Access Statistics for Mohamed Belhaj

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Asymmetric Interaction and Aggregate Incentives: a Note 0 0 0 25 1 1 1 47
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL RISK: AN INCENTIVE APPROACH 0 0 0 59 3 7 7 113
Competing Activities in Social Networks 0 0 0 64 0 1 3 106
Competing Activities in Social Networks 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 51
Contracting on Networks 0 0 0 29 2 2 2 59
Contracting on Networks 0 0 0 58 1 3 4 136
Costly agreement-based transfers and targeting on networks with synergies 0 0 0 4 0 2 4 64
Costly agreement-based transfers and targeting on networks with synergies 0 0 0 8 4 9 17 62
ENDOGENOUS EFFORTS ON NETWORKS: DOES CENTRALITY MATTER ? 0 0 0 65 0 1 1 83
Efficient networks in games with local complementarities 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 25
Endogenous efforts on communication networks under strategic complementarity 0 0 0 84 2 3 3 160
Group Targeting under Networked Synergies 0 0 0 22 0 5 7 41
Group Targeting under Networked Synergies 0 0 0 15 1 3 5 27
Group targeting under networked synergies 0 0 0 12 2 5 5 19
Moral hazard and risk-sharing: risk-taking as an incentive tool 0 0 0 52 2 3 6 144
Network Design under Local Complementarities 0 0 1 25 2 2 8 79
Network Design under Local Complementarities 0 0 0 49 1 3 7 90
Network Games under Strategic Complementarities 0 0 0 184 0 1 4 328
Network Games under Strategic Complementarities 0 0 0 16 0 3 4 63
Network games under strategic complementarities 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 22
On the Role of External Financing Costs in Optimal Investment Decisions 0 0 0 27 0 2 3 196
On the Role of External Financing Costs in Optimal Investment Decisions 0 0 0 10 1 2 3 51
Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention 0 0 0 41 1 4 5 174
Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision: Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 52
Risk taking under heterogenous risk sharing 0 0 0 31 1 2 4 123
Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34
Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 34
Targeting the Key Player: An Incentive-Based Approach 0 0 0 45 1 3 4 35
Targeting the Key Player: An Incentive-Based Approach 0 0 1 47 1 1 4 39
Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach 0 0 0 18 0 3 3 23
The Value of Network Information: Assortative Mixing Makes the Difference 0 0 0 9 0 1 3 84
The Value of Network Information: Assortative Mixing Makes the Difference 0 0 0 29 0 2 4 66
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 1,041 29 80 134 2,630

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Competing Activities in Social Networks 0 0 1 35 1 3 6 120
Efficient networks in games with local complementarities 0 1 1 14 1 6 8 58
Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity 0 0 0 25 1 3 5 98
Excess capital, operational disaster risk, and capital requirements for banks 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 66
Group targeting under networked synergies 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 25
Network games under strategic complementarities 0 0 1 35 1 5 12 118
Optimal Investment under Credit Constraints 0 0 0 7 1 2 2 25
Risk taking under heterogenous revenue sharing 0 0 1 30 2 4 7 167
Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard 0 0 0 31 1 3 4 143
Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives 0 0 0 19 0 1 5 62
Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach 0 0 0 4 0 3 7 38
Total Journal Articles 0 1 4 230 8 32 61 920

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09