Access Statistics for Masaki Aoyagi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Beliefs in Repeated Games 0 1 1 20 0 3 6 24
Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities 0 0 0 70 1 1 7 98
Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities 0 0 0 54 0 1 2 102
Career Concerns and Incentive Compatible Task Design 3 4 13 14 4 6 16 17
Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 1 240 1 1 3 552
Connecting Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 27
Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality 0 0 0 21 2 2 2 52
Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication 0 0 1 25 0 0 1 108
Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of a Normal Form Game 0 0 0 17 1 2 2 51
Incentive Compatible Information Disclosure 1 2 6 6 3 8 18 18
Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament 0 0 0 41 1 1 1 143
Many-to-Many Matching on a Skill-Sharing Platform 0 0 0 9 0 1 7 20
Matching Platforms 0 0 1 28 1 3 36 110
Matching Platforms 0 1 1 112 1 10 38 917
Monopoly Sale of a Network Good 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 112
Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 206
Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition 0 0 0 28 2 2 4 68
Strategic Obscurity in the Forecasting of Disasters 0 0 0 41 1 1 2 47
Strategic Uncertainty and Probabilistic Sophistication 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 40
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private 0 0 2 67 0 0 2 107
Total Working Papers 4 8 26 872 18 42 149 2,819

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Beliefs in Repeated Games: An Experiment 1 1 1 1 7 12 13 13
Bertrand competition under network externalities 0 1 3 22 1 2 10 87
Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions 0 0 1 211 0 0 7 582
Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence 1 1 6 59 1 2 15 220
Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication 0 0 0 140 1 1 3 404
Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring 0 0 0 29 1 1 1 110
Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information 0 0 0 20 2 2 3 127
Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance 0 0 0 57 0 1 1 183
Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication 0 0 0 47 1 1 1 136
Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games 0 0 0 32 1 1 1 107
Existence of equilibrium configurations of competitive firms on an infinite two-dimensional space 0 0 0 6 2 2 2 25
Information feedback in a dynamic tournament 0 0 2 59 2 2 6 240
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 14
Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model 0 0 1 48 1 1 3 119
Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 97
Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games 0 0 0 114 1 1 2 251
Reputation and Entry Deterrence under Short-Run Ownership of a Firm 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 83
Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition 0 0 1 24 2 3 5 76
Spatial competition of firms in a two-dimensional bounded market 1 1 1 49 1 1 2 152
Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 60
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private 0 0 0 13 2 2 2 61
Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 13
Total Journal Articles 3 4 17 967 31 42 92 3,160

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03