Access Statistics for Masaki Aoyagi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Assigning a Treatment under Hidden Spillovers 0 0 1 1 2 3 13 13
Beliefs in Repeated Games 0 0 1 30 0 1 18 45
Beliefs in Repeated Games 0 0 0 20 0 2 16 43
Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities 0 0 0 78 0 1 14 50
Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities 0 0 0 54 0 0 13 116
Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities 0 0 0 70 2 2 16 117
Career Concerns and Incentive Compatible Task Design 0 0 0 16 0 3 15 36
Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 241 0 0 8 562
Connecting Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information 0 0 0 14 0 0 17 46
Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality 0 0 0 21 0 1 7 61
Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication 0 0 0 25 0 0 11 119
Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of a Normal Form Game 0 0 0 17 1 1 8 60
Incentive Compatible Information Disclosure 0 1 4 20 1 4 40 78
Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament 0 0 0 41 0 0 9 156
Many-to-Many Matching on a Skill-Sharing Platform 0 0 1 10 0 2 26 55
Matching Platforms 0 0 1 114 1 3 18 937
Matching Platforms 0 0 2 31 2 9 36 154
Monopoly Sale of a Network Good 0 0 0 32 0 2 20 132
Optimal Obscurity in the Acquisition and Disclosure of Information about a Shock 0 0 0 11 0 0 10 48
Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers 0 0 0 18 0 0 9 216
Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition 0 0 0 28 0 0 14 82
Strategic Obscurity in the Forecasting of Disasters 0 0 0 41 0 0 12 59
Strategic Uncertainty and Probabilistic Sophistication 0 0 0 2 0 0 11 13
Strategic Uncertainty and Probabilistic Sophistication 0 0 0 16 0 0 18 62
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private 0 0 0 68 1 2 23 131
Total Working Papers 0 1 10 1,019 10 36 402 3,391

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Beliefs in Repeated Games: An Experiment 0 2 5 10 0 6 72 109
Bertrand competition under network externalities 0 0 0 25 1 2 14 108
Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions 0 0 0 211 0 1 28 612
Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence 0 0 1 60 0 0 13 235
Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication 0 0 0 140 1 2 14 419
Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring 0 0 0 29 0 0 5 116
Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information 0 0 0 20 0 0 3 132
Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance 0 0 0 57 1 1 12 196
Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication 0 0 0 47 0 1 16 157
Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games 0 0 0 32 0 1 10 118
Existence of equilibrium configurations of competitive firms on an infinite two-dimensional space 0 0 0 6 2 2 8 33
Information feedback in a dynamic tournament 0 0 0 61 1 4 28 273
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform 0 1 1 3 0 2 11 26
Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model 0 0 0 48 0 1 15 136
Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers 0 0 1 23 0 0 14 113
Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games 0 0 0 114 0 1 10 261
Reputation and Entry Deterrence under Short-Run Ownership of a Firm 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 85
Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition 0 0 0 25 0 1 6 86
Spatial competition of firms in a two-dimensional bounded market 0 0 0 50 0 1 3 157
Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 72
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private 0 1 1 15 1 4 18 83
Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 28
Total Journal Articles 0 4 9 989 7 30 328 3,555

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11