| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
152 |
| Benefits of a slanted view: a discussion of 'disclosure bias' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
147 |
| Depreciation in a model of probabilistic investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
156 |
| Enhancing Vertical Efficiency Through Horizontal Licensing |
0 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
151 |
| Hierarchical reporting, aggregation, and information cascades |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
182 |
| Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
224 |
| Implementing Coordinated Team Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
161 |
| Intertemporal aggregation and incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
203 |
| Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
256 |
| Mechanism Design under Alternative Information Structures and Constrained Capacity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
79 |
| Offering stock options to gauge managerial talent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
474 |
| On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
269 |
| Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition |
0 |
1 |
1 |
295 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
807 |
| Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
96 |
| Pricing Internal Trade to Get a Leg up on External Rivals |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
167 |
| Purchasing sleeping patents to curtail budget padding |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
208 |
| Taxes and the Efficiency‐Rent Extraction Trade‐off |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
118 |
| Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives |
0 |
0 |
2 |
105 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
350 |
| The Use of Debt to Prevent Short-Term Managerial Exploitation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
120 |
| The interaction among disclosure, competition between firms, and analyst following |
0 |
1 |
2 |
128 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
358 |
| Unintended consequences of regulating disclosures: The case of Regulation Fair Disclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
203 |
| Using Job Rotation to Extract Employee Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
534 |
| Using Optional Job Rotation Programs to Gauge On-the-Job Learning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
214 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
695 |
| Using Return Polices to Elicit Retailer Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
263 |
| Using disclosure to influence herd behavior and alter competition |
1 |
1 |
1 |
136 |
2 |
2 |
17 |
306 |
| Virtual Implementation in Separable Bayesian Environments Using Simple Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
59 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
4 |
12 |
1,683 |
9 |
34 |
301 |
6,738 |
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