Access Statistics for Lin Zhou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 1 3 7 62 1 5 17 514
An 'Average' Lyapunov Convexity Theorem and Some Core Equivalence Results 5 7 23 92 10 18 52 501
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 1 1 4 20 218
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 0 4 6 22 373
Consistent Allocation Rules in Atomless Economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 78
Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences 4 7 26 378 11 20 69 1,212
IMPOSSIBILITY OF STRATEGY-PROOF MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIES WITH PURE PUBLIC GOODS 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 132
Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies 2 2 10 60 2 6 22 180
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 1 2 7 89 1 6 24 727
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 3 8 27 170
Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems 0 0 3 25 0 0 10 302
Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies 1 2 7 45 1 5 23 279
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 2 2 8 30 5 6 19 405
Voting by Committees 1 3 18 54 1 5 45 264
Total Working Papers 17 28 109 836 41 92 365 5,355

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 3 14 35 74 8 34 93 217
A Simple Proof of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem 0 0 0 0 3 11 45 326
A Theorem on Open Coverings of a Simplex and Scarf's Core Existence Theorem through Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem 0 0 0 0 2 3 10 143
A Weak Monotonicity Property of the Nucleolus 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 73
A characterization of demand functions that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference 0 0 1 5 0 0 7 45
Choice problems with a 'reference' point 1 4 14 63 1 5 20 143
Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies 0 0 1 14 1 2 4 100
Game Theory via Revealed Preferences 2 3 6 54 2 4 14 126
General equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor 1 3 6 35 4 7 19 108
Harsanyi's Utilitarianism Theorems: General Societies 0 0 4 36 2 4 15 128
Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods 0 0 10 25 1 2 26 105
Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules 2 2 4 61 2 2 10 381
Nash implementation in pure public good economies 1 3 11 13 2 5 22 34
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 1 6 13 144
On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems 2 7 40 148 2 8 49 214
Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies 0 1 3 15 1 3 11 68
Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees 2 3 10 33 2 4 20 68
Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems 0 0 1 45 0 0 2 164
Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points 0 0 8 84 0 0 11 274
Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem 1 2 6 155 2 6 18 670
Subjective probability theory with continuous acts 0 0 5 24 0 0 15 127
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 1 2 4 31 1 2 6 90
The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems 0 0 0 0 4 4 29 191
The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice 4 13 43 248 5 18 64 531
The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games 0 1 1 29 0 3 16 103
Voting by Committees 0 0 4 61 1 2 35 276
Total Journal Articles 20 58 217 1,253 48 137 578 4,849

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04