Access Statistics for Achille Basile

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice 0 0 0 6 0 0 7 16
Coalitional Fairness with Participation Rates 0 0 0 58 2 2 15 109
Cones with Semi-interior Points and Equilibrium 0 0 1 64 0 0 12 169
Core Equivalences for Equilibria Supported by Non-linear Prices 0 0 0 53 0 0 27 159
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof 0 0 0 8 0 2 5 18
Mixed Markets with Public Goods 0 0 0 63 0 0 13 217
On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information 0 0 0 73 2 2 28 270
On the relation between Preference Reversal and Strategy-Proofness 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 12
The Core of Economies with Collective Goods and a Social Division of Labor 0 0 0 30 0 1 17 106
The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives 0 0 0 8 0 2 11 21
The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 25
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 371 4 11 143 1,122

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions 0 0 0 1 0 1 12 16
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice 0 0 0 1 0 2 13 25
Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference 0 0 0 1 1 1 16 23
Coalitional economies with public projects 0 0 0 5 0 1 11 50
Coalitional fairness with participation rates 0 0 0 1 1 2 15 38
Cones with semi-interior points and equilibrium 0 0 1 11 0 1 11 95
Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies 0 1 1 24 0 2 11 101
Economies with informational asymmetries and limited vetoer coalitions 0 0 0 12 0 1 18 85
Finitely Additive Nonatomic Coalition Production Economies: Core-Walras Equivalence 1 1 1 21 1 1 10 97
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof 0 0 0 2 0 1 6 12
Introduzione 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 17
Isotone Classes of Social Choice Functions with Binary Range 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 15
Liapunov-Richter theorem in B-convex spaces 0 0 0 10 0 0 13 72
Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 32
OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS 0 0 1 1 0 0 8 16
Obituary 0 0 0 14 0 0 4 42
On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information 0 0 0 8 1 1 16 49
On the Liapunov-Richter theorem in the finitely additive setting 1 1 1 9 1 1 4 52
On the aubin-like characterization of competitive equilibria in infinite dimensional economies 0 0 0 6 0 0 11 49
On the edgeworth's conjecture in finitely additive economies with restricted coalitions 0 0 0 15 0 0 7 68
On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness 0 0 0 4 0 0 7 22
On the ultrafilter representation of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions 0 0 0 17 0 0 4 61
Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 12
The Core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour 0 0 0 1 1 1 15 27
The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives 0 0 0 1 0 2 19 21
The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 12
Total Journal Articles 2 3 5 168 7 22 275 1,109

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-10-11