Access Statistics for Pablo Amoros

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
- IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIMAL CONTRACTS UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION 0 0 0 28 0 1 8 106
- SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES WITH SEVERAL COMMODITIES 0 0 0 22 0 0 13 178
A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation 0 0 0 296 0 0 7 1,230
A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants 0 0 0 30 0 0 11 130
Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition 0 0 0 46 0 0 10 79
Conditions on the jury for the natural implementation of the deserving winner of a contest 0 0 0 32 0 0 8 78
Deciding Whether a Law is Constitutional, Interpretable, or Unconstitutional 0 0 0 16 0 0 9 126
Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign? 0 1 1 32 1 2 11 174
Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors 0 0 0 32 0 2 14 214
Evaluation and strategic manipulation 0 0 1 30 1 1 13 57
Indicators of Electoral Victory 0 0 0 39 1 2 12 140
Majoritarian aggregation and Nash implementation of experts' opinions 0 0 0 28 0 0 18 58
Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation 0 0 0 74 0 0 5 357
Picking the Winners 0 0 0 37 1 1 16 107
Picking the Winners 0 0 0 31 0 0 13 100
Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms 0 0 0 23 1 1 12 71
The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary 0 0 1 35 5 5 40 128
The closed primaries versus the top-two primary 0 0 0 55 3 3 16 115
The problem of aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition 0 0 0 22 0 1 15 57
Unequivocal Majority and Maskin-Monotonicity 0 0 0 30 0 1 9 222
Total Working Papers 0 1 3 938 13 20 260 3,727

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants 0 0 0 9 1 1 6 81
Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition 0 0 0 4 0 1 11 29
Bargaining and waning commitments 0 0 0 12 0 1 9 72
Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 60
Closed primaries versus top-two primaries 0 0 1 6 1 3 15 58
Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional 0 0 0 3 0 1 6 100
Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities 0 0 0 16 0 1 6 106
Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors 0 0 0 33 1 2 12 159
Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies 0 0 1 1 1 2 14 14
Evaluation and strategic manipulation 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 22
Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 12
Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9
Indicators of electoral victory 0 0 0 14 0 0 9 92
Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign? 0 0 0 14 0 0 22 116
Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation 0 0 0 17 0 0 12 186
Nash implementation of supermajority rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 16
Picking the winners 0 0 0 14 0 0 7 70
Single-peaked preferences with several commodities 0 0 0 71 0 1 8 360
Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms 0 0 0 2 0 0 11 42
The Scholarship Assignment Problem 0 0 0 53 0 3 15 245
Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity 0 0 1 9 0 0 8 79
Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition 0 0 0 3 0 2 10 40
Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts 0 0 0 2 0 1 17 31
original papers: Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection 0 0 0 68 0 0 7 442
Total Journal Articles 0 0 3 356 4 21 248 2,441

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10