Access Statistics for Pablo Amoros

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
- IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIMAL CONTRACTS UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 96
- SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES WITH SEVERAL COMMODITIES 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 164
A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation 0 0 0 296 1 2 3 1,223
A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants 0 1 1 30 1 2 2 119
Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition 0 1 1 46 0 1 2 69
Conditions on the jury for the natural implementation of the deserving winner of a contest 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 70
Deciding Whether a Law is Constitutional, Interpretable, or Unconstitutional 0 1 1 16 0 1 2 117
Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign? 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 159
Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors 0 0 0 32 0 1 1 200
Evaluation and strategic manipulation 0 1 2 29 0 1 4 44
Indicators of Electoral Victory 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 128
Majoritarian aggregation and Nash implementation of experts' opinions 0 1 1 28 0 1 2 40
Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 351
Picking the Winners 0 0 0 37 1 1 1 90
Picking the Winners 0 1 1 31 0 1 1 87
Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms 0 1 1 23 0 2 2 59
The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary 0 1 1 33 0 2 4 82
The closed primaries versus the top-two primary 0 0 0 55 1 1 1 98
The problem of aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition 0 1 1 22 0 1 1 42
Unequivocal Majority and Maskin-Monotonicity 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 211
Total Working Papers 0 9 10 933 4 17 31 3,449

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 73
Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition 0 0 1 4 0 1 2 18
Bargaining and waning commitments 0 0 0 12 2 2 3 62
Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: Conditions based on the jury 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 52
Closed primaries versus top-two primaries 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 42
Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 94
Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities 0 0 0 16 0 2 3 98
Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors 0 0 1 33 0 0 1 146
Evaluation and strategic manipulation 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 11
Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4
Indicators of electoral victory 0 0 0 14 0 1 10 81
Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign? 0 0 1 13 0 0 3 92
Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 173
Nash implementation of supermajority rules 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
Picking the winners 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 62
Single-peaked preferences with several commodities 0 0 0 70 1 1 1 351
Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 30
The Scholarship Assignment Problem 0 0 1 53 0 0 4 230
Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 70
Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 29
Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 14
original papers: Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection 0 0 0 68 0 0 3 435
Total Journal Articles 0 0 5 350 6 13 46 2,172

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03