| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| (Not) Addressing Issues in Electoral Campaigns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
7 |
15 |
21 |
| A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods |
0 |
0 |
2 |
160 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
670 |
| A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information |
0 |
0 |
5 |
169 |
4 |
19 |
39 |
355 |
| A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information |
0 |
1 |
3 |
117 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
127 |
| A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
53 |
| A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
11 |
14 |
129 |
| A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
6 |
9 |
11 |
449 |
| A Theorem on Preference Aggregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
54 |
| Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
99 |
| Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
4 |
8 |
11 |
74 |
| Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
173 |
| Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
482 |
| Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
136 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
618 |
| Compromising on Compromise Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
30 |
| Daunou's Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
56 |
| Deciding on what to Decide |
0 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
9 |
14 |
69 |
| Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
38 |
| Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infrastructure Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
| Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
87 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
58 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
102 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
49 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
59 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
601 |
| Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
626 |
| Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
23 |
24 |
76 |
| Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
8 |
12 |
89 |
| Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
14 |
14 |
138 |
| Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
86 |
| How to choose a non-controversial list with k names |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
89 |
| Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
40 |
| Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
186 |
| Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
328 |
| Information Disclosure with Many Alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
60 |
| Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
5 |
11 |
14 |
31 |
| Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
60 |
| Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
15 |
| Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations |
0 |
1 |
1 |
42 |
4 |
13 |
23 |
142 |
| Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
446 |
| On the Endogenous Order of Play in Sequential Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
3 |
16 |
22 |
31 |
| On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
230 |
| On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
343 |
| On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
304 |
| On the rule of K names |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
71 |
| Opinion Aggregation: Borda and Condorcet Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
11 |
16 |
43 |
| Order-k Rationality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
8 |
10 |
52 |
| Order-k Rationality |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
14 |
| Ordinal Relative Satisficing Behavior: Theory and Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
116 |
| Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
8 |
13 |
33 |
| Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
40 |
| Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
345 |
| Protective Behaviour in Matching Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
256 |
| Ranking Sets of Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
482 |
| Ranking Sets of Objects |
0 |
0 |
1 |
265 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
699 |
| Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
51 |
| STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
18 |
371 |
| Self-Selection Consistent Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
125 |
| Self-Selection Consistent Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
364 |
| Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
148 |
| Single-dipped preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
10 |
13 |
141 |
| Stable Condorcet Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
259 |
| Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
548 |
| Strategy-Proof Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
462 |
| Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
621 |
| Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
13 |
1,065 |
| Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
335 |
| Strategy-proof social choice |
0 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
0 |
13 |
23 |
202 |
| Strategy-proof social choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
130 |
| Supporting others and the evolution of influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
10 |
| The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
182 |
| Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
438 |
| Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
277 |
| Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
96 |
| Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
119 |
| Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
80 |
| VOTING BY QUOTA AND COMMITTEE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
313 |
| Voting Under Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
156 |
| Voting by Committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
167 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
670 |
| Voting by Committees Under Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
259 |
| Voting by Committees under Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
413 |
| Voting by Committees under Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
52 |
| Voting by Committees under Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
40 |
| Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
234 |
0 |
8 |
9 |
1,290 |
| Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
377 |
| Wine rankings and the Borda method |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
| Wine rankings and the Borda method |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
56 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
5 |
27 |
3,362 |
88 |
527 |
823 |
19,618 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| (Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
| A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information |
2 |
3 |
12 |
40 |
5 |
12 |
42 |
152 |
| A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
13 |
14 |
124 |
| A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
107 |
| A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
| An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
217 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
478 |
| Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
25 |
| Balancing the power to appoint officers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
47 |
| CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
9 |
10 |
| Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
192 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
945 |
| Collective Probabilistic Judgements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
105 |
| Compromising on compromise rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
22 |
| Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
79 |
| Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
104 |
| DECIDING ON WHAT TO DECIDE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
| Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
22 |
| Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
2 |
10 |
15 |
45 |
| Editor's note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
97 |
| Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
110 |
| Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
252 |
| Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
74 |
| General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
63 |
| Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees |
0 |
0 |
2 |
245 |
0 |
11 |
16 |
549 |
| Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
8 |
17 |
189 |
| Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
3 |
49 |
50 |
105 |
| How to choose a non-controversial list with k names |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
130 |
| Immunity to credible deviations from the truth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
11 |
33 |
| Implementability via protective equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
82 |
| Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
3 |
11 |
18 |
270 |
| Information disclosure with many alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
16 |
| Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
8 |
| Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
76 |
| Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
100 |
| Manipulation of social decision functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
50 |
| Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
3 |
8 |
10 |
255 |
| Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons |
0 |
0 |
2 |
92 |
0 |
9 |
22 |
418 |
| Memorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
45 |
| Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
80 |
| Michael Maschler in Barcelona |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
| On coalition formation: durable coalition structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
146 |
| On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
100 |
| On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
302 |
| On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
55 |
| On the rule of k names |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
10 |
14 |
91 |
| Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
14 |
21 |
| Order-k rationality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
15 |
| Pivotal voters: A new proof of arrow's theorem |
1 |
1 |
6 |
187 |
6 |
11 |
21 |
379 |
| Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
96 |
| Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
54 |
| Protective behavior in matching models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
65 |
| Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
| Self-Selection Consistent Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
134 |
| Sequential voting and agenda manipulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
100 |
| Stable voting schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
227 |
| Strategy-Proof Exchange |
0 |
0 |
2 |
193 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
606 |
| Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
114 |
| Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem |
0 |
1 |
2 |
97 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
257 |
| Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
168 |
| Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
107 |
| Supporting others and the evolution of influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
87 |
| The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
371 |
| Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
460 |
| Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
86 |
| Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
102 |
| Voting by Committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
2 |
9 |
17 |
496 |
| Voting by committees under constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
7 |
13 |
137 |
| Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
178 |
| Voting under Constraints |
1 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
1 |
8 |
12 |
128 |
| Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
12 |
12 |
| Wine rankings and the Borda method |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| original papers: Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
928 |
| Total Journal Articles |
5 |
12 |
43 |
2,584 |
73 |
437 |
714 |
11,449 |