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3 months |
12 months |
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| COMPETITION, HIDDEN INFORMATION, AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENT |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
21 |
21 |
| Competition and the Ratchet Effect |
2 |
5 |
27 |
27 |
7 |
18 |
96 |
96 |
| Competition and the Ratchet Effect |
1 |
1 |
21 |
21 |
5 |
8 |
38 |
38 |
| Competition and the Ratchet Effect |
1 |
1 |
23 |
23 |
7 |
13 |
65 |
65 |
| Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
3 |
6 |
37 |
135 |
| Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
25 |
| Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment |
1 |
1 |
2 |
30 |
3 |
3 |
42 |
137 |
| Competition, hidden information, and efficiency: an experiment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
54 |
| Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in |
2 |
5 |
20 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
13 |
| Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and in the Laboratory |
4 |
9 |
22 |
22 |
8 |
17 |
33 |
33 |
| Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
20 |
| Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment |
1 |
2 |
19 |
70 |
6 |
16 |
64 |
187 |
| Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie |
3 |
4 |
7 |
12 |
3 |
7 |
21 |
38 |
| Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories |
0 |
1 |
10 |
138 |
1 |
5 |
36 |
460 |
| Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? |
1 |
2 |
16 |
48 |
5 |
5 |
24 |
50 |
| Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories |
1 |
3 |
11 |
140 |
11 |
22 |
79 |
558 |
| Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
20 |
| Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories |
1 |
3 |
18 |
133 |
5 |
15 |
59 |
493 |
| Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ? |
0 |
2 |
8 |
9 |
4 |
14 |
38 |
40 |
| Effort Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments |
0 |
2 |
8 |
22 |
2 |
5 |
26 |
64 |
| Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence |
1 |
5 |
11 |
49 |
4 |
11 |
30 |
156 |
| Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence |
2 |
3 |
39 |
39 |
3 |
10 |
45 |
45 |
| Effort and Comparison Income: Survey and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
49 |
| Effort and Comparison Income: Survey and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
7 |
53 |
2 |
5 |
35 |
199 |
| Effort and comparison income: Survey and experimental evidence |
1 |
1 |
8 |
59 |
2 |
3 |
26 |
199 |
| Effort, revenu et rang: une étude expérimentale |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
19 |
| Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence |
1 |
2 |
24 |
56 |
6 |
16 |
69 |
130 |
| Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence |
0 |
0 |
4 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
85 |
| Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence |
0 |
1 |
9 |
54 |
1 |
6 |
33 |
112 |
| Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
33 |
| Experimental Economics: Contributions, Recent Developments, and New Challenges |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
| Experimental Economics: Contributions, Recent Developments, and New Challenges |
0 |
0 |
1 |
167 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
108 |
| Experimental Economics: Contributions, Recent Developments, and New Challenges |
4 |
8 |
21 |
242 |
7 |
15 |
45 |
140 |
| Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence |
3 |
5 |
11 |
37 |
7 |
14 |
41 |
89 |
| Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence |
2 |
3 |
6 |
32 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
53 |
| Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
1 |
12 |
29 |
5 |
11 |
55 |
85 |
| Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence |
1 |
3 |
15 |
16 |
3 |
5 |
35 |
41 |
| Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment |
2 |
3 |
22 |
22 |
10 |
20 |
68 |
68 |
| Human Capital over the Life Cycle |
0 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
24 |
| Individual Responsibility and the Funding of Collective Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
61 |
| Individual Responsibility and the Funding of Collective Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
| Individual Responsibility and the Funding of Collective Goods |
1 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
7 |
13 |
52 |
124 |
| Individual Responsibility and the Funding of Collective Goods |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
11 |
| Individual Responsibility and the Funding of Collective Goods |
0 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
85 |
| Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating ? |
2 |
3 |
18 |
19 |
3 |
4 |
46 |
54 |
| Learning from Strike |
0 |
1 |
3 |
110 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
582 |
| Learning from Strikes |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
21 |
| Male and Female Competitive Behavior - Experimental Evidence |
1 |
3 |
12 |
22 |
5 |
14 |
47 |
82 |
| Male and Female Competitive Behavior - Experimental Evidence |
7 |
18 |
69 |
160 |
19 |
44 |
258 |
736 |
| Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Experimental |
1 |
3 |
12 |
18 |
2 |
7 |
52 |
76 |
| Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Experimental Evidence |
11 |
17 |
49 |
222 |
78 |
175 |
461 |
1,431 |
| Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism |
3 |
6 |
20 |
47 |
24 |
43 |
120 |
209 |
| Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
14 |
45 |
540 |
| New Organizational Forms, Learning and Incentive-Based Inequality |
1 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
30 |
| Nouvelles conditions de travail: satisfaction ou résignation ? |
1 |
3 |
9 |
9 |
17 |
34 |
59 |
61 |
| Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay - An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting |
1 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
4 |
4 |
26 |
37 |
| Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting |
1 |
2 |
10 |
98 |
5 |
9 |
31 |
276 |
| Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting |
1 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
26 |
| Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting |
1 |
2 |
10 |
107 |
7 |
14 |
40 |
365 |
| Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation |
1 |
4 |
27 |
41 |
12 |
36 |
116 |
117 |
| Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation |
2 |
9 |
49 |
102 |
8 |
25 |
184 |
291 |
| Punishment, Inequality and Emotions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
32 |
3 |
4 |
13 |
48 |
| Punishment, Inequality and Emotions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
18 |
| Punishment, Inequality and Emotions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
59 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
158 |
| Punishment, Inequality and Emotions |
0 |
2 |
5 |
44 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
135 |
| Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment |
2 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
4 |
13 |
22 |
22 |
| Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students |
0 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
2 |
5 |
35 |
36 |
| Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students |
0 |
0 |
2 |
86 |
1 |
2 |
30 |
538 |
| Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students |
0 |
0 |
7 |
113 |
1 |
5 |
38 |
423 |
| Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
44 |
| Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company |
0 |
0 |
8 |
153 |
5 |
8 |
65 |
846 |
| Redesigning Teams and Incentives:A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company |
0 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
41 |
| Responsabilité individuelle et fiscalité |
0 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
1 |
8 |
27 |
36 |
| Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
18 |
| Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments |
3 |
4 |
20 |
51 |
5 |
8 |
57 |
191 |
| Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments |
1 |
1 |
9 |
49 |
3 |
3 |
30 |
165 |
| Tax Evasion and Social Interactions |
1 |
4 |
14 |
115 |
4 |
11 |
39 |
247 |
| Tax Evasion and Social Interactions |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
31 |
| Tax Evasion and Social Interactions |
3 |
7 |
25 |
153 |
4 |
12 |
65 |
444 |
| Tax Evasion and Social Interactions |
2 |
3 |
10 |
113 |
2 |
5 |
28 |
313 |
| Tax Evasion and Social Interactions |
1 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
26 |
| Tax Evasion and Social Interactions |
2 |
4 |
15 |
154 |
5 |
14 |
52 |
603 |
| Tax Evasion and Social Interactions |
2 |
4 |
8 |
8 |
4 |
9 |
16 |
16 |
| Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? |
1 |
2 |
9 |
21 |
6 |
9 |
33 |
60 |
| Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? |
2 |
4 |
16 |
40 |
6 |
11 |
64 |
147 |
| Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? |
3 |
4 |
17 |
104 |
5 |
10 |
50 |
128 |
| Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? |
3 |
4 |
18 |
106 |
5 |
12 |
60 |
178 |
| The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations |
0 |
0 |
7 |
50 |
2 |
2 |
31 |
203 |
| The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
15 |
23 |
| The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
16 |
| The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations |
3 |
7 |
18 |
68 |
7 |
19 |
78 |
311 |
| The Peter Principle: An Experiment |
1 |
5 |
31 |
80 |
16 |
39 |
162 |
279 |
| The Peter Principle: An Experiment |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
31 |
| The Peter Principle: An Experiment |
3 |
3 |
6 |
21 |
5 |
7 |
22 |
69 |
| The Peter Principle: An Experiment |
0 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
2 |
9 |
34 |
52 |
| Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
36 |
476 |
| Total Working Papers |
106 |
234 |
1,038 |
4,402 |
462 |
1,037 |
4,233 |
15,781 |
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