Access Statistics for William George Stanford

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Conjectural Variations Strategies in Dynamic Cournot Games With Fast Reactions	0	0	3	35	0	1	16	155
Duopoly, Conjectural Variations and Supergames	0	0	1	21	1	2	6	151
Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games	3	9	16	61	5	14	42	283
Total Working Papers	3	9	20	117	6	17	64	589

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	85
Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games	1	2	6	20	1	2	19	70
Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games	1	2	10	57	3	7	29	371
Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games	1	1	2	6	1	1	3	20
Individually rational pure strategies in large games	0	1	4	14	0	1	8	43
On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games	0	0	0	2	1	1	3	12
On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs	0	0	1	6	1	4	35	59
On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs	0	0	1	13	0	0	3	31
On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games	0	0	2	8	0	0	30	62
Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games	0	0	0	6	0	2	7	39
Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial	0	0	1	7	0	0	14	39
Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	13
Total Journal Articles	3	6	27	141	7	18	156	844

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04