Access Statistics for Jan Boone

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
'Be Nice Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy 0 0 0 4 2 6 14 70
'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy 0 0 0 61 2 5 12 380
'Be nice, unless it pays to fight': A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy 0 0 1 3 1 8 27 75
A New Way to Measure Competition 0 0 1 681 3 4 11 2,048
A New Way to Measure Competition 0 0 2 40 0 1 18 140
A New Way to Measure Competition 0 0 1 33 3 7 18 119
A Note on the Relation between Income and Welfare 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 21
An earned income tax credit in the Netherlands: Simulations with the mimic model 0 0 0 5 1 3 7 39
Are recessions good for workplace safety? 0 0 0 8 4 6 13 43
Balance of Power 0 0 0 123 2 4 11 749
Balance of Power 0 0 0 2 4 6 10 38
Balance of power 0 0 0 0 1 5 14 39
Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 0 0 0 32 4 5 8 103
Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 0 0 0 15 4 7 13 68
Basic versus Supplementary Health Insurance: The Role of Cost Effectiveness and Prevalence 0 0 0 12 3 3 8 98
Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection 0 0 1 23 2 6 23 96
Basic versus supplementary health insurance: the role of cost effectiveness and prevalence 0 0 0 13 1 2 31 107
Community Rating in Health Insurance: Trade-Off Between Coverage and Selection 0 0 0 23 2 2 9 31
Community Rating in Health Insurance: Trade-Off Between Coverage and Selection 0 0 0 11 2 2 8 82
Community rating in health insurance: trade-off between coverage and selection 0 0 0 33 2 7 13 63
Competition 0 0 0 119 0 1 7 256
Competition 1 1 3 365 2 2 14 881
Competition Leverage: How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 52
Competition and welfare 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 17
Competition for Traders and Risk 0 0 0 2 0 1 9 43
Competition for Traders and Risk 0 0 0 5 1 2 8 46
Competition for traders and risk 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 65
Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment 0 0 0 18 2 3 8 97
Competitive Location on a Plane with Discrete Demand and Managerial Objectives 0 0 0 0 2 3 9 178
Competitive Pressure, Selection and Investments in Development and Fundamental Research 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 29
Competitive pressure: The effects on investments in product and process innovation 1 1 2 92 2 4 16 225
Cost-Sharing Design Matters: A Comparison of the Rebate and Deductible in Healthcare 0 0 0 11 1 1 7 23
Cost-Sharing Design Matters: A Comparison of the Rebate and Deductible in Healthcare 0 0 0 14 0 0 6 46
Cyclical Fluctuations in Workplace Accidents 0 0 0 4 2 2 8 42
Cyclical Fluctuations in Workplace Accidents 0 1 1 134 5 8 11 735
Cyclical Fluctuations in Workplace Accidents 0 0 0 90 4 5 10 747
Does the Market Choose Optimal Health Insurance Coverage 0 0 0 14 1 2 9 72
Does the market choose optimal health insurance coverage? 0 0 0 52 3 5 10 157
Economics and Duality Can they be Seperated 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 461
Effective Active Labor Market Policies 0 1 1 468 12 18 25 1,060
Effective Active Labour Market Policies 0 0 0 720 1 5 21 1,812
Effective Labor Market Policies 0 2 2 16 3 7 12 101
Efficientie, concurrentie en globale budgetten in de zorg 0 0 0 24 2 2 5 67
Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior 0 0 0 154 1 5 10 482
Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior 0 0 0 3 3 3 9 45
Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behaviour 0 0 0 100 3 5 14 442
Fee-for-service, Capitation and Health Provider Choice with Private Contracts 0 0 0 12 2 3 6 64
Firms Merge in Response to Constraints 0 0 0 4 1 1 10 36
Firms Merge in Response to Constraints 0 0 0 86 1 3 7 347
Harder straffen doet minder pijn 0 0 0 2 5 5 7 30
Health Insurance Competition: The Effect of Group Contracts 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 38
Health Insurance without Single Crossing: Why Healthy People have High Coverage 0 0 0 9 1 1 3 46
Health Insurance without Single Crossing: why healthy people have high coverage 0 0 0 55 0 0 8 65
Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs 0 0 0 15 1 2 9 66
Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs 0 0 0 33 1 1 6 42
Health insurance competition: the effect of group contracts 0 0 0 10 0 0 8 86
Health provider networks, quality and costs 0 0 0 53 5 5 10 51
Health provider networks, quality and costs 0 0 0 31 0 1 5 69
How (Not) to Measure Competition 0 0 0 19 0 1 7 90
How (Not) to Measure Competition 0 0 0 52 0 1 8 167
How (not) to measure competition 0 0 0 321 3 9 17 541
Ideen voor vernieuwing van het innovatiebeleid 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 17
Kinky Choices, Dictators and Split Might: A Non-Cooperative Model for Household Consumption and Labor Supply 0 0 0 44 4 4 16 240
Kinky Choices, Dictators and Split Might: A Non-Cooperative Model for Household Consumption and Labor Supply 0 0 1 32 3 7 18 212
Kinky Choices, Dictators and Split Might: A Non-Cooperative Model for Household Consumption and Labor Supply 0 0 0 3 2 2 6 64
Kinky choices, dictators and split might. A non-cooperative model for household consumption and labor supply 0 0 1 28 5 5 14 101
Marktstructuur en Innovatie 0 0 0 2 2 2 6 39
Measuring Competition using the Profit Elasticity: American Sugar Industry, 1890-1914 0 0 0 9 0 1 6 45
Measuring competition using the Profit Elasticity: American Sugar Industry, 1890-1914 0 0 0 65 0 1 7 179
Measuring competition using the Profit Elasticity: American Suger Industry, 1890 - 1914 0 0 0 39 2 5 14 124
Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work 0 0 0 64 0 2 11 238
Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work 0 0 0 235 0 12 23 1,033
Modeling Financial Incentives to get Unemployment Back to Work 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 33
Modelling Financial Incentives To Get Unemployed Back To Work 0 0 0 64 0 4 10 329
Naked Exclusion: Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing 0 0 0 2 4 4 8 43
Naked exclusion: Towards a behavioral approach to exclusive dealing 0 0 0 27 4 7 15 169
Optimal Competition: A Benchmark for Competition Policy 0 0 1 21 0 0 8 92
Optimal Competition: A Benchmark for Competition Policy 0 0 1 207 2 4 17 647
Optimal Labour Taxation and Search 0 0 0 105 0 0 9 400
Optimal Labour Taxation and Search 0 0 0 6 1 1 6 49
Optimal Market Design 0 1 1 4 0 3 11 55
Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions 0 0 0 3 1 3 9 30
Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 24
Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions 0 0 0 50 3 3 9 192
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions 0 0 0 34 3 5 14 303
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions 0 0 0 2 1 3 13 63
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions 0 0 1 121 2 4 13 613
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions 0 0 0 69 1 4 10 356
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions 0 0 0 32 3 7 14 277
Optimal competition: A benchmark for competition policy 0 0 0 1 3 4 14 46
Optimal market design 0 1 1 124 4 8 15 336
Optimal market design 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 57
Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions 0 0 1 10 4 4 13 74
Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions 0 0 1 120 1 7 20 476
Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities 0 0 0 2 0 2 11 31
Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 27 1 1 4 65
Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 11 1 2 12 50
Pricing above Value: Selling to an Adverse Selection Market 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 8
Pricing above Value: Selling to an Adverse Selection Market 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 16
Procurement with Specialized Firms 0 0 0 7 1 1 7 53
Procurement with specialized firms 0 0 0 25 3 3 9 67
Procurement with specialized firms 0 0 0 24 1 2 7 31
Provider Competition and Over-Utilization in Health Care 0 0 0 23 3 3 7 123
Provider competition and over-utilization in health care 0 0 0 14 5 11 19 81
Recessions Are Bad for Workplace Safety 0 0 0 37 4 6 15 151
Recessions are Bad for Workplace Safety 0 0 0 5 5 6 15 75
Recessions are bad for workplace safety 0 0 1 15 3 5 15 101
Selective Contracting and Foreclosure in Health Care Markets 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 50
Selective contracting and foreclosure in health care markets 0 0 0 33 1 1 6 111
Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types 0 0 0 0 2 3 10 34
Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types 0 0 0 17 1 2 9 158
Selling to consumers with endogenous types 0 0 0 41 2 12 21 267
Stochastic Mechanisms and Quasi-Linear Preferences 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 32
Tax Policy in a Model of Search with Training 0 0 0 0 2 2 15 39
Tax Policy in a Model of Search with Training 0 0 0 21 4 5 20 219
Tax policy and the labor market: A sensitivity analysis with an AGE model 0 0 0 5 0 2 5 21
Technological progress and unemployment 0 0 0 8 1 1 3 35
The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases 0 0 0 10 2 3 11 69
The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases 0 0 0 41 5 5 9 203
The Optimal Taxation of UnskilIed Labor with Job Search and Social Assistance 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 45
The Optimal Taxation of Unskilled Labor with Job Search and Social Assistance 0 0 1 58 1 1 14 444
The Optimal Taxation of Unskilled Labour with Job Search and Social Assistance 0 0 1 60 2 10 17 390
The Trade-Off between Sclerosis and Hold Up Problems: Rhenish vs. Anglosaxon Economies 0 0 0 1 6 6 9 21
The optimal taxation of unskilled labor with job search and social assistance 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 41
The simple economics of bunching. Optimal taxation with quasi-linear preferences 0 0 1 10 1 4 11 69
Trade Policy, Market Leaders and Endogenous Competition Intensity 0 0 0 52 1 1 14 245
Transparency and prices with imperfect substitutes 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 28
Transparency, Prices and Welfare with Imperfect Substitutes 0 0 0 47 1 2 9 245
Transparency, Prices and Welfare with Imperfect Substitutes 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 28
Unemployment versus In-work Benefits with Search Unemployment and Observable Abilities 0 1 1 31 1 2 12 219
Unemployment vs. In-work Benefits with Search Unemployment and Observable Abilities 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 28
Welfare Effects of Employment Protection 0 0 0 234 4 6 17 803
Welfare Improving Employment Protection 0 1 1 128 5 10 17 483
Welfare improving employment protection 0 0 0 34 3 8 14 142
Why Is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? 0 0 0 36 2 3 13 142
Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? 0 0 0 4 2 3 17 58
Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? 0 0 0 18 3 5 17 162
Why is there a spike in the job finding rate at benefit exhaustion? 0 0 0 16 5 7 17 135
’Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy 0 0 1 82 0 1 6 416
Total Working Papers 2 10 32 6,977 266 492 1,481 27,518

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New Way to Measure Competition 0 0 0 674 2 4 27 1,541
Are recessions good for workplace safety? 0 0 0 71 0 0 7 204
Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection 0 0 2 31 6 10 25 196
Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: Experimental evidence 0 0 3 60 2 8 24 272
Bringing Unemployed Back to Work: Effective Active Labor Market Policies 0 0 0 82 1 7 10 250
Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment 0 0 0 4 2 11 20 92
Competition: Theoretical Parameterizations and Empirical Measures 0 0 2 362 2 2 16 594
Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in Product and Process Innovation 0 0 0 2 6 10 24 817
Erratum to "Transparency and prices with imperfect substitutes" [Economics Letters 93 (2006) 398-404] 0 0 1 19 1 1 8 60
Experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior 0 0 0 96 2 2 7 322
Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate 1 2 22 1,095 1 7 55 2,400
Modeling Financial Incentives to Get the Unemployed Back to Work 0 0 0 72 2 6 13 218
Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 5 0 0 14 1,200
Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions 0 0 0 30 1 3 9 131
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions 0 0 0 165 4 5 19 550
Optimal labour taxation and search 0 0 0 96 2 6 11 268
Optimal taxation and welfare benefits with monitoring of job search 0 0 0 11 2 3 11 74
Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities 0 0 0 36 0 0 35 165
Procurement with specialized firms 0 0 0 1 1 3 8 37
Recessions are bad for workplace safety 0 0 0 38 5 8 13 232
Risky procurement with an insider bidder 0 0 0 38 3 6 12 141
Tax policy in a matching model with training 0 0 0 0 3 3 11 154
Technological Progress, Downsizing and Unemployment 0 0 0 126 0 3 9 486
The Simple Economics of Bunching: Optimal Taxation with Quasi‐Linear Preferences 0 0 0 51 1 1 4 180
The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases 0 0 0 19 1 2 4 207
The optimal taxation of unskilled labor with job search and social assistance 0 0 2 78 0 0 8 381
Trade policy in markets with collusion: The case of North–South R&D spillovers 0 0 0 12 1 2 9 83
Transparency and prices with imperfect substitutes 0 0 0 9 0 0 6 69
Unemployment Insurance and Workers' Mobility 0 0 0 12 4 4 7 105
Welfare‐Improving Employment Protection 0 0 1 170 2 8 19 500
When is the Price Cost Margin a Safe Way to Measure Changes in Competition? 0 0 1 130 2 5 15 426
Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? 0 0 1 19 2 4 14 111
Total Journal Articles 1 2 35 3,614 61 134 474 12,466

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06