Access Statistics for Enriqueta Aragones

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Model of Multiparty Competition 0 0 1 32 0 2 10 176
A Model of Participatory Democracy: Understanding the Case of Porto Alegre 0 0 2 383 3 10 21 1,691
A Model of Participatory Democracy: Undestanding the Case of Porto Alegre 0 0 1 17 1 4 13 109
A Solution to the Envy-Free Selection Problem in Economies with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 35 0 5 9 392
Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off 0 0 0 446 1 9 23 4,410
Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off 0 0 0 18 1 6 16 210
Ambiguity in election games 0 0 1 165 0 2 6 1,127
Approval Voting 0 0 1 2 0 6 11 47
Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation 0 1 2 93 1 5 16 360
Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space 0 1 1 51 0 7 20 210
Electoral Competition through Issue Selection 0 0 0 38 0 1 11 143
Electoral Competition through Issue Selection 0 0 0 19 0 1 13 86
Electoral Competition through Issue Selection 0 0 0 36 0 2 12 99
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 200 3 3 14 632
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 77 0 0 8 470
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 21 0 5 12 218
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 57
Imperfectly Informed Voters and Strategic Extremism 0 0 0 28 0 5 16 93
Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism 0 1 1 40 1 5 17 81
Incumbency (dis)advantage when citizens can propose Abstract:This paper analyses the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to citizen proposals such as the outcome of referenda or popular initiatives. We argue that these proposals constitute a potential source of electoral disadvantage when citizens factor in their evaluation of the incumbent his reaction to these proposals. This is because an incumbent politician may jeopardize his re-election by implementing policies close to his preferred ones but unpopular among the electorate. We characterize conditions under which this potential disadvantage becomes in fact an electoral advantage for the incumbent. We fi nd that the choices of the incumbent during the legislature will be closest to citizens policy proposals when the intensity of electoral competition is neither too soft nor too tough. Finally, we use our results to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms such as referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition and on the incumbency advantage phenomenon 0 0 0 8 1 4 10 113
Making Statements and Approval Voting 0 0 0 66 0 1 4 402
Making statements and approval voting 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 40
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate 1 1 2 122 3 8 18 721
Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate 0 1 1 92 2 5 16 429
Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies 0 0 0 20 1 2 11 320
Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies 0 0 0 330 0 6 12 5,677
Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition 0 0 0 79 0 1 4 562
Political reputations and campaign promises 0 0 1 106 3 5 12 252
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections 0 0 0 81 0 2 10 192
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections 0 0 0 45 0 3 12 201
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 68 0 2 5 95
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 0 0 3 13 695
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 35 0 1 7 86
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 12 1 3 9 123
Rhetoric and analogies 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 53
Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information 0 0 1 167 0 7 16 737
Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information 0 0 0 79 0 1 12 297
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition 0 0 2 65 1 8 21 405
Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition 0 0 0 226 1 5 12 1,189
The Disadvantage of Winning an Election 0 0 0 5 2 6 15 133
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 35 0 0 5 145
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study 0 1 2 90 0 5 12 271
The Key Party in the Catalan Government 0 0 0 49 2 6 15 284
The disadvantage of winning an election 0 0 0 24 1 4 16 558
The disadvantage of winning an election 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 78
The disadvantage of winning an election 0 0 0 59 0 4 27 341
Total Working Papers 1 6 19 3,567 29 176 575 25,010
7 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre 0 0 5 206 0 8 32 1,127
Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space 0 0 1 43 0 4 19 175
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 197 2 5 21 857
Government formation in a two dimensional policy space 0 0 0 31 0 2 6 128
Making statements and approval voting 0 0 0 8 0 1 13 101
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate 0 0 1 147 0 7 41 518
Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies 0 1 3 14 0 1 13 62
Political Reputations and Campaign Promises 0 0 3 69 2 6 14 290
Rhetoric and analogies 0 0 0 14 2 7 15 108
The key party in the Catalan government 0 0 0 9 1 5 9 74
Total Journal Articles 0 1 13 738 7 46 183 3,440

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
approval voting 0 0 0 13 0 1 7 108
Total Chapters 0 0 0 13 0 1 7 108

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04