Access Statistics for Helmuts Azacis

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Byzantine Agreement Protocol for Game Theorists 0 0 2 4 2 2 13 16
A Detail-Free Mediator 0 0 0 29 0 0 7 108
A General Model of International Tax Competition with Applications 0 0 0 32 3 3 18 109
Baltic Tax Reform 0 0 0 100 4 5 18 302
Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction 0 0 0 45 2 4 21 154
Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint 0 0 0 23 1 2 9 156
Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint 0 0 0 58 3 3 19 351
Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach 0 0 0 28 3 4 17 59
Flat Tax Reform.The Baltics 2000 – 2007 0 0 1 91 4 5 17 242
Incumbency and Entry in License Auctions: The Anglo-Dutch Auction Meets Other Simple Alternatives 0 0 1 111 1 1 11 512
Information Disclosure by a Seller in Sequential First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 48 1 1 15 187
Information Transmission Under Privacy Concerns 0 0 5 5 2 3 22 22
Is International Cooperation Necessary for Climate Policy? 0 8 15 15 6 13 19 19
Repeated Implementation 0 0 0 22 3 4 21 80
Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents 0 0 1 40 0 3 12 129
Resource Misallocation in the Presence of R&D Spillovers 0 0 1 23 2 2 11 32
Strong Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games 0 0 2 17 2 5 16 63
Taxation and the Sustainability of Collusion: Ad Valorem versus Specific Taxes 0 0 0 109 0 1 17 242
The Non-Equivalence of Import Tariffs and Export Taxes in Trade Wars: Ad Valorem vs Specific Trade Taxes 0 0 2 48 6 6 24 170
The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames 0 0 0 68 2 2 8 239
Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case 0 0 0 16 2 4 14 45
Total Working Papers 0 8 30 932 49 73 329 3,237
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A detail-free mediator 0 0 0 7 0 0 12 67
Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction 0 0 0 13 0 1 11 80
Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint 0 0 0 15 2 2 8 93
Emissions Taxes Versus Tradeable Permits With Many Countries 0 1 4 4 0 3 14 14
FIGHTING COLLUSION: AN IMPLEMENTATION THEORY APPROACH 0 0 0 0 5 5 15 15
Flat tax reform: The Baltics 2000-2007 0 0 1 93 1 4 17 311
How to replace public communication with private one 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5
Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo-Dutch auction meets another simple alternative 0 0 0 29 1 1 11 142
Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions 1 1 1 3 2 3 12 31
On the Use of the Helmert Transformation, and its Applications in Panel Data Econometrics 0 0 3 14 1 1 20 68
Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents 0 0 0 2 1 1 9 27
Repeated implementation: A practical characterization 0 0 0 8 1 1 4 52
Simple forward induction in monotonic multi-sender signaling games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes 0 0 1 22 1 1 16 81
The non‐equivalence of import tariffs and export taxes in trade wars: Ad valorem versus specific trade taxes 0 0 0 0 6 7 9 9
The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames 0 0 0 34 0 1 10 164
Total Journal Articles 1 2 10 244 26 36 173 1,159

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Statistics updated 2026-11-12