Access Statistics for R. Pablo Arribillaga

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof 0 0 0 18 2 2 14 76
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof 0 0 0 28 0 0 6 78
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof 0 0 0 3 1 1 11 24
Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability 0 0 0 25 0 1 21 61
Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability 0 0 0 44 0 0 12 70
Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem 0 0 0 26 0 0 14 53
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules 0 0 0 5 1 1 8 15
Obvious Manipulations in Matching without and with Contracts 0 0 0 1 1 1 8 12
Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules 0 0 0 12 0 0 8 20
Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition 0 0 0 1 1 1 9 12
Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition 0 0 0 7 0 1 6 13
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules 0 0 0 14 2 2 5 10
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule 0 0 0 5 1 2 8 9
On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness 0 0 0 6 1 1 7 37
On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness 0 0 0 31 0 0 8 57
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game 0 0 0 6 0 0 14 65
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game 0 0 0 29 0 0 5 64
Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules 0 0 0 10 8 9 25 47
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules 0 0 0 8 1 1 9 19
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules 0 0 2 8 1 1 13 19
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms 1 1 1 9 1 1 15 20
Unimprovable Students and Inequality in School Choice 0 0 0 6 0 2 17 24
Total Working Papers 1 1 3 302 21 27 243 805

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 15
Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability 0 0 0 5 1 1 10 49
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability 0 0 0 4 0 0 12 46
Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 31
Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem 0 0 0 2 1 1 14 27
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules 0 0 1 1 1 1 9 17
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness 0 0 0 7 0 0 6 34
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game 0 0 0 0 3 3 10 20
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 10
Total Journal Articles 0 0 1 20 7 8 90 249

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10