Access Statistics for Salvador Barberà

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods 0 0 2 158 0 0 4 656
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information 0 0 1 113 0 1 3 112
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information 0 0 2 162 0 4 14 308
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 115
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 45
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 438
A Theorem on Preference Aggregation 0 1 1 9 0 2 2 46
A Theorem on Preference Aggregation 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 54
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel 0 1 2 24 1 2 6 85
Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers 0 0 0 31 0 0 3 63
Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 165
Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules 0 0 0 159 0 0 2 472
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions 0 0 0 135 0 0 1 608
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 97
Daunou’s Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities 0 0 1 44 0 0 2 46
Deciding on what to Decide 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 53
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 31
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 31
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 82
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 50
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 66 0 0 1 597
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 42
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 96
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 54
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 622
Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51
Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies 0 1 1 35 0 1 3 77
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 122
Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 74
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names 0 0 2 10 0 0 2 81
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 83
Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 31
Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide? 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 175
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 318
Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 50
Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40
Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 56
Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations 0 0 0 41 0 1 2 116
Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 437
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 57
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 338
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union 0 0 0 65 0 0 1 222
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union 0 0 0 61 0 0 1 295
On the rule of K names 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 65
On the rule of K names 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55
Ordinal Relative Satisficing Behavior: Theory and Experiments 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 103
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice 0 0 0 98 0 0 1 339
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 36
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 30
Protective Behaviour in Matching Models 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 248
Ranking Sets of Objects 0 0 0 264 1 1 4 690
Ranking Sets of Objects 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 468
Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 38
STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 353
Self-Selection Consistent Choices 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 119
Self-Selection Consistent Functions 0 0 0 59 0 0 1 360
Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 139
Single-dipped preferences 0 0 2 39 0 0 3 126
Stable Condorcet Rules 0 0 1 57 0 0 1 249
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules 0 0 0 42 0 0 1 542
Strategy-Proof Exchange 0 0 0 67 0 0 2 448
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 611
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1,050
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 323
Strategy-proof social choice 0 0 0 29 1 1 4 178
Strategy-proof social choice 0 0 1 60 0 0 3 116
Supporting others and the evolution of influence 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 177
Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 426
Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result 0 0 0 106 0 0 0 270
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result 0 1 1 11 0 1 1 89
Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? 0 0 0 16 1 1 4 117
Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 70
VOTING BY QUOTA AND COMMITTEE 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 304
Voting Under Constraints 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 149
Voting by Committees 0 0 1 167 0 0 4 658
Voting by Committees Under Constraints 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 251
Voting by Committees under Constraints 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 36
Voting by Committees under Constraints 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 407
Voting by Committees under Constraints 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 44
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution 0 0 0 234 0 0 0 1,278
Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 370
Total Working Papers 0 4 18 3,284 5 19 112 18,935

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes 0 0 2 21 0 0 3 110
A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 103
A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 54
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions 0 1 1 216 0 1 1 466
Balancing the power to appoint officers 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 40
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions 0 0 0 191 1 2 5 931
Collective Probabilistic Judgements 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 103
Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203] 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 70
Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394] 0 0 0 17 0 0 2 100
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 29
Editor's note 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 90
Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach 0 0 1 45 0 0 2 105
Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings 0 0 1 67 0 0 4 242
Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule 0 0 0 16 1 1 1 65
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 54
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees 1 1 3 243 1 1 7 532
Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies 0 0 1 19 0 0 3 171
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 54
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names 0 0 0 13 0 0 3 120
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 21
Implementability via protective equilibria 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 70
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? 0 0 0 31 0 0 2 251
Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 73
Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework 0 0 1 27 0 0 2 97
Manipulation of social decision functions 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 45
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 244
Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons 0 0 0 89 0 0 5 392
Memorial 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 37
Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 71
Michael Maschler in Barcelona 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 24
On coalition formation: durable coalition structures 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 134
On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 92
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union 0 0 2 47 0 0 4 285
On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 45
On the rule of k names 0 0 1 14 0 0 2 76
Pivotal voters: A new proof of arrow's theorem 1 1 6 179 1 1 11 349
Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 85
Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 46
Protective behavior in matching models 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 53
Self-Selection Consistent Functions 0 0 0 21 0 0 1 128
Sequential voting and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 87
Stable voting schemes 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 32
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules 0 1 2 37 0 1 2 212
Strategy-Proof Exchange 0 0 5 191 0 0 8 592
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 101
Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 1 1 1 95 1 1 5 250
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences 0 0 2 44 0 2 5 158
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers 0 0 1 21 0 0 1 96
Supporting others and the evolution of influence 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 80
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance 0 0 1 68 0 0 1 361
Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems 0 0 0 0 0 6 14 444
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result 0 0 0 15 0 1 1 78
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? 0 0 0 14 0 0 4 95
Voting by Committees 0 0 2 108 1 1 9 476
Voting by committees under constraints 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 124
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 172
Voting under Constraints 0 0 0 25 0 0 2 113
original papers: Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms 0 0 0 142 0 0 0 919
Total Journal Articles 3 5 33 2,483 6 19 116 10,447

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice 0 2 4 39 1 4 12 136
Total Chapters 0 2 4 39 1 4 12 136

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Statistics updated 2024-09-04