Access Statistics for Joseph Moussa Abdou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise 0 0 0 19 1 4 5 54
A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise 0 0 0 6 6 7 9 24
A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise 0 0 0 16 1 4 8 34
A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise 0 0 1 11 0 0 5 21
A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise 0 0 0 3 0 3 6 14
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 15
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 0 2 4 8 17
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 15 3 4 6 79
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 56
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 5 3 7 7 14
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 8
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 15 4 9 10 85
A Stability Index for Local Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 20 5 7 9 115
A stability index for local effectivity functions 0 0 0 12 7 10 10 107
Asymptotic Value in Frequency-Dependent Games with Separable Payoffs: A Differential Approach 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 5
Asymptotic Value in Frequency-Dependent Games with Separable Payoffs: A Differential Approach 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Asymptotic Value in Frequency-Dependent Games with Separable Payoffs: A Differential Approach 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 5
Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 16
Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach 0 0 0 12 2 4 4 35
Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach 0 0 0 11 1 4 7 18
Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games: A differential approach 0 0 0 8 2 5 5 24
Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games: A differential approach 0 0 0 20 2 3 3 41
Correlated effectivity functions 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 248
Correlated effectivity functions 0 0 0 2 3 3 4 37
Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3
Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 7
Decomposition of games: some strategic considerations 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 14
Decomposition of games: some strategic considerations 0 0 0 0 3 6 10 49
Decomposition of games: some strategic considerations 0 0 0 17 3 7 7 47
Decomposition of games: some strategic considerations 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 38
Decomposition of games: some strategic considerations 0 0 0 20 1 1 4 33
Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 11
Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains 0 0 0 30 2 4 4 170
Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 8
Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 57
Interaction sheaves on continuous domains 0 0 0 11 3 6 7 81
Interaction sheaves on continuous domains 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 54
Interaction sheaves on continuous domains 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 24
Reducing Evolutionary Stability to Pure Strategies in Positive Semidefinite Games 0 0 0 7 4 6 8 45
Reducing Evolutionary Stability to Pure Strategies in Positive Semidefinite Games 0 0 1 2 1 1 3 17
Stability Index of Interaction forms 0 0 0 13 1 2 2 117
Stability Index of Interaction forms 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 20
Stability and Index of the Meet Game on a Lattice 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 67
Stability and Index of the Meet Game on a Lattice 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 7
Stability and Index of the Meet Game on a Lattice 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 14
Stability and Index of the Meet Game on a Lattice 0 0 0 12 4 6 7 82
Stability and Index of the Meet Game on a Lattice 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 11
Stability and Index of the Meet Game on a Lattice 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 127
The Structure of Unstable Power Systems 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 16
The Structure of Unstable Power Systems 0 0 0 11 3 5 6 16
The Structure of Unstable Power Systems 0 0 0 18 2 2 3 113
The Structure of Unstable Power Systems 0 0 0 35 5 8 10 280
The Structure of Unstable Power Systems 0 0 0 16 1 2 5 85
The structure of unstable power mechanisms 0 0 0 0 2 6 8 14
The structure of unstable power mechanisms 0 0 0 0 3 6 6 11
The structure of unstable power mechanisms 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 13
Toward a category of the political Part I-Homónoia 0 1 1 1 1 4 5 5
Toward a category of the political Part I-Homónoia 0 0 2 2 1 1 8 8
Uniformity and games decomposition 0 0 0 11 2 7 7 22
Uniformity and games decomposition 0 0 0 4 3 9 11 32
Uniformity and games decomposition 0 0 0 50 2 6 10 193
Uniformity and games decomposition 0 0 0 9 4 4 4 34
Total Working Papers 0 1 5 498 122 227 311 3,018
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise 0 0 1 12 2 4 11 49
A stability index for local effectivity functions 0 0 0 7 1 4 6 75
Asymptotic Value in Frequency-Dependent Games with Separable Payoffs: A Differential Approach 0 0 0 1 3 4 4 15
Correlated effectivity functions 0 0 0 10 3 3 3 80
Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 5
Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability 0 0 0 7 4 6 7 73
Interaction sheaves on continuous domains 0 0 0 12 2 2 4 102
Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms 0 0 0 23 2 2 5 116
Nash and Strongly Consistent Two-Player Game Forms 0 0 0 0 2 7 10 175
Neutral Veto Correspondences with a Continuum of Alternatives 0 0 0 0 4 4 8 62
On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 113
Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice 0 0 0 4 4 6 9 51
Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 69
Strongly consistent two-player game forms 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 48
The structure of unstable power mechanisms 0 0 0 10 4 4 7 88
Tight and Effectively Rectangular Game Forms: A Nash Solvable Class 0 0 0 11 3 5 6 119
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 130 38 56 91 1,240

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12