Access Statistics for Roland Strausz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations 0 0 3 16 2 6 21 81
Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations 3 6 18 128 14 32 120 581
Collusion and Durability 2 4 26 69 5 19 90 193
Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship 0 0 4 184 0 3 11 942
Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent- Relationship (REVISION) 1 2 6 323 7 14 24 1,314
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication 0 1 2 28 1 6 29 128
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication 4 8 54 302 11 26 142 777
Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship 2 4 32 606 10 21 83 2,400
Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal--Agent Models 3 14 67 368 20 96 330 1,357
Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal–Agent Models 1 2 5 27 1 6 23 116
Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs 0 2 11 153 4 12 56 417
Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships 1 2 18 150 5 15 107 648
Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture 0 1 10 123 2 5 22 340
Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture 1 1 10 41 3 6 31 103
Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle 1 6 30 364 5 19 85 1,361
Implementation Errors and Information Acquisition in Public Procurement 3 11 38 38 8 38 83 83
Interim Information in Long Term Contracts 0 2 4 19 2 8 14 71
Mediation in Situations of Conflict 0 1 2 139 0 4 6 358
Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment 0 2 19 147 16 40 199 727
Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment 0 0 3 26 2 5 17 88
Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants 0 3 16 235 0 9 45 992
Mitigating Non-contractible actions by randomness 0 1 5 31 1 5 15 412
Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams 2 3 24 245 4 11 55 1,006
Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors 0 1 7 26 2 9 32 108
Planned Obsolescence and the Provision of Unobservable Quality 23 63 99 205 53 158 307 704
Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty 1 2 14 67 6 27 69 344
Regulation in a Political Economy: An explanation of limited commitment of governments in the context of the ratchet effect 1 1 13 327 3 6 44 1,789
The Bologna Process: How Student Mobility Affects Multi-Cultural Skills and Educational Quality 2 8 36 83 13 50 133 270
The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality 3 22 73 184 12 78 284 583
The Effect of Fair vs. Book Value Accounting on the Behavior of Banks 9 63 313 984 50 305 1,269 4,012
Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing 3 6 26 207 21 53 162 886
Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing 0 0 7 35 3 7 41 153
VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities 2 8 29 78 4 25 82 211
Total Working Papers 68 250 1,024 5,958 290 1,124 4,031 23,555

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bolton, P., and Dewatripont, M.:Contract Theory 0 0 6 29 0 4 19 75
Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations 1 1 6 10 3 10 33 55
Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship 2 6 19 62 4 22 87 377
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case 0 0 8 8 15 48 145 818
Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication 1 4 12 12 5 14 34 34
Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship 5 21 92 388 29 89 372 1,881
Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle 2 7 25 145 3 11 45 323
Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models 1 2 10 26 2 10 24 74
Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships 3 3 16 68 3 5 28 165
Honest certification and the threat of capture 1 2 9 20 2 6 15 61
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case 1 2 5 35 1 3 9 89
Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts 0 0 5 12 1 4 15 42
Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment 0 0 4 14 3 13 56 106
Mitigating Non-Contractability with Interim Randomization 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 27
Ordinary Shares and Managers 0 0 1 8 1 6 16 49
Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty 0 0 1 2 1 5 15 20
Regulation in a political economy: explaining limited commitment and the ratchet effect 0 0 0 59 1 4 14 412
The Bologna process: how student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality 0 4 8 8 4 23 30 30
Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing 0 1 5 28 2 9 23 105
VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities 0 0 2 2 0 2 12 34
Total Journal Articles 17 53 234 936 82 291 998 4,777

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Swedish Business School at Örebro University.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail .

Statistics updated 2008-08-03