| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Lego Approach to International Monetary Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| A Note on Official Support of the Forward Exchange Rate: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Auric Goldfinger, Henry Morgenthau, and Camp David: August 1971 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
| Capital Flows, Exchange Rates, and the New International Financial Architecture: Six Financial Crises in Search of a Generic Explanation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
| Comments on “The Internationalization of Capital” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Coordinating Free World Financial Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Counter-Speculation and the Forward Exchange Market: A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
| Devaluation Is the Answer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Equilibrium and disequilibrium in the international money market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
| Exchange Risk, Political Risk, and Investor Demand for External Currency Deposits |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
365 |
| Exchange Risk, Yield Curves, and the Pattern of Capital Flows |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
| External shocks and U.S. domestic financial stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
| Financial Crises and Bank Capital |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
45 |
| Gold, SDR's, and Central Bank Swaps |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
283 |
| Gold, SDRs, and central bank swaps: A reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
| Gresham's Law and the Demand for NRU's and SDR'S: A Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
| Gresham's Law, Asset Preferences, and the Demand for International Reserves |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
| International Banking: A Survey |
0 |
0 |
5 |
939 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
2,070 |
| International Monetary Instability All Over Again |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
31 |
| Management of the U.S. Dollar 1971–2022 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
23 |
| Monetary Independence under Floating Exchange Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
| More about Counter-Speculation in the Forward Exchange Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| NAFTA—Pro and Con |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| New Techniques for Assessing International Risk: Discussion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
| Perspectivas del Endeudamiento de los PMD |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
| Rules and Authorities in International Monetary Arrangements: The Role of the Central Bank |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
173 |
| SPECULATION IN THE FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE REVISITED* |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| SPECULATION IN THE FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RE‐REVISITED—REPLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Some Evidence that a Tobin Tax on Foreign Exchange Transactions May Increase Volatility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
288 |
| Some Evidence that a Tobin Tax on Foreign Exchange Transactions May Increase Volatility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
74 |
| Speculation and Price Stability Once Again |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
47 |
| Speculation and Price Stability: A Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| The 35 Most Tumultuous Years in Monetary History: Shocks, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Trauma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
| The Commission on Money and Credit: Ten Years Later |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
148 |
| The Costs and Benefits of the U.S. Role as a Reserve Currency Country |
0 |
1 |
6 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
115 |
| The Interest Rate Parity Theorem: A Reinterpretation |
0 |
1 |
7 |
921 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
2,927 |
| The failure of world monetary reform 1971-1974: John Williamson, (Thomas Nelson & Sons, Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex, 1977) pp. xiii + 221, [UK pound]3.25 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
118 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
315 |
| The integration of National financial markets: A review of theory and findings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
| The integration of the offshore and domestic banking system |
1 |
1 |
2 |
183 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
336 |
| Towards a theory of international banking |
0 |
1 |
5 |
693 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
1,974 |
| Why did the United States Evolve from the Largest International Creditor in 1980 to the Largest International Debtor in 1990? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
29 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
6 |
37 |
3,497 |
11 |
30 |
118 |
10,382 |
| Chapter |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New World Record — Four Financial Crises in 25 Years |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| A System Is How the Pieces Fit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| A System is How the Pieces Fit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Anatomy of a Typical Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Banking on the Wire |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Banking on the Wire |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Bernie Madoff: Frauds, Swindles, and the Credit Cycle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
| Bernie Madoff: Frauds, Swindles, and the Credit Cycle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Bitcoin: Worse Than a Ponzi |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
947 |
2,135 |
8,000 |
8,070 |
| Bubble Contagion: Mexico City to Tokyo to Bangkok to New York, London, and Reykjavik |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| Bubble Contagion: Mexico City to Tokyo to Bangkok to New York, London, and Reykjavik |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| Bubble Contagion: Tokyo to Bangkok to New York |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| Central Bank of Iceland Financial Stability Reports 2006–8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Central Bankers Read Election Returns, Not Balance Sheets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Central Bankers Read Election Returns, not Balance Sheets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Changes in Exchange Rates and National Commodity Price Levels |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Changes in Exchange Rates and Yield Differentials |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Changes in Exchange Rates as Economic Disturbances |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| China — The 800-Pound Gorilla |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| China — The 800lb Gorilla |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Domestic Contagion: Twin Peaks? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Epilogue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Euphoria and Economic Booms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
| Euphoria and Paper Wealth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Eurodollars: an Economic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Euromania and Eurocrash |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
| Exchange Exposure in a Multiple Currency World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Exchange Risk and Yield Differentials |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| External Financing and the Level of Development: A Conceptual Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Financial Crises: A Hardy Perennial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| Financial Crises: A Hardy Perennial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
| Financial Crisis: a Hardy Perennial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
| Financial turbulence and international investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
37 |
| Fitting the Pieces Once Again |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Fitting the Pieces Together Once Again |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Five Asset Price Bubbles in 30 Years — A New World Record |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Frauds, Swindles, and the Credit Cycle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| From Marxist Command Economies to Market Capitalism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Fueling the Flames: The Expansion of Credit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Fueling the Flames: The Expansion of Credit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Fueling the Flames: the Expansion of Credit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Global Imbalances and the Persistent US Trade Deficit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Globalization 1.0 — The Silk Road to Asia and the Salt Caravans across the Sahara |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Gold in the International Monetary System: A Catalog of the Options |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Gold — How Much Is a ‘Barbarous Relic’ Worth? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Gold — How Much is a ‘Barbarous Relic’ Worth? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Interest Rate Differentials and Political Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| International Contagion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
| International Contagion 1618–1930 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| International Contagion 1618–1933 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| International Monetary Fund, Article IV Consultations 2006 and 2008 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Introduction to the Seventh Edition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Introduction: The Reconstruction of International Monetary Arrangements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Japan — The First Superstate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Japan — The First Superstate? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| MBSs, ABSs, CMOs, CDOs, Zeros, Swaps, Options, and Credit Default Swaps — The Revolution in Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Monetary Reform — Where Do The Problems Go When They’re Assumed Away? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Monetary Reform — Where Do the Problems Go When Assumed To Have Been Solved? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Monetary Turbulence and the Icelandic Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
| OECD Economic Survey of Iceland, 2006 and 2008 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Oil and the OPEC Roller Coaster |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Optimal Bankrupts — Deadbeats on an International Treadmill |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Policy Responses: Benign Neglect, Exhortation, and Bank Holidays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| Policy Responses: Benign Neglect, Exhortation, and Bank Holidays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
| Policy Responses: Letting it Burn Out, and Other Devices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Political Risk and International Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| President Xi’s Perfect Storm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Radio Luxembourg and the Eurodollar Market Are Both Offshore Stations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Radio Luxembourg and the Eurodollar Market are both Offshore Stations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Speculative Manias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Speculative Manias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Speculative Manias |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Strategies Towards Exchange Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Structural Change, Monetary Policy and the Foreign Exchange Value of Sterling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Tax Avoidance — A Game for the Rich |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Tax Implications of Exchange Losses and Gains |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
| Taxation, Regulation, and the Level Playing Field |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| The Anatomy of a Typical Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
| The Anatomy of a Typical Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
| The Costs of Altering Exposure to Exchange Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| The Critical Stage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| The Critical Stage — When the Bubble is About to Pop |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| The Critical Stage: When the Bubble Is About to Pop |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| The Dollar and Coca-Cola Are Both Brand Names |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Dollar and Coca-Cola are Both Brand Names |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| The Domestic Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| The Domestic Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
| The Domestic Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
| The Firm Under Pegged and Floating Exchange Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
| The Firm, Exchange Risk and Political Risk: A General Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| The Future of International Commercial Banking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| The Gnomes of Zurich Play in the Largest Market in the World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| The Gnomes of Zurich Play in the Largest Market in the World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Greatest Monetary Agreement in History |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| The Greatest Monetary Agreement in History |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| The International Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| The International Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| The International Lender of Last Resort Before 2000 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| The Lehman Panic — An Avoidable Crash |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
| The Lessons of History |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| The Lessons of History |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| The Lessons of History and the Most Tumultuous Decades Ever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| The Lessons of History and the Most Tumultuous Decades Ever |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| The Management of the External Debt Burden |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| The Money Game and the Level Playing Field |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
| The Name of the Game Is Money — But the Disputes Are about Where the Jobs Are |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| The Name of the Game is Money |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| The Reverend Thomas Malthus, the OPEC Cartel, and the Price of Energy from 1800 to 2100 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| The Three Ds — Disinflation, Deflation, and Depression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Twenty-First Century International Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
| The Underground Economies and the Cost of Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| The World Market for Bonds and Stocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| The World Markets for Stocks and Bonds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| They Invented Money So They Could Have Inflation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| They Invented Money so They Could Have Inflation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Transition Economies: Who Lost Russia? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Why Are Multinational Firms Mostly American? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Why are Multinational Firms Mostly American? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Zeros, Swaps, and Options — The Revolution in Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Zlotys, Rubles, and Leks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Total Chapters |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
963 |
2,166 |
8,096 |
8,503 |
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