| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
160 |
| Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
42 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
61 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
38 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
4 |
5 |
16 |
129 |
| Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
195 |
| Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
33 |
| Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
57 |
| Chinese Sputnik Moments? |
5 |
19 |
19 |
19 |
11 |
35 |
35 |
35 |
| Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
101 |
| Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
6 |
11 |
34 |
356 |
| Do Social Norms Substitute for Enforcement? Evidence from Public Officials’ Home Purchases in Singapore |
3 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
27 |
47 |
47 |
47 |
| Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patents |
0 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
2 |
6 |
30 |
146 |
| Financing Labor |
1 |
1 |
1 |
107 |
5 |
6 |
25 |
438 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
1 |
5 |
27 |
291 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
1 |
2 |
5 |
137 |
7 |
13 |
60 |
506 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
17 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
5 |
16 |
114 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking |
0 |
0 |
2 |
107 |
1 |
4 |
27 |
428 |
| Information, credit, and organization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
2 |
3 |
24 |
109 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
2 |
5 |
17 |
337 |
6 |
19 |
106 |
852 |
| Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
1 |
2 |
2 |
56 |
9 |
12 |
32 |
127 |
| Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
6 |
7 |
27 |
75 |
| Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
9 |
11 |
25 |
70 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
5 |
54 |
0 |
6 |
34 |
172 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
236 |
| Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
2 |
4 |
31 |
267 |
| NAR Settlement, House Prices, and Consumer Welfare |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
9 |
32 |
47 |
| Noisy Experts? Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
16 |
| One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Heterogeneous Depositor Compensation During Periods of Uncertainty |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
36 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
207 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
223 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
210 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
315 |
| Private Credit, Balance Sheets and Financial Stability |
0 |
0 |
22 |
22 |
18 |
29 |
77 |
77 |
| Regional Redistribution Through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
153 |
| Regional Redistribution through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
67 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
5 |
8 |
45 |
248 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
2 |
35 |
169 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
3 |
12 |
30 |
| Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
225 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
4 |
8 |
24 |
134 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
55 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
1 |
1 |
5 |
324 |
5 |
12 |
74 |
1,161 |
| The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives, and Defaults |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
3 |
6 |
22 |
156 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
5 |
8 |
20 |
130 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
229 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
34 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
138 |
| The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
4 |
4 |
16 |
105 |
| The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
33 |
33 |
56 |
67 |
| The Secular Decline of Traditional Banking: Drivers and the Changing Transmission of Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
3 |
4 |
22 |
99 |
| The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Corporate Finance and Beyond |
0 |
0 |
1 |
84 |
5 |
7 |
30 |
251 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
4 |
7 |
33 |
136 |
| Weighted Noise: Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
3 |
6 |
20 |
30 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
82 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
3 |
5 |
32 |
195 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
16 |
30 |
| Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
2 |
9 |
41 |
334 |
| Who Pays for Payments? |
0 |
0 |
23 |
23 |
77 |
79 |
103 |
103 |
| Why is Intermediating Houses so Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers |
2 |
2 |
5 |
19 |
5 |
10 |
37 |
114 |
| Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
87 |
| Total Working Papers |
18 |
50 |
142 |
2,732 |
326 |
525 |
1,713 |
10,795 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
3 |
6 |
21 |
151 |
| Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups |
0 |
3 |
11 |
227 |
4 |
13 |
44 |
844 |
| Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models Are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
33 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
21 |
21 |
| Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? |
1 |
1 |
2 |
99 |
4 |
4 |
13 |
344 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
3 |
4 |
20 |
102 |
| Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
1 |
8 |
34 |
3 |
7 |
49 |
135 |
| Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
78 |
| Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans |
3 |
11 |
31 |
686 |
20 |
46 |
132 |
2,128 |
| Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
5 |
15 |
34 |
219 |
| Financial Innovation in the Twenty-First Century: Evidence from US Patents |
1 |
2 |
25 |
149 |
2 |
6 |
59 |
308 |
| Financial market frictions and diversification |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
3 |
5 |
16 |
212 |
| Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
222 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
796 |
| Financing Labor* |
0 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
2 |
4 |
36 |
89 |
| Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks |
2 |
10 |
44 |
352 |
22 |
44 |
262 |
1,474 |
| Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity |
0 |
0 |
8 |
427 |
9 |
14 |
83 |
1,410 |
| Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
8 |
11 |
25 |
511 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
4 |
5 |
25 |
49 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking |
0 |
0 |
5 |
217 |
4 |
9 |
45 |
849 |
| Interest Rate Pass-Through: Mortgage Rates, Household Consumption, and Voluntary Deleveraging |
0 |
3 |
11 |
110 |
6 |
18 |
51 |
502 |
| Internal Capital Market and Dividend Policies: Evidence From Business Groups |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
223 |
| Learning by Trading |
1 |
2 |
7 |
118 |
24 |
37 |
75 |
427 |
| Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
261 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
4 |
13 |
76 |
285 |
17 |
48 |
220 |
829 |
| Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
21 |
21 |
| Monetary tightening and U.S. bank fragility in 2023: Mark-to-market losses and uninsured depositor runs? |
6 |
15 |
39 |
46 |
25 |
63 |
212 |
255 |
| Mortgage Market Design: Lessons from the Great Recession |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
17 |
69 |
| Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinance Program |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
7 |
30 |
51 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
1 |
2 |
72 |
3 |
11 |
43 |
520 |
| Regional Redistribution through the US Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
379 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
4 |
5 |
20 |
173 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
3 |
8 |
27 |
74 |
| Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis |
0 |
0 |
3 |
242 |
2 |
6 |
48 |
792 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
3 |
7 |
26 |
115 |
| Shadow Bank Distress and Household Debt Relief: Evidence from the CARES Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
100 |
| Statistical Default Models and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
214 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
3 |
9 |
53 |
578 |
20 |
49 |
246 |
2,457 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
1 |
2 |
11 |
124 |
6 |
15 |
52 |
496 |
| The Problem of Good Conduct among Financial Advisers |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
9 |
23 |
36 |
| The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Finance and Beyond |
2 |
2 |
8 |
31 |
4 |
9 |
44 |
122 |
| The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults |
0 |
0 |
2 |
180 |
3 |
17 |
49 |
717 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
338 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
7 |
15 |
62 |
161 |
| Total Journal Articles |
25 |
80 |
372 |
4,924 |
259 |
557 |
2,310 |
19,085 |