Access Statistics for Iñaki Aguirre

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Rationale for the “Meeting Competition Defense” when Competitive Pressure Varies Across Markets 0 0 0 19 5 9 27 73
Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis 0 0 0 30 2 3 3 82
Cournot Oligopoly, Price Discrimination and Total Output 0 0 0 117 1 1 14 85
Joan Robinson Was Almost Right: Output under Third-Degree Price Discrimination 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 66
Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand 0 0 0 125 3 3 3 399
Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing Policy as an Entry Deterrence Device 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 1,666
Multimarket Competition and Welfare Effects of Price discrimination 0 0 0 19 2 2 2 109
Oligopoly price discrimination, competitive pressure and total output 0 1 1 40 2 3 8 123
On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act 0 0 0 34 2 3 3 105
On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules 0 0 0 6 4 4 4 60
Product Differentiation with Consumer Arbitrage 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 91
Product Differentiation with Consumer Arbitrage 0 0 0 3 4 4 4 28
Uniform Pricing: Good or Bad News About Market Profitability? 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 1,664
Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Ippolito Meets Schmalensee and Varian 0 0 0 10 3 3 3 64
Total Working Papers 0 1 1 428 33 41 84 4,615

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A rationale for the “meeting competition defense” under primary‐line injury 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 9
Information transmission and incentives not to price discriminate 0 0 0 32 2 5 13 395
Modelling countervailing incentives in adverse selection models: A synthesis 0 0 0 5 0 4 11 51
Monopolistic price discrimination and output effect under conditions of constant elasticity demand 0 0 0 65 0 2 9 462
Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature 0 0 2 154 4 11 39 675
Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand 0 0 2 18 1 3 12 68
Oligopoly price discrimination, competitive pressure and total output 0 0 3 12 5 6 22 83
On the Economics of the “Meeting Competition Defense” Under the Robinson–Patman Act 0 0 0 18 2 2 6 171
On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules 0 0 0 178 5 11 20 796
Output and misallocation effects in monopolistic third-degree price discrimination 0 0 0 101 2 5 17 395
Product differentiation with consumer arbitrage 0 0 0 26 3 5 9 197
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Costly Public Funds and the Value of Private Information 0 0 0 27 1 3 8 184
Regulating a Multiproduct Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Cross-Subsidization and Countervailing Incentives 0 0 0 21 1 2 5 169
Strategic entry deterrence through spatial price discrimination 0 0 1 58 3 3 16 297
The Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing Policy and Competitive Advantage 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 589
Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Apology not Necessary _ Comment 0 0 0 9 1 1 7 114
Total Journal Articles 0 0 8 724 31 64 207 4,655

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Ippolito Meets Schmalensee and Varian 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 45
Total Chapters 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 45

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06