| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Continuous-Time Model of Financial Clearing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| A Continuous-Time Model of Financial Clearing |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
| A Political Model of Trust |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
| A Political Model of Trust |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
46 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
225 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
1 |
1 |
1 |
229 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
285 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
355 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
762 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
262 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
0 |
3 |
192 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
704 |
| A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments |
1 |
1 |
1 |
190 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
958 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
56 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
418 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Natural Bankruptcy Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
| Are Russian commercial courts biased?Evidence from a natural bankruptcy experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
| Are Russian commercial courts biased?Evidence from a natural bankruptcy experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
| Authoritarian Institutions |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
5 |
| Banks as Tanks: A Continuous-Time Model of Financial Clearing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
59 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
363 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
203 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
63 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
493 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
69 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
499 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
347 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
| Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
356 |
| Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
201 |
| Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Evidence from Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
261 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,064 |
| Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
154 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
755 |
| Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Coalition Formation in Political Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
| Coalition Formation in Political Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
162 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
573 |
| Coalition Formation in Political Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
603 |
| Collusive market sharing and corruption in procurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
| Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
132 |
| Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
30 |
| Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders |
0 |
2 |
7 |
267 |
1 |
9 |
33 |
1,403 |
| Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
40 |
| Crisis? What Crisis? Bank stability, financial development and propaganda |
1 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
9 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
191 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
485 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
177 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
487 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
15 |
| Development Based on Commodity Revenues? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
0 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
111 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
487 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
43 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
453 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
147 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
534 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
396 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
554 |
| Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An ?Eliminations Model? of Stalin?s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
313 |
| Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) |
0 |
0 |
2 |
147 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
641 |
| Do Political Blogs Matter? Corruption in State-Controlled Companies, Blog Postings, and DDoS Attacks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
262 |
| Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
115 |
| Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
221 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
758 |
| Economic Transition and the Rise of Alternative Institutions: Political Connections in Putin's Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
86 |
| Electoral College and Election Fraud |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
| Endogenous Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
92 |
| Financial Restrictions and Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
147 |
| Government Control of the Media |
0 |
1 |
2 |
275 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
3,106 |
| Government Control of the Media |
0 |
0 |
4 |
36 |
0 |
3 |
38 |
1,146 |
| How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
159 |
| Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
64 |
| Incumbency Advantage in Nondemocratic Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
| Inequality, Property Rights Protection, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
169 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
739 |
| Inequality, Property Rights, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
648 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,967 |
| Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
| Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID Response in Russia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
| Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
296 |
| Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
| Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
399 |
| Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence |
0 |
0 |
5 |
156 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
127 |
| Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence |
0 |
2 |
10 |
115 |
6 |
9 |
38 |
193 |
| Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence |
1 |
4 |
7 |
55 |
2 |
8 |
23 |
105 |
| Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
872 |
| Isolation and Insurrection: How Partisanship and Political Geography Fueled January 6, 2021 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Market Sharing in Procurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
22 |
| Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
348 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
295 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
854 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
311 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
236 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
804 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
301 |
| Persuasion on Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
51 |
| Persuasion on Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
202 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
290 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
478 |
| Political Economy of Crisis Response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
55 |
| Political Economy of Crisis Response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
44 |
| Political Economy of Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
96 |
| Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
241 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
666 |
| Poverty and Economic Dislocation Reduce Compliance with COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place Protocols |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
74 |
| Poverty and Economic Dislocation Reduce Compliance with COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place Protocols |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
125 |
| Private Protection of Property Rights, Inequality, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
290 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
692 |
| Provincial Protectionism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
441 |
| Rebel Capacity and Combat Tactics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| Social Media and Corruption |
0 |
0 |
2 |
160 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
675 |
| Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Re-evaluating De Tocqueville |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
176 |
| Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Re-evaluating De Tocqueville |
1 |
1 |
2 |
191 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
312 |
| Structural or Cyclical? Unemployment in Latvia Since the 2008-09 Financial Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
137 |
| Technological Foundations of Political Instability |
0 |
0 |
2 |
79 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
176 |
| The Historical Perspective on the Trump Puzzle: A Review of Barry Eichengreen’s “The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era†|
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
52 |
| The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
617 |
| The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
559 |
| The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
162 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
1,278 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
82 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
58 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
35 |
| The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
| The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
317 |
| The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
252 |
| Unmasking Partisanship: Polarization Undermines Public Response to Collective Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
35 |
| Unmasking Partisanship: Polarization Undermines Public Response to Collective Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
| Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
42 |
| Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
| Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
| Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
317 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1,297 |
| Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
268 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
788 |
| Winning by Losing: Incentive Incompatibility in Multiple Qualifiers |
1 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
106 |
| Total Working Papers |
7 |
21 |
91 |
9,617 |
48 |
144 |
605 |
40,767 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Political Economy Model of a Research University |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
1 |
1 |
8 |
236 |
4 |
10 |
32 |
1,166 |
| A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments |
1 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
303 |
| Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a bankruptcy law transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
223 |
| Basics of contract theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2016 - Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström) |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
38 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
99 |
| Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies |
0 |
1 |
1 |
154 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
538 |
| Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement |
0 |
1 |
1 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
268 |
| DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY–COMPETENCE TRADE‐OFF |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
245 |
| Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
404 |
| Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
520 |
| Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
322 |
| Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
505 |
| Economic transition and the rise of alternative institutions: Political connections in Putin's Russia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
77 |
| Economics and Politics of Russian Bankruptcies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Economics of Development Based on Commodity Revenues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Economics of the Resource Curse |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
13 |
| Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
136 |
| Elections in Non-Democracies |
0 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
41 |
| FINANCIAL MARKETS EFFICIENCY(NOBEL MEMORIAL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS 2013) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Government control of the media |
4 |
8 |
38 |
214 |
8 |
18 |
104 |
811 |
| How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
12 |
| Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
17 |
| Information revelation and efficiency in auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
141 |
| Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
439 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
1 |
1 |
5 |
219 |
4 |
7 |
23 |
939 |
| Political Economy of Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
127 |
| Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
183 |
4 |
10 |
17 |
850 |
| Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with COVID-19 shelter-in-place protocols |
1 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
88 |
| Provincial protectionism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
173 |
| Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin's archives |
3 |
4 |
10 |
123 |
4 |
6 |
23 |
463 |
| Social Media and Corruption |
0 |
0 |
6 |
91 |
0 |
3 |
27 |
417 |
| Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Reevaluating De Tocqueville |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
316 |
| The Historical Perspective on the Donald Trump Puzzle: A Review of Barry Eichengreen's The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
53 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
0 |
0 |
19 |
26 |
2 |
9 |
54 |
74 |
| The end of economic transition |
0 |
0 |
3 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
115 |
| The killing game: A theory of non-democratic succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
110 |
| Theory of Mechanism Design (2007 Nobel Prize in Economics) |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
| Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Applications (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2012) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Unmasking partisanship: Polarization undermines public response to collective risk |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
28 |
| Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
103 |
| Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
690 |
| Winning by Losing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
177 |
| {'italic': 'Kompromat', '#text': 'Corrigendum: How Does Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes'} |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Total Journal Articles |
11 |
22 |
113 |
2,339 |
53 |
134 |
513 |
11,092 |
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