| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A NOTE ON REDUCED STRATEGIES AND COGNITIVE HIERARCHIES IN THE EXTENSIVE AND NORMAL FORM |
0 |
0 |
11 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
11 |
| A note on comparative ambiguity aversion and justi?fiability |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
79 |
| Ambiguity Attitudes and Self-Confirming Equilibrium in Sequential Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
| An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
852 |
| An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
382 |
| Analysis of Information Feedback and Selfconfirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
111 |
| Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
| Belief change, Rationality, and Strategic Reasoning in Sequential Games |
0 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
74 |
| Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory |
1 |
2 |
6 |
107 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
205 |
| Belief-dependent Preferences and Reputation: Experimental Analysis of a Repeated Trust Game |
0 |
0 |
2 |
128 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
139 |
| Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
41 |
| Beliefs, Plans, and Perceived Intentions in Dynamic Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
98 |
| Buyer Power and Quality Improvement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
171 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
668 |
| Buyer Power and Quality Improvements |
0 |
0 |
2 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
386 |
| Context-Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
| Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
525 |
| Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
171 |
| Deception: The Role of Guilt |
0 |
0 |
1 |
142 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
231 |
| Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in a Trust Game |
0 |
1 |
7 |
269 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
487 |
| Dynamic Psychological Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
623 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3,102 |
| Dynamic Psychological Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
285 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,310 |
| Epistemic Game Theory without Types Structures: An Application to Psychological Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
160 |
| Frustration and Anger in Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
105 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
109 |
| Frustration and Anger in Games |
0 |
2 |
2 |
28 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
147 |
| Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game: An Experiment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
253 |
| Guilt and Inequality in Dictator Games |
10 |
24 |
33 |
33 |
16 |
37 |
53 |
53 |
| Guilt, Inequity, and Gender in a Dictator Game |
3 |
16 |
43 |
43 |
7 |
31 |
81 |
81 |
| Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
235 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,247 |
| Imperfect Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
407 |
| Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game |
1 |
1 |
1 |
178 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
457 |
| Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
168 |
| Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
18 |
| Incorporating Belief-Dependent Motivation in Games Abstract:Psychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989) and significantly generalized by Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009), extends the standard gametheoretic framework by letting players' utility at endnodes depend on their interactive beliefs. While it is understood that a host of applications that model and/or test the role of emotional and other psychological forces find their home in PGT, the framework is abstract andcomprises complex mathematical objects, such as players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus,PGT provides little guidance on how to model specific belief-dependent motivations and usethem in game theoretic analysis. This paper takes steps to fill this gap. Some aspects are simplified - e.g., which beliefs matter - but others are refined and brought closer to applications by providing more structure. We start with belief-dependent motivations and showhow to embed them in game forms to obtain psychological games. We emphasize the role oftime and of the perception of players' intentions. We take advantage of progress made on the foundations of game theory to expand and improve on PGT solution concepts.JEL classification:C72; C73; D81; D82; D92. Keywords:Psychological game theory; Belief-dependent motivation; Intentions; Time;Rationalizability; Self-confirming equilibrium; Bayesian sequential equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
305 |
| Information Flows and Memory in Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
93 |
| Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
280 |
| Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
340 |
| Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
1 |
3 |
137 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
453 |
| Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
60 |
| International agreements on product standard: an incomplete contracting theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
214 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,093 |
| International agreements on product standards: an incomplete-contracting theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
617 |
| Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
| M&A negotiations with limited information: how do opaque firms buy and get bought? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
113 |
| Mixed Extensions of Decision Problems under Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
191 |
| On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| Psychological Game Theory |
0 |
1 |
16 |
381 |
4 |
7 |
39 |
838 |
| RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
412 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
954 |
| RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
34 |
| Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
| Rationalizable Bidding in General First-Price Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
589 |
| Rationalization and Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
288 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
613 |
| Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
388 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
1,364 |
| Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
| Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
101 |
| Sophisticated Reasoning, Learning, and Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Imperfect Feedback |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
25 |
| Sources of Uncertainty and Subjective Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
| Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
248 |
| Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
265 |
| THE LOGIC OF BELIEF PERSISTENCY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| The Epistemic Spirit of Divinity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
| Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
247 |
| Total Working Papers |
15 |
51 |
151 |
6,542 |
37 |
120 |
404 |
21,847 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Note on Comparative Ambiguity Aversion and Justifiability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
| A Note on Stochastic Independence without Savage-Null Events |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
141 |
| A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
52 |
| Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
35 |
| Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
| Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory |
3 |
4 |
15 |
39 |
4 |
6 |
22 |
77 |
| Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game |
1 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
70 |
| Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
43 |
| Buyer power and quality improvements |
0 |
0 |
2 |
80 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
269 |
| Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
| Deception: The role of guilt |
0 |
0 |
3 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
178 |
| Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
118 |
| Dynamic psychological games |
1 |
4 |
13 |
418 |
1 |
6 |
27 |
1,396 |
| Editors' Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
| Editors' note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
| Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
53 |
| Forward induction reasoning revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
155 |
| Four textbooks on game theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
107 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
337 |
| Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
107 |
| Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games |
1 |
2 |
5 |
33 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
132 |
| Guilt in Games |
1 |
1 |
3 |
257 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
852 |
| Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
288 |
| Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
71 |
| Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games |
1 |
2 |
4 |
31 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
96 |
| Information flows and memory in games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
8 |
| Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
178 |
| Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
208 |
| Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
136 |
| Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
51 |
| Learning and self-confirming long-run biases |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
| Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
| Mixed extensions of decision problems under uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
| On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
233 |
| On Rationalizability in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
329 |
| RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS |
0 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
53 |
| Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
302 |
| Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
207 |
| Rationalization and Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
269 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
915 |
| Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
337 |
| Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
228 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
921 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty |
0 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
277 |
| Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
3 |
81 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
280 |
| Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle |
0 |
0 |
2 |
61 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
234 |
| Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning |
0 |
0 |
2 |
225 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
584 |
| Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
119 |
| The Logic of Belief Persistence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
| Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
73 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
23 |
79 |
3,026 |
30 |
81 |
247 |
10,458 |
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