Access Statistics for Daniel R. Vincent

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions 0 0 1 241 0 3 5 1,220
Bargaining with Common Values 0 0 1 161 1 1 3 277
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 210
Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 26 0 0 2 201
Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 65
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 49
Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 348
Modeling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 36 0 0 2 199
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 120
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 2 80 0 1 10 382
Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses 0 0 0 189 0 0 3 1,231
Platform Competition With Cash-back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 72 0 0 1 163
Platform Competition With User Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 12 0 1 1 40
Price Regulation and Quality of Service 0 0 0 158 0 0 1 419
Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates 0 0 0 27 0 2 4 121
Same Price, Cash, or Card: Vertical Control by Payment Networks 0 0 0 117 0 0 0 321
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 1 1 1 64 1 2 3 526
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding 0 0 1 340 0 0 7 1,387
The Afternoon Effect 0 0 0 115 0 0 2 1,144
The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 20
Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions 0 0 0 113 1 1 4 408
Total Working Papers 1 1 6 1,878 5 15 55 8,851

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with common values 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 111
Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 146
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret 0 0 5 297 0 2 9 914
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist 0 0 3 149 0 0 9 335
Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 11
Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 37
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 26
Duality in procurement design 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 77
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 130
How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 300
Mixed Bundling and Mergers 0 1 5 6 0 1 10 12
Modelling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 114
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly 0 0 1 147 2 3 8 417
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum 0 0 0 72 0 2 5 161
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 4 387 0 2 14 959
Optimal versus satisfactory decision making: a case study of sales with a target 0 0 0 18 0 0 3 168
Platform Competition With Cash‐Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 25
Punishment Schedules for Capital Flight 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 57
Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 228
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 2 2 2 78 3 5 15 362
Tariffying Auctions 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 190
The Declining Price Anomaly 1 1 6 264 1 2 10 597
The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network 0 0 1 185 0 0 3 586
The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 24 1 1 1 153
Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions 0 0 1 58 0 0 3 232
Total Journal Articles 3 5 29 1,934 9 29 110 6,348

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Daniel R. Vincent on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
Factor Price Differences and Multinational Activity 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 13
Total Chapters 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 16

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Statistics updated 2025-05-12