Access Statistics for Lin Zhou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 0 0 0 112 0 0 0 645
An 'Average' Lyapunov Convexity Theorem and Some Core Equivalence Results 0 0 0 136 0 0 1 643
Bayesian Utilitarianism 0 0 0 16 0 3 3 711
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 507
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 448
Consistent Allocation Rules in Atomless Economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 168
Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences 0 0 0 473 1 3 3 1,532
IMPOSSIBILITY OF STRATEGY-PROOF MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIES WITH PURE PUBLIC GOODS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 198
Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 0 111 0 0 2 328
Integral Representation of Continuous Comonotonically Additive Functionals 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 494
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 119 1 1 1 866
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 247
Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 431
Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies 0 0 0 98 0 0 1 449
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 0 0 0 78 0 1 2 606
Voting by Committees 0 0 0 167 0 2 2 660
Total Working Papers 0 0 0 1,376 2 11 19 8,933

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 0 0 0 119 0 0 1 367
A Simple Proof of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem 0 0 0 0 2 2 9 549
A Theorem on Open Coverings of a Simplex and Scarf's Core Existence Theorem through Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 224
A Weak Monotonicity Property of the Nucleolus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 141
A characterization of demand functions that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 110
Choice problems with a 'reference' point 0 0 0 103 0 3 5 316
Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 226
Game Theory via Revealed Preferences 0 0 4 95 0 0 4 278
General equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor 0 0 0 82 0 0 1 264
Harsanyi's Utilitarianism Theorems: General Societies 0 0 1 85 0 2 3 259
Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules 0 1 2 95 0 1 2 493
Nash implementation in pure public good economies 0 0 0 90 0 2 3 243
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 288
On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems 1 2 4 475 1 3 10 833
Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies 0 0 0 28 0 7 8 167
Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 265
Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 230
Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points 0 0 0 115 0 0 0 396
Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem 0 0 1 198 0 2 3 803
Subjective probability theory with continuous acts 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 220
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 0 0 0 61 1 3 4 225
The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 421
The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice 0 0 6 447 0 0 13 1,005
The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games 0 0 0 55 0 0 2 203
Voting by Committees 0 0 1 108 0 1 7 480
Total Journal Articles 1 3 19 2,423 4 30 83 9,006

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Statistics updated 2025-05-12