| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| (Don't) Make My Vote Count |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
| (Don’t) Make My Vote Count |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
| (Don’t) Make My Vote Count |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
| A Model of Participatory Democracy: Understanding the Case of Porto Alegre |
0 |
0 |
0 |
381 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,671 |
| A Model of Participatory Democracy: Undestanding the Case of Porto Alegre |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
98 |
| An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
279 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,406 |
| An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
| An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
50 |
| Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
| Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
225 |
| Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
300 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
1,405 |
| Deposit Insurance, Bank Competition and Risk Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
131 |
| Difference-form group contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
55 |
| Do Personality Traits Affect Productivity? Evidence from the Lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,070 |
| Do Personality Traits Affect Productivity? Evidence from the Lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
163 |
| Do personality traits affect productivity? Evidence from the LAB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
| Does Market Concentration Preclude Risk Taking in Baking? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
230 |
| Does Market Concentration Preclude Risk Taking in Banking? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
110 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
765 |
| Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
344 |
| Enjoy the Silence: An Experiment on Truth-Telling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
180 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1,023 |
| Gender differences and stereotypes in strategic thinking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
166 |
| Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty contest |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
157 |
| Gender, Competition and Performance: Evidence from Real Tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
172 |
| Gender, competition and performance:Evidence from real tournaments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
142 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
265 |
| Identity and Corruption: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
53 |
| Immigration, Conflict and Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
104 |
| Immigration, Conflict and Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
58 |
| Incumbency (dis)advantage when citizens can propose Abstract:This paper analyses the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to citizen proposals such as the outcome of referenda or popular initiatives. We argue that these proposals constitute a potential source of electoral disadvantage when citizens factor in their evaluation of the incumbent his reaction to these proposals. This is because an incumbent politician may jeopardize his re-election by implementing policies close to his preferred ones but unpopular among the electorate. We characterize conditions under which this potential disadvantage becomes in fact an electoral advantage for the incumbent. We fi nd that the choices of the incumbent during the legislature will be closest to citizens policy proposals when the intensity of electoral competition is neither too soft nor too tough. Finally, we use our results to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms such as referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition and on the incumbency advantage phenomenon |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
103 |
| On the Relationship between Market Concentration and Bank Risk Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
344 |
| On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
86 |
| On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
256 |
| On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
125 |
| On the Social Efficiency of Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
435 |
| Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
291 |
| Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
70 |
| Property Out of Conflict: A Survey and Some New Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
23 |
| Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
216 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
474 |
| Testosterone, Facial Symmetry and Cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma |
1 |
1 |
1 |
79 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
355 |
| The Disadvantage of Winning an Election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
118 |
| The Emergence of Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
326 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
965 |
| The Emergence of Institutions |
0 |
1 |
3 |
43 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
133 |
| The disadvantage of winning an election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
542 |
| The disadvantage of winning an election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
321 |
| The disadvantage of winning an election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
74 |
| The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
| The redistributive effects of enfranchising non-citizens. Evidence from Sweden |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
39 |
| The use of conflict as a bargaining tool against unsophisticated opponents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
854 |
| Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and Individual Biological Features |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
61 |
| Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and Individual Biological Features |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
110 |
| When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflD72icts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
436 |
| Who is the fairest of them all? The independent effect of attractive features and self-perceived attractiveness on cooperation among women |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
| Who is the fairest of them all? The independent effect of attractive features and self-perceived attractiveness on cooperation among women |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
149 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
4 |
13 |
3,938 |
24 |
53 |
172 |
16,434 |
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