| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Trade Policy Under Dictatorship and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
271 |
| A Theory of Trade Policy under Dictatorship and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
122 |
| Competition over Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
84 |
| Contesting an International Trade Agreement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
128 |
| Contesting an International Trade Agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
89 |
| Contesting an international trade agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
65 |
| Contesting an international trade agreement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
32 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition Over Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
220 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
124 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
132 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
114 |
| HOTELLING TAX COMPETITION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
354 |
| Hotelling Tax Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
| Hotelling Tax Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
127 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
491 |
| How and Why Dictators Forestall Democratization Using International Trade Policy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
21 |
| Is the WTO Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
158 |
| Is the WTO Article XXIV bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
242 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
279 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
264 |
| Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
412 |
| Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
243 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy and Trade Liberalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
52 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
225 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Patent Breadth in an International Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
| Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition |
0 |
1 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
245 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
403 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
420 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
| Social Conflict and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
291 |
| Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
| Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
167 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
328 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
313 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
195 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
558 |
| The Efficiency, Equity and Politics of Emission Permit Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
706 |
| The GATT and Gradualism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
315 |
| The GATT and Gradualism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
28 |
29 |
29 |
429 |
| The Political Economy of Immigration, Investment, and Naturalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
147 |
| The Structure and Performance of the World Market in a Cobb-Douglas Example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
300 |
| The efficiency, equity and politics of emissions permit trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
90 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
105 |
| WHY ARE TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL? A Theory Based on Noncooperative Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
361 |
| Why Are Trade Agreements Regional? A Theory based on Noncooperative Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
299 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| World Price Shocks, Income, and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
87 |
| World Price Shocks, Income, and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
4 |
9 |
2,769 |
47 |
64 |
133 |
10,154 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.