Access Statistics for Andrea Attar

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard 0 0 0 42 1 2 6 165
Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences 0 0 0 22 0 5 11 125
Common agency games with separable preferences 0 0 1 14 1 1 7 86
Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness 0 0 0 47 0 3 15 136
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples 0 0 0 35 1 3 18 69
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples 0 0 0 12 1 4 8 28
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples 0 0 0 6 4 4 12 33
Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle 0 0 0 42 3 5 16 152
Competing Mechanisms: Communication under Exclusivity Clauses 0 0 0 18 3 5 14 32
Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection 0 0 1 34 4 10 22 54
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 11
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus 0 0 0 0 1 6 12 36
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus 0 0 0 31 4 7 17 62
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume 0 0 0 3 3 6 12 44
Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection 0 0 0 46 3 4 22 147
Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection 0 0 0 0 3 3 10 29
Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection 0 0 0 5 2 3 15 24
Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals 0 0 1 16 2 3 9 16
Financial contracting along the business cycle 0 0 0 43 1 4 10 163
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 46 4 5 16 159
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 2 2 3 30 6 7 17 51
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 16
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 2 21 3 4 12 32
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms 0 0 0 6 0 1 11 30
Mediated Renegotiation 0 1 19 34 1 5 52 76
Moral Hazard: Messages, Delegation and Efficiency 0 0 0 79 2 6 14 298
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 0 0 0 19 0 10 24 101
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 0 0 0 28 1 6 13 62
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 0 0 0 33 4 7 17 91
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants 0 0 0 37 0 4 10 94
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants 0 0 0 76 0 3 9 192
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 36
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 76 3 3 7 302
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 32 4 7 10 194
Multiple lenders, strategic default and debt covenants 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 10
Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market 0 0 0 10 2 4 8 88
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 174 4 4 18 552
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 63 3 5 18 232
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 44 6 8 17 234
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 36 3 6 7 153
Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection 0 0 0 87 0 2 8 145
Nonexclusive competition and adverse selection 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 33
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 0 42 2 4 15 63
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 0 59 1 6 15 73
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 0 39 5 11 19 80
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 53 1 3 11 92
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 18 3 6 18 53
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 31 3 7 14 69
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 20 2 9 15 47
On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 4 5 7 16 37
On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 33 1 5 9 71
On a Class of Smooth Preferences 0 0 0 25 1 2 7 44
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 34
On competitive nonlinear pricing 0 0 0 8 3 5 13 41
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 0 1 0 3 6 20
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 0 14 0 1 6 84
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 19
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 35
On multiple agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 28 1 1 3 103
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 78 2 4 12 267
On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: a Multiple Lending Example 0 0 1 30 2 2 7 55
Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 19 1 6 14 55
Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment 0 0 1 47 0 0 10 49
Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A comment 0 0 0 9 4 5 9 44
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents: a comment 0 0 1 18 1 1 11 94
Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection 0 0 1 14 4 7 24 50
Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection 0 0 0 1 2 4 12 21
Self-Revealing Renegotiation 0 5 5 5 2 11 11 11
The Social Costs of Side Trading 0 0 0 4 0 2 11 28
The Social Costs of Side Trading 0 0 0 11 2 9 18 56
The Social Costs of Side Trading 0 0 0 5 1 8 17 39
The Social Costs of Side Trading 0 0 0 6 3 7 23 36
The Social Costs of Side Trading 0 0 0 21 2 4 25 51
The social costs of side trading 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 12
Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications 0 0 0 52 6 10 21 124
Total Working Papers 2 8 36 2,043 150 340 977 6,550

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard 0 0 0 37 4 5 11 154
Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences 0 0 0 34 1 5 15 156
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness 0 0 0 13 2 3 8 82
Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples 0 0 0 5 2 5 12 35
Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse 0 0 0 3 0 1 8 27
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus 0 0 0 1 2 4 11 38
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume 0 0 0 231 1 1 8 647
Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy 0 0 0 52 1 2 6 173
Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection 0 1 2 13 2 5 18 86
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants 0 0 0 5 2 6 17 58
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 39 1 5 15 206
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions 0 0 0 59 1 1 10 153
Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 87 4 8 15 350
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection 0 0 0 42 6 10 41 251
On a class of smooth preferences 0 0 0 0 2 3 12 32
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition 0 0 0 7 2 5 12 71
On competitive nonlinear pricing 0 0 0 3 3 6 19 48
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 0 28 1 5 22 163
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 65 0 2 14 234
Private communication in competing mechanism games 0 0 0 5 2 2 15 51
The Social Costs of Side Trading 0 0 0 6 2 4 13 27
Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games 0 0 0 24 2 2 11 136
Total Journal Articles 0 1 2 759 43 90 313 3,178

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications 0 0 0 9 3 3 11 49
Total Chapters 0 0 0 9 3 3 11 49

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06