Access Statistics for Enriqueta Aragones

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Model of Multiparty Competition 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 166
A Model of Government Formation with a Two Dimensional Policy Space 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 80
A Model of Participatory Democracy: Understanding the Case of Porto Alegre 0 0 0 381 1 1 5 1,670
A Model of Participatory Democracy: Undestanding the Case of Porto Alegre 0 0 1 16 0 0 3 96
A Solution to the Envy-Free Selection Problem in Economies with Indivisible Goods 0 0 1 35 1 2 5 383
Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off 0 0 0 18 0 1 6 194
Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off 0 0 1 446 0 0 7 4,387
Ambiguity in election games 0 0 0 164 0 1 1 1,121
Approval Voting 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 36
Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 342
Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space 0 0 0 50 0 0 7 190
Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 73
Electoral Competition Between Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information 0 0 1 22 0 0 2 79
Electoral Competition through Issue Selection 0 0 0 38 0 2 5 132
Electoral Competition through Issue Selection 0 0 0 19 1 1 2 73
Electoral Competition through Issue Selection 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 87
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 47
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 21 1 1 3 206
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 200 1 1 2 618
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 77 1 1 1 461
Imperfectly Informed Voters and Strategic Extremism 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 75
Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism 0 0 0 39 1 1 4 64
Incumbency (dis)advantage when citizens can propose Abstract:This paper analyses the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to citizen proposals such as the outcome of referenda or popular initiatives. We argue that these proposals constitute a potential source of electoral disadvantage when citizens factor in their evaluation of the incumbent his reaction to these proposals. This is because an incumbent politician may jeopardize his re-election by implementing policies close to his preferred ones but unpopular among the electorate. We characterize conditions under which this potential disadvantage becomes in fact an electoral advantage for the incumbent. We fi nd that the choices of the incumbent during the legislature will be closest to citizens policy proposals when the intensity of electoral competition is neither too soft nor too tough. Finally, we use our results to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms such as referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition and on the incumbency advantage phenomenon 0 0 0 8 1 1 2 102
Making Statements and Approval Voting 0 0 0 66 0 0 1 397
Making Statements and Approval Voting 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 46
Making statements and approval voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate 0 0 0 120 0 0 0 703
Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate 0 0 0 91 0 0 3 412
Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 307
Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies 0 0 0 330 0 0 5 5,664
Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 558
Political reputations and campaign promises 0 0 0 105 0 0 0 240
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections 0 0 0 45 0 0 1 189
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections 0 0 0 81 1 1 1 182
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections 0 0 0 4 2 2 2 39
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 68 0 1 1 90
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 35 1 1 3 79
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 12 1 1 2 111
Rhetoric and Analogies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 682
Rhetoric and analogies 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 43
Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information 0 0 0 79 0 0 1 284
Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information 0 0 1 166 0 0 2 721
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition 0 0 1 63 0 0 4 384
Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition 0 0 2 226 1 1 4 1,176
The Disadvantage of Winning an Election 0 0 1 5 0 3 10 118
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 26
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 35 0 0 3 140
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 88 0 0 3 259
The Key Party in the Catalan Government 0 0 0 49 0 1 1 269
The Key Party in the Catalan Government 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 63
The disadvantage of winning an election 0 0 0 24 0 0 4 542
The disadvantage of winning an election 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 73
The disadvantage of winning an election 0 0 0 59 0 2 5 312
Total Working Papers 0 0 9 3,592 21 33 123 24,823

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre 0 1 1 200 0 4 11 1,094
Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space 0 0 0 42 0 0 2 156
Fact-Free Learning 0 0 0 197 2 2 6 835
Government formation in a two dimensional policy space 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 122
Making statements and approval voting 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 88
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate 0 0 2 146 3 5 32 476
Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies 0 0 1 11 0 0 2 49
Political Reputations and Campaign Promises 0 0 1 66 0 0 2 275
Rhetoric and analogies 0 0 1 14 1 1 2 92
The key party in the Catalan government 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 65
Total Journal Articles 0 1 7 724 6 13 60 3,252

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
approval voting 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 97
Total Chapters 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 97

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03