
| Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
| Entropy and the value of information for investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
| Entropy and the value of information for investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
95 |
| Entropy and the value of information for investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
170 |
| Entropy and the value of information for investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
147 |
| Entropy and the value of information for investors |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
194 |
| Entropy and the value of information for investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
| Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
| Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
61 |
| Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
125 |
| Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust (full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is satisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types. We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation can be significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
197 |
| Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
105 |
| Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
| Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
| Ex-Post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching: the case of private values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
| Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching: The case of private values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
1 |
221 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,799 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
207 |
| Fidelity Networks and Long-Run Trends in HIV/AIDS Gender Gaps |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
93 |
| Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
319 |
| Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
| Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
195 |
| Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
124 |
| Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
301 |
| Implemetation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
| Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
| Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
| Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
186 |
| Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
| Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies |
1 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
| Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
156 |
| Information transmission in coalitional voting games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
| Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
| Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
29 |
| Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
829 |
| Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
| Level-K Mechanism Design |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
58 |
| MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
208 |
| Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
126 |
| Marginal contributions and externalities in the value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
413 |
| Marginal contributions and externalities in the value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
210 |
| Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
258 |
| Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
204 |
| Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
242 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
566 |
| Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
| Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
192 |
| Mistakes in cooperation: the stochastic stability of edgeworth's recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
182 |
| Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
705 |
| Multilateral Bargaining With Imperfect Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
485 |
| Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
394 |
| Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
| Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
| Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
186 |
| Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
88 |
| Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
| Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
101 |
| Nash program |
0 |
0 |
1 |
227 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
517 |
| Negotiations with Side-Deals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
221 |
| On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
| On WatsonÃs Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
| On Watson’s Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
108 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
353 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
389 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
551 |
| On the Impossibility of Implementation under Incomplete Information |
1 |
1 |
2 |
95 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
460 |
| Optimal investment with insurable background risk and nonlinear portfolio allocation frictions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
78 |
| Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
| Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
177 |
| Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences |
1 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
40 |
| Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
| Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
34 |
| Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
| Regret Matching with Finite Memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
| Regret Matching with Finite Memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
61 |
| Regret matching with finite memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
| Regret matching with finite memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
| Rejecting Small Gambles Under Expected Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
364 |
| Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
| Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
110 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
318 |
| Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
| Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
| Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
29 |
| Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement? |
1 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
41 |
| Slutsky Matrix Norms and Revealed Preference Tests of Consumer Behaviour |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
162 |
| Slutsky Matrix Norms and the Size of Bounded Rationality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
169 |
| Slutsky Matrix Symmetry: A New Behavioral Condition |
1 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
4 |
10 |
17 |
17 |
| Slutsky Matrix Symmetry: A New Behavioral Condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
28 |
| Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
| Stochastically stable implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
79 |
| TOP5ITIS |
1 |
1 |
2 |
127 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
316 |
| The Appeal of Information Transactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
| The Appeal of Information Transactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
| The Digital Revolution: Lights and Shadows |
1 |
1 |
1 |
38 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
51 |
| The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auction and Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
132 |
| The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auctions and Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,382 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
129 |
| The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
160 |
| The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
| The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
| The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
663 |
| The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
285 |
| The Theory of Weak Revealed Preference |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
28 |
| The evolution of bidding behavior in private-values auctions and double auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
| Top5itis Revisited: Some Thoughts on the Notion of General Interest in Economics by Roberto Serrano |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
229 |
| Volume of Trade and Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
| Volume of Trade and Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
45 |
| Walrasian Allocations Without Price-Taking Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
161 |
| Total Working Papers |
24 |
31 |
79 |
8,389 |
67 |
122 |
372 |
39,768 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
265 |
| A Market to Implement the Core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
101 |
| A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
166 |
| A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
92 |
| A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
120 |
| A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
| A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
111 |
| A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
| A normalized value for information purchases |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
52 |
| Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
| Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
| Agricultural and Food Trade in European Union Countries, 1963-2000: A Gravity Equation Approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
109 |
| An Economic Index of Riskiness |
0 |
5 |
9 |
177 |
1 |
7 |
23 |
681 |
| Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
130 |
| Bargaining and Bargaining Sets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
| Bargaining and competition revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
| Bargaining, coalitions and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
529 |
| Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
120 |
| COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
45 |
| Cardinal revealed preference: Disentangling transitivity and consistent binary choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
| Classifying bounded rationality in limited data sets: a Slutsky matrix approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
106 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
351 |
| Continuous level-k mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
112 |
| Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
229 |
| Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
349 |
| Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (I): Fixed and random matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
| Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (II): 2×2 games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| Feasible implementation of taxation methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
573 |
| Fidelity Networks and Long-Run Trends in HIV/AIDS Gender Gaps |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
237 |
| Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
188 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
552 |
| Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
146 |
| Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
533 |
| Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
200 |
| Information transmission in coalitional voting games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
110 |
| Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
| Level-$k$ Mechanism Design |
1 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
84 |
| Lloyd Shapley's Matching and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
52 |
| Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
233 |
| Market Power And Information Revelation In Dynamic Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
174 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
119 |
| Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
| Multilateral Bargaining |
1 |
2 |
3 |
155 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
497 |
| Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
131 |
| Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
810 |
| Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
68 |
| Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
156 |
| Non-cooperative implementation of the core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
307 |
| On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
94 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
176 |
| Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
171 |
| Regret Matching with Finite Memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
| Reinterpreting the Kernel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
| Rejecting small gambles under expected utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
177 |
| Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
118 |
| Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
| Signaling, screening, and core stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
| Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: time for retirement? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
35 |
| Slutsky matrix norms: The size, classification, and comparative statics of bounded rationality |
0 |
1 |
4 |
31 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
189 |
| Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
212 |
| Stochastically stable implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
| Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
174 |
| The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
| The Nash Program: a broader interpretation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
133 |
| The Neoclassical Economists Did Not Misinterpret Cournot on Competition: A Comment on Nomidis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
| The Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
185 |
| The evolution of exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
188 |
| Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
| Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
| Welfare Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
| Total Journal Articles |
5 |
14 |
43 |
2,187 |
29 |
60 |
179 |
11,948 |
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