Access Statistics for Tommy Andersson

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 2 25 0 0 4 87
(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 16 0 1 4 74
A Competitive Partnership Formation Process 0 0 0 20 0 0 2 60
A Competitive Partnership Formation Process 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 121
A Competitive Partnership Formation Process 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
A Competitive Partnership Formation Process 0 0 0 55 0 0 2 168
A Method for Finding the Maximal Set in Excess Demand 0 0 1 23 0 0 3 112
An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 70
An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 80
An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 25 0 0 3 37
An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 126
An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities 0 0 0 35 0 0 3 38
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings 0 0 2 259 0 0 8 450
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 39
Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden: stable maximum matchings 0 0 0 23 0 0 4 34
Beyond Truth-telling: A Replication Study on School Choice 0 0 3 15 0 1 9 28
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 46
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 142
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability 0 0 0 41 0 0 1 146
Decomposing the Afternoon Effect: An Empirical Investigation of Sequential Train Ticket Auctions 0 0 2 50 1 1 6 131
Decomposing the Afternoon Effect: An Empirical Investigation of Sequential Train Ticket Auctions 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 52
Dynamic Refugee Matching 0 0 1 11 0 0 5 42
Dynamic Refugee Matching 1 1 8 267 1 1 20 592
Dynamic refugee matching 0 0 1 6 0 0 2 34
Essays on Nonlinear Pricing and Welfare 0 0 0 18 0 0 2 133
Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses 0 0 0 24 1 1 2 50
Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses 0 0 0 11 0 1 3 21
Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 15
How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls? 0 0 0 71 0 0 2 106
How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls? 0 0 1 55 0 0 2 91
Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier 0 0 0 131 0 0 4 308
Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 81 0 0 2 206
Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auctions 0 0 1 68 0 0 3 270
Multiple Pricing for Personal Assistance Services 0 0 0 27 0 0 4 45
Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control 0 0 0 155 0 0 5 387
Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices 1 1 1 13 1 1 2 27
Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 153
Nonlinear Income Taxes and the Utility Possibility Set 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 197
Nonlinear Pricing and the Utility Possibility Set 0 1 1 64 0 1 2 229
Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game 0 0 0 34 0 0 1 260
Nonlinear Pricing under a Balanced-Budget Requirement: The Two-Type Case 0 0 0 32 0 0 2 201
Nonlinear Pricing under a Balanced-Budget Requirement: The n-Type Case 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 128
Nonlinear Taxation and Punishment 0 0 0 18 0 0 2 149
Optimal Trade-Off Between Economic Activity and Health During an Epidemic 0 0 0 31 0 0 2 28
Optimal Trade-Off between Economic Activity and Health during an Epidemic 0 0 0 37 0 0 3 79
Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 21
Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 1 2 107 1 2 6 320
Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 0 0 25 0 0 4 58
Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets 0 0 0 20 1 1 3 30
Pairwise Kidney Exchange with Blood-Group Incompatibility 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 97
Placement Optimization in Refugee Resettlement 0 0 5 311 5 5 20 858
Profit Maximizing Nonlinear Pricing Revisited 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 421
Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application 0 0 1 80 0 0 2 187
School Choice 0 0 0 31 0 0 12 58
School Choice 0 0 0 15 0 1 7 29
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 77
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 121
Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier 0 0 1 56 0 0 3 580
Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions 0 0 0 92 0 0 1 148
Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools 0 1 4 56 0 1 14 221
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 36
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders 0 0 0 26 0 1 3 112
Status Quo Bias and Hidden Condorcet Cycles in Binary Referendums 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 13
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects: A Characterization Result 0 0 0 28 0 0 3 52
Strategy-Proof House Allocation with Price Restrictions 0 0 0 62 0 0 1 98
The Curse of Bad Geography: Stagnant Water, Diseases, and Children’s Human Capital 0 0 3 21 0 2 10 46
Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 114
Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 101
Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 48 0 0 1 86
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach 0 0 0 19 0 0 3 47
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design 0 0 0 31 0 0 3 56
Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness 0 0 0 45 0 0 2 258
Total Working Papers 2 5 40 3,239 11 22 249 10,050
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Nonlinear Income Taxes and the Utility Possibility Set 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 50
A Simple Model of the Production-health Trade-off During an Epidemic 0 0 0 39 0 1 5 59
A competitive partnership formation process 0 0 0 29 0 0 2 92
A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited 0 0 2 54 0 1 5 153
A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand 0 0 1 27 0 0 4 108
An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations 0 0 1 35 0 1 4 102
An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities 0 0 1 3 0 0 3 6
An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 82
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings 0 1 3 19 0 1 7 42
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability 0 0 2 70 1 2 10 225
Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach 1 1 2 10 1 1 4 49
Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages 0 0 0 59 0 0 2 243
Efficiency properties of non-linear pricing schedules without the single-crossing condition 0 0 0 20 0 0 2 101
Efficient but getting wet feet: A not-entirely-frivolous note on the side-effects of growth-promoting institutions 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 84
Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls? 0 0 2 30 0 0 4 87
Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 64
Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange Programmes 1 1 1 6 1 1 3 19
Multi-item Vickrey–English–Dutch auctions 0 0 2 30 1 1 5 153
Multiple pricing for personal assistance services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NON‐LINEAR PRICING AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 52
NON‐LINEAR PRICING AS A COOPERATIVE GAME 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 71
Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited 0 0 0 48 0 0 3 126
Nonlinear taxation and punishment 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 69
Non‐Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control 0 1 4 20 0 2 7 115
On status quo bias and the existence of Condorcet cycles in binary voting situations 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 0 2 5 0 0 4 29
Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier 1 2 2 16 1 3 6 112
Placement Optimization in Refugee Resettlement 1 1 4 7 1 1 9 19
Profit maximizing nonlinear pricing 0 0 2 52 0 0 6 176
Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 116
Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study 0 0 0 16 0 1 3 100
Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 22
Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 36
Sequential school choice with public and private schools 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 9
Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders 0 1 2 16 0 2 8 51
Solving House Allocation Problems with Risk-Averse Agents 0 0 0 30 0 1 3 121
Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 5
Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions 0 0 4 54 1 2 14 132
Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach 0 0 2 45 0 1 7 119
Wastefulness in sequential school choice with public and private schools 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 142
Total Journal Articles 4 9 40 880 11 32 170 3,349

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Statistics updated 2025-06-06