Access Statistics for Daniel Treisman
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Loans for Shares" Revisited |
3 |
4 |
13 |
57 |
5 |
19 |
55 |
299 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
306 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
548 |
| Democracy by mistake |
0 |
2 |
3 |
158 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
159 |
| Donald Trump's words |
0 |
2 |
18 |
18 |
1 |
5 |
40 |
40 |
| Elections in Russia, 1991-2008 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
| Embezzlement Versus Bribery |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
226 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
99 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
59 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
76 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism |
1 |
1 |
6 |
110 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
661 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
0 |
1 |
4 |
185 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
857 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
25 |
60 |
| Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
110 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
1 |
1 |
2 |
84 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
266 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
1 |
1 |
3 |
170 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
300 |
| Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
| Oil and Democracy in Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
228 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of Chudar |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
629 |
| Public Employment and Redistributive Politics: Evidence from Russia’s Regions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,270 |
| The Geography of Fear |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
169 |
| The US and Russia: They Don't Need Us |
0 |
0 |
0 |
216 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
379 |
| Twenty Years of Political Transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
| What makes governments popular? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
110 |
| Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
| Total Working Papers |
6 |
12 |
55 |
2,194 |
22 |
66 |
275 |
7,118 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Normal Country: Russia After Communism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
373 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
2,472 |
| A theory of informational autocracy |
1 |
2 |
6 |
65 |
2 |
6 |
38 |
316 |
| Death and prices |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
| Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity? |
0 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
33 |
| Deciphering Russia's federal finance: Fiscal appeasement in 1995 and 1996 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
| Democracy by Mistake: How the Errors of Autocrats Trigger Transitions to Freer Government |
2 |
2 |
12 |
54 |
3 |
4 |
24 |
142 |
| Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
429 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
1,148 |
| FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A RECONSIDERATION |
0 |
0 |
3 |
123 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
327 |
| Fiscal Redistribution in a Fragile Federation: Moscow and the Regions in 1994 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover |
0 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
50 |
| Informational Autocrats |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
133 |
| Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Policy Expenditure: Assessing the Effect of Municipal Amalgamation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
94 |
| Misperceiving inequality |
4 |
7 |
19 |
68 |
5 |
14 |
43 |
216 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of ‘Chudar’ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
84 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
245 |
| Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world |
0 |
0 |
9 |
592 |
3 |
9 |
47 |
1,826 |
| Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin |
1 |
1 |
4 |
32 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
72 |
| Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge, then stabilize? |
0 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
21 |
| Rational Appeasement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
144 |
| Russia's Billionaires |
1 |
1 |
5 |
35 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
220 |
| State corroding federalism |
0 |
0 |
3 |
228 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
686 |
| The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
| The causes of corruption: a cross-national study |
3 |
7 |
53 |
2,357 |
5 |
12 |
127 |
9,453 |
| The politics of soft credit in post‐Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Total Journal Articles |
12 |
24 |
135 |
4,602 |
34 |
81 |
402 |
17,758 |
|
|
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