| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Behavioral Model of Turnout |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
| A Model of Muddling Through |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
33 |
| ASPIRATION-BASED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN REPEATED INTERACTION GAMES: AN OVERVIEW |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
22 |
| Adaptively Rational Retrospective Voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
54 |
| Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
| An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
57 |
| Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
32 |
| Communitarian versus Universalistic Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
53 |
| Comparing Centralized and Decentralized Institutions: A Reply to Schwartz and Tomz |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Endogenous reorganization: Status, productivity & meritocratic dynamics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
| Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
57 |
| Formal Models of Bureaucracy |
1 |
2 |
3 |
27 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
99 |
| Inequality, Aspirations, and Social Comparisons* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
| Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
25 |
| Management fads, pedagogies, and other soft technologies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
67 |
| Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. By Gary J. Miller. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 254p. $47.95 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
| Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
348 |
| On Accountability and Hierarchy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
| Optimal team composition for tool‐based problem solving |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
40 |
| Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
41 |
| Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
117 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
601 |
| Rethinking Allison's Models |
0 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
52 |
| Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. By Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994. 392p. $55.00 cloth, $18.95 paper |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
46 |
| Satisficing and Selection in Electoral Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
| Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
318 |
| Spatial Models of Delegation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
60 |
| Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
| The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
32 |
| The Perfect is the Enemy of the Best |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
| The Possibility of Cooperation. By Michael Taylor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 205p. $39.50 doth, $12.75 paper |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Time, Chance, and Organizations: Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment. By Herbert Kaufman (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1985. xii, 180 p. $20.00, cloth; $11.95, paper) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
35 |
| When in Doubt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
10 |
10 |
29 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
9 |
21 |
418 |
36 |
86 |
153 |
2,375 |