| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games |
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31 |
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3 |
53 |
| A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
| A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
| A Core-partition solution for coalitional rankings with a variable population domain |
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1 |
16 |
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0 |
3 |
36 |
| A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance |
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0 |
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1 |
38 |
| A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance |
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1 |
1 |
18 |
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1 |
2 |
88 |
| A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values |
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0 |
0 |
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2 |
2 |
| A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values |
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2 |
15 |
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3 |
29 |
| A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games |
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7 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
33 |
| A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games |
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18 |
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2 |
24 |
| A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games |
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14 |
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3 |
44 |
| A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games |
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0 |
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1 |
24 |
| Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core |
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4 |
25 |
| Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution |
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1 |
3 |
6 |
12 |
| Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
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3 |
5 |
| Allocation rules for museum pass programs |
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0 |
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34 |
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0 |
2 |
94 |
| An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games |
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1 |
35 |
| An axiomatization of the iterated h-index and applications to sport rankings |
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28 |
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1 |
53 |
| An axiomatization of the iterated h-index and applications to sport rankings |
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42 |
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4 |
94 |
| An optimal bound to acces the core of TU-games |
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1 |
4 |
26 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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31 |
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3 |
84 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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1 |
1 |
4 |
37 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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2 |
31 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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2 |
33 |
| Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends |
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1 |
44 |
| Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends |
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1 |
34 |
| Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends |
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1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| Average tree solution for graph games |
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34 |
| Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends |
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33 |
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1 |
95 |
| Average tree solutions for graph games |
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54 |
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3 |
300 |
| Average tree solutions for graph games |
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26 |
| Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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2 |
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38 |
| Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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26 |
| Axiomatic and bargaining foundations of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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27 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
59 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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9 |
2 |
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3 |
26 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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1 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values |
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3 |
9 |
| Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification |
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38 |
| Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification |
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25 |
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2 |
63 |
| Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification |
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8 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
32 |
| Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games |
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0 |
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0 |
1 |
3 |
37 |
| Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
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42 |
| Axioms of Invariance for TU-games |
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54 |
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1 |
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156 |
| Axioms of Invariance for TU-games |
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0 |
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39 |
| Axioms of invariance for TU-games |
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25 |
1 |
1 |
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72 |
| Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games |
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1 |
36 |
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0 |
3 |
66 |
| Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
30 |
| Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation |
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0 |
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1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
| Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation |
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0 |
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68 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
272 |
| Bounded rationality and repeated network formation |
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1 |
29 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
3 |
24 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
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1 |
27 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
0 |
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1 |
2 |
30 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
46 |
| Characterizations of Weighted and Equal Division Values |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
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2 |
44 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
30 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
59 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| Coalitional desirability and the equal division value |
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0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
62 |
| Coalitional desirability and the equal division value |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
40 |
| Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: Two extensions of the Shapley value |
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0 |
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24 |
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2 |
88 |
| Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
| Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
| Compensations in the Shapley Value and the Compensation Solutions for Graph Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
27 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
29 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
124 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
29 |
| Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value |
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1 |
2 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
41 |
| Cooperative games with diversity constraints |
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0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
| Cooperative games with diversity constraints |
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0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
| Cooperative games with diversity constraints |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
| Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
| Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value |
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0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
49 |
| Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
64 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
28 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding |
1 |
3 |
4 |
28 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
85 |
| Efficient extension of the Myerson value |
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0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
| Efficient extensions of communication values |
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0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
| Efficient extensions of communication values |
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0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
37 |
| Efficient extensions of the Myerson value |
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0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
64 |
| Examination design: an axiomatic approach |
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0 |
1 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
49 |
| Examination design: an axiomatic approach |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors: The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
32 |
| Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions |
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0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
34 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
350 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
| Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
| Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Freezeout, Compensation Rules and Voting Equilibria |
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0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
106 |
| Freezeout, Compensation Rules, and Voting Equilibria |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
| GAMES WITH IDENTICAL SHAPLEY VALUES |
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0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
92 |
| Games with Identical Shapley Values |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures |
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0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
28 |
| Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
| Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
72 |
| Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
68 |
| Informational Advantage and Influence of Communicating Central Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
105 |
| La mise en place de la législation européenne REACH: Une analyse des effets anticoncurrentiels |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
50 |
| Les effets d'une réglementation sur la concurrence et l'innovation: première analyse de la réglementation européenne REACH |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
40 |
| Les informations exigées par la législation REACH: analyse du partage des coûts |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
| Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances |
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0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
| Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints on Individual Preferences |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
19 |
| Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences |
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0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
| Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies |
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0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
46 |
| Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| New axiomatisations of the Diversity Owen and Shapley values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
| New axiomatizations of the Diversity Owen and Shapley values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
| New axiomatizations of the Diversity Owen and Shapley values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
| On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation |
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0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
100 |
| On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
| On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
| On the number of blocks required to access the core |
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0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
137 |
| On the number of blocks required to access the core |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
| PERCEPTRON VERSUS AUTOMATON∗ |
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0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
119 |
| Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
| Perceptron versus Automaton |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
| Perceptron versus Automaton |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
| Perceptron versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
| Perceptron versus automaton |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
| Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
55 |
| Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? |
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0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
129 |
| REACH legislation |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
| Rationalité limitée et jeux de machines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
| Relationship between labeled network games and museum pass games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
54 |
| Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
| Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
| Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturels |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
| Sharing the cost of cleaning up non-point source pollution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
| Sharing the cost of cleaning up non-point source pollution |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
| Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
| Solidarity within a Fixed Community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Taxing congestion of the space commons |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| The Average Tree Solution for Multi-Choice Forest Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
| The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
101 |
| The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
| The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure |
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0 |
1 |
50 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
130 |
| The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| The River Sharing Problem: a Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
105 |
| The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Rooted Forest Games and an Application to Sharing a River with Bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
| The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Sharing International Rivers with Bifurcations |
0 |
1 |
2 |
60 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
184 |
| The neighborhood value for cooperative graph games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| The neighborhood value for cooperative graph games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
| The neighborhood value for cooperative graph games |
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0 |
11 |
11 |
1 |
9 |
22 |
22 |
| The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
| The proportional Shapley value and an application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
33 |
| The proportional Shapley value and an application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
| The proportional Shapley value and applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
| The proportional Shapley value and applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
63 |
| The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
39 |
| The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
86 |
| The sequential surplus division for sharing a river with bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| Théorie des jeux coopératifs et non-coopératifs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
| Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
51 |
| Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
32 |
| Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
41 |
| Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
| Weighted Component Fairness for Forest Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
89 |
| Weighted component fairness for forest games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
9 |
41 |
1,690 |
57 |
100 |
495 |
7,858 |
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