Access Statistics for Yaron Azrieli

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society 0 0 13 13 0 0 21 21
Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society 0 0 6 6 0 1 18 18
Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game 0 0 0 35 0 3 10 245
Categorization generated by prototypes -- an axiomatic approach 0 0 0 133 0 0 16 689
Characterization of multidimensional spatial models of elections with a valence dimension 0 0 0 37 0 1 16 155
Cooperative investment games or population games 0 0 0 262 3 3 12 1,934
Elicitability 0 0 10 10 0 2 24 24
Incentives in Experiments with Objective Lotteries 0 0 0 87 1 2 18 115
Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis 0 0 2 235 0 0 53 553
Marginal stochastic choice 0 0 0 9 0 2 16 25
ON THE SELF-(IN) STABILITY OF WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES 0 1 1 29 0 2 6 34
On Concavification and Convex Games 0 0 0 197 0 2 16 605
Pure self-confirming equilibrium 0 0 0 37 1 2 14 142
Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion 0 0 4 4 1 2 21 21
Success functions in large contests 0 1 3 6 0 3 12 19
THE VALUE OF A STOCHASTIC INFORMATION STRUCTURE 0 0 0 150 1 3 11 600
Temporary exclusion in repeated contests 0 0 0 12 0 0 5 17
Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach 0 0 0 61 0 2 9 335
Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information 0 1 1 10 0 1 11 64
Total Working Papers 0 3 40 1,333 7 31 309 5,616

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A bank runs model with a continuum of types 0 0 1 34 1 1 19 202
Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension 0 0 0 4 2 3 16 85
Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game 0 0 0 10 0 0 11 107
Categorizing others in a large game 0 0 0 19 0 1 8 114
Comment on “The Law of Large Demand for Information” 0 0 0 9 0 1 7 90
Constrained preference elicitation 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Constrained versus Unconstrained Rational Inattention 0 0 0 2 1 2 10 24
Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring 0 0 0 2 2 2 14 26
Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions 0 0 0 6 0 2 7 70
Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions 0 0 1 8 1 1 10 75
Extendable Cooperative Games 0 0 0 28 0 0 9 133
Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis 1 2 12 54 3 11 101 331
Incentives in experiments with objective lotteries 0 0 2 11 1 1 21 74
Marginal stochastic choice 0 0 0 0 1 1 15 15
Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types 0 0 0 17 1 1 8 126
Monitoring experts 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 9
On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information 0 0 0 5 0 0 12 66
On some families of cooperative fuzzy games 0 0 0 36 0 2 19 148
On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules 0 0 0 3 2 4 14 48
PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES 0 0 0 7 0 1 7 25
Rental harmony with roommates 0 0 0 15 1 1 17 103
Stable unions 0 0 0 5 0 0 18 68
Symmetric mechanism design 0 0 0 16 2 3 10 100
The price of ‘one person, one vote’ 0 0 0 6 0 0 8 62
The value of a stochastic information structure 0 0 1 28 0 1 15 144
Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 26 0 0 14 97
Total Journal Articles 1 2 17 351 19 40 396 2,344
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Statistics updated 2026-08-07