Access Statistics for Vera Angelova

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services 0 0 0 25 1 5 10 82
Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? Experimental Evidence from Markets for Expert Services 0 0 0 52 1 4 8 96
Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services 0 0 0 26 4 10 12 78
Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents 0 0 0 36 0 11 14 395
Competition and Fatigue At Work 0 0 0 30 4 7 8 69
Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game 0 0 0 25 0 1 6 49
Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game 0 0 0 39 0 7 13 108
Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance? 0 0 0 54 0 1 3 64
Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members 0 0 0 28 1 9 13 33
Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members 0 0 0 45 0 3 8 47
Lying to Individuals versus Lying to Groups 0 0 0 57 3 8 12 24
Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 46 1 6 8 130
Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 66 1 10 13 100
Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 34 1 5 7 142
Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 39 1 5 7 134
Relative performance of liability rules: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 25 2 19 22 63
Voluntary Cooperation Based on Equilibrium Retribution - An Experiment Testing Finite-Horizon Folk Theorems 0 0 0 26 0 4 14 129
What renders financial advisors less treacherous? - On commissions and reciprocity - 0 0 0 53 3 9 12 168
What renders financial advisors less treacherous? On commissions and reciprocity 0 0 0 18 0 2 8 53
Total Working Papers 0 0 0 724 23 126 198 1,964

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
CAN SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM THREATS FOSTER COOPERATION? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF FINITE-HORIZON FOLK THEOREMS 0 2 2 13 3 11 13 70
Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services 0 0 0 11 1 4 8 52
Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents 0 0 0 12 7 24 27 146
Competition and fatigue 1 1 1 4 2 7 13 29
Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game 0 0 0 30 1 3 10 196
Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance? 0 0 0 2 5 15 18 61
On the evolution of professional consulting 0 1 6 231 1 15 22 392
Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence 0 0 1 9 1 8 15 70
Total Journal Articles 1 4 10 312 21 87 126 1,016

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04