Access Statistics for Aggey Semenov

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games 0 0 0 67 0 1 1 100
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games 0 0 0 46 0 1 3 81
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game 0 0 0 64 0 0 2 56
A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement 0 0 2 85 0 0 2 134
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 40
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 8
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 47 0 1 1 108
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 23
A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 45
Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 107
Charitable Giving and NPOs Investment Decision in a Stochastic Dynamic Economy 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4
Charitable Giving and NPOs Investment Decision in a Stochastic Dynamic Economy 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 13
Common Agency with Risk-Averse Agent 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 233
Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying 0 0 0 34 0 0 1 229
Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 69
Delegation to potentially uninformed agent 0 0 0 20 2 2 3 43
Entry deterrrence via renegotiation-proof non-exclusive contracts 0 0 0 65 0 1 1 196
Existence and continuity of the optimal contract in adverse selection models with constraints 0 0 1 12 1 1 2 38
Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition 0 0 0 83 1 1 1 255
On imperfect commitment in contracts 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 39
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 29
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Social Pricing and Water Provision in Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 139
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ON STATE BANKING REGULATION AND BANK EXPANSION IN U.S 0 0 1 42 0 0 2 104
Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares 0 0 0 111 1 2 2 78
The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics 0 0 0 57 0 1 2 217
Vertical Limit pricing 0 0 0 55 1 1 1 141
Total Working Papers 0 0 4 960 10 21 43 2,547

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 1 25 2 2 12 137
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 52
A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 105 0 3 3 380
Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 40
Common agency with risk-averse agent 0 0 0 23 0 1 1 155
Continuity in mechanism design without transfers 1 1 2 77 1 1 5 193
Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 32
Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 8
Exclusion via Non-Exclusive Contracts 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 59
Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition 0 0 0 58 0 0 4 198
On the Dynamic Analysis of Cournot–Bertrand Equilibria 0 0 2 6 0 0 3 26
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 50
Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 55 0 0 1 169
Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 16
The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics 0 0 0 82 0 0 1 218
The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 360
Total Journal Articles 1 1 5 505 5 10 40 2,103

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03