| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
316 |
| A Kripke-Lewis semantics for belief update and belief revision |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
| A Logical Representation of Extensive Games with Perfect Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
191 |
| A SET-THEORETIC APPROACH TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES: PART 1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
391 |
| A Syntactic Approach to Rationality in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
25 |
| A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
| A definition of Perfect Baysian Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
748 |
| A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
| A simple modal logic for belief revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
| A simple modal logic for belief revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
36 |
| AGREEING TO DISAGREE: A SURVEY |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
53 |
| AGREEING TO DISAGREE: A SURVEY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
668 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,805 |
| ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
399 |
| ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| An Axiomatic Approach to Equilibrium in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
| An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| Axiomatization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
| BRANCHING TIME LOGIC, PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
730 |
| BRANCHING TIME LOGIC, PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| Counterfactuals and the Prisoner?s Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
311 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
695 |
| EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
| Epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
| Epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
51 |
| Epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
29 |
| Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
36 |
| Extensive Forms and Set-Theoretic Forms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
| FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR THE HARSANYI DOCTRINE |
0 |
0 |
1 |
169 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
555 |
| Filtered belief revision and generalized choice structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| Four Logics for Minimal Belief Revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
| Fundamental Agreement: A new foundation for the Harsanyi Doctrine |
1 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
50 |
| GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
601 |
| Game Theory: Parts I and II. Open access book |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
99 |
| IF HE DOES NOT KNOW. WILL HE KNOW THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
320 |
| IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
| INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS AND THE LOGIC OF COMMON BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSISTENCY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
| INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSISTENCY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,029 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMANTICS OF BELIEF AND COMMON BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMANTICS OF BELIEF AND COMMON BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
330 |
| Information Partitions and the Logic of Knowledge and Common Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
241 |
| Information, Rational Reliefs and Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
| Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
718 |
| Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
445 |
| KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS IN EXTENSIVE GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
| Knowledge, Rationality and Equilibrium in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
| Logic and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Logic and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
| Logic and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
23 |
| Minimax regret with imperfect ex-post knowledge of the state |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
| Nash Versus Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium: The Role of Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
640 |
| Non-cooperative game theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
35 |
| On the Choice Between Process and Product Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
377 |
| Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
| Petrinets and Input-Output Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,107 |
| Players' Information in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
110 |
| Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
452 |
| Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
412 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
954 |
| RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
34 |
| Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
| Rational play in games: A behavioral approach |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
| Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
| Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| SET-THEORETIC EQUIVALENCE EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
164 |
| Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
266 |
| THE LOGIC OF BELIEF PERSISTENCY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
| THE LOGIC OF PREDICTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
| THE LOGIC OF PREDICTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2,603 |
| THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL PLAY IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
383 |
| TWO LECTURES ON THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Temporal Belief Revision Rationalized by Plausibility Orderings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Temporal interaction of information and belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| The Coverability Problem in Input-Output Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
186 |
| The Logic of Shared Belief, Public Rumor, Public Shared Belief and Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
356 |
| Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
637 |
| Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
7 |
19 |
2,378 |
14 |
37 |
136 |
19,750 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
| A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
| AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
| AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
| Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
114 |
| Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
30 |
| Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
| Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Divergence of choices despite similarity of characteristics: An application of catastrophe theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Editors' Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
| Editors' note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
| Entry deterrence with uncertain entry and uncertain observability of commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
| Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
| Extensive forms and set-theoretic forms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
| General Equilibrium Theory with Imperfect Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
361 |
| How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
349 |
| INTRODUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
30 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY ON AMBIGUITY AVERSION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY ON NEUROECONOMICS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
| Information, Knowledge and Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
308 |
| Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
| Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
183 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
533 |
| Introduction to the Special Section on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT12) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Introduction to the special issue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
| Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
212 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
819 |
| Logic and the foundations of the theory of games and decisions: introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
| Memory and perfect recall in extensive games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
174 |
| Minimax regret with imperfect ex-post knowledge of the state |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
| Modal logic and game theory: two alternative approaches |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
348 |
| Monopoly Equilibria and Catastrophe Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
| Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
280 |
| On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
26 |
| On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
168 |
| Players' information in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
| Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
| Rationality and Coordination, Bicchieri Cristina. Cambridge University Press, 1994, xiii + 270 pages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
| Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
339 |
| Reply to Vilks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Reply to ‘Social Cost and Groves Mechanisms’ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Set-Theoretic Equivalence of Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
| Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
119 |
| The Logic of Belief Persistence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
| The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| The Logical Representation of Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
139 |
| The coverability problem in input-output systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
64 |
| Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
92 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
344 |
| Vertical Separation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
363 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,267 |
| Total Journal Articles |
0 |
3 |
10 |
1,538 |
13 |
27 |
73 |
7,186 |
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