| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
321 |
| A Kripke-Lewis semantics for belief update and belief revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
23 |
| A Logical Representation of Extensive Games with Perfect Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
198 |
| A SET-THEORETIC APPROACH TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES: PART 1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
401 |
| A Syntactic Approach to Rationality in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
38 |
| A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
26 |
| A definition of Perfect Baysian Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
757 |
| A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
53 |
| A modal logic translation of the AGM axioms for belief revision |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
32 |
| A simple modal logic for belief revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
28 |
| A simple modal logic for belief revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
21 |
| AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
48 |
| AGREEING TO DISAGREE: A SURVEY |
1 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
3 |
7 |
26 |
82 |
| AGREEING TO DISAGREE: A SURVEY |
0 |
1 |
1 |
669 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
1,826 |
| ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
21 |
| ASSESSING THE TRUTH AXIOM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
405 |
| An Axiomatic Approach to Equilibrium in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
140 |
| An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
25 |
| Axiomatization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
20 |
| BRANCHING TIME LOGIC, PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
739 |
| BRANCHING TIME LOGIC, PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
15 |
| Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
26 |
| Counterfactuals and the Prisoner?s Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
28 |
| EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
311 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
708 |
| EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
26 |
| Epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
36 |
| Epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
39 |
| Epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
60 |
| Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
48 |
| Extensive Forms and Set-Theoretic Forms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
119 |
| FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR THE HARSANYI DOCTRINE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
571 |
| Filtered belief revision and generalized choice structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
41 |
| Four Logics for Minimal Belief Revision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
20 |
| Fundamental Agreement: A new foundation for the Harsanyi Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
3 |
6 |
19 |
74 |
| GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
608 |
| Game Theory: Parts I and II. Open access book |
1 |
2 |
5 |
34 |
6 |
14 |
41 |
144 |
| IF HE DOES NOT KNOW. WILL HE KNOW THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
329 |
| IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
114 |
| INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS AND THE LOGIC OF COMMON BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
32 |
| INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSISTENCY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1,037 |
| INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSISTENCY OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
36 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMANTICS OF BELIEF AND COMMON BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
20 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMANTICS OF BELIEF AND COMMON BELIEF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
350 |
| Information Partitions and the Logic of Knowledge and Common Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
247 |
| Information, Rational Reliefs and Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
110 |
| Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
725 |
| Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
458 |
| KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS IN EXTENSIVE GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
149 |
| Knowledge, Rationality and Equilibrium in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
182 |
| Logic and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
34 |
| Logic and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
112 |
| Logic and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
48 |
| Minimax regret with imperfect ex-post knowledge of the state |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
21 |
| Modeling the intensity of competition |
0 |
28 |
28 |
28 |
1 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
| Nash Versus Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium: The Role of Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
648 |
| Non-cooperative game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
45 |
| On the Choice Between Process and Product Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
382 |
| Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
27 |
| Petrinets and Input-Output Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,111 |
| Players' Information in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
118 |
| Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
461 |
| Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
39 |
| RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
57 |
| RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
412 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
959 |
| Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
136 |
| Rational play in games: A behavioral approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
55 |
| Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
| Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
26 |
| SET-THEORETIC EQUIVALENCE EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
170 |
| Supposing and learning: a unified framework for belief revision |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
| Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
273 |
| THE LOGIC OF BELIEF PERSISTENCY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
20 |
| THE LOGIC OF PREDICTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2,609 |
| THE LOGIC OF PREDICTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
33 |
| THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL PLAY IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
395 |
| TWO LECTURES ON THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| Temporal Belief Revision Rationalized by Plausibility Orderings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
20 |
| Temporal interaction of information and belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
18 |
| The Coverability Problem in Input-Output Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
192 |
| The Logic of Shared Belief, Public Rumor, Public Shared Belief and Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
362 |
| The logic of KM belief update is contained in the logic of AGM belief revision |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
| Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
647 |
| Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
34 |
51 |
2,440 |
28 |
82 |
819 |
20,652 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
34 |
| A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
86 |
| A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
107 |
| AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
54 |
| AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
46 |
| Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
127 |
| Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
39 |
| Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
72 |
| Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
34 |
| Divergence of choices despite similarity of characteristics: An application of catastrophe theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
26 |
| Editors' Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
53 |
| Editors' note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
63 |
| Entry deterrence with uncertain entry and uncertain observability of commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
58 |
| Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
34 |
| Extensive forms and set-theoretic forms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
| General Equilibrium Theory with Imperfect Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
375 |
| How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
360 |
| INTRODUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY ON AMBIGUITY AVERSION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
47 |
| INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY ON NEUROECONOMICS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
53 |
| Information, Knowledge and Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
320 |
| Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
50 |
| Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
185 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
559 |
| Introduction to the Special Section on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT12) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
31 |
| Introduction to the special issue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
72 |
| Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence |
1 |
1 |
1 |
214 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
843 |
| Logic and the foundations of the theory of games and decisions: introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
103 |
| Memory and perfect recall in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
187 |
| Minimax regret with imperfect ex-post knowledge of the state |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
33 |
| Modal logic and game theory: two alternative approaches |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
363 |
| Monopoly Equilibria and Catastrophe Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
141 |
| Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
292 |
| On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
34 |
| On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
185 |
| Players' information in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
58 |
| Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
13 |
| Rationality and Coordination, Bicchieri Cristina. Cambridge University Press, 1994, xiii + 270 pages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
34 |
| Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
138 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
358 |
| Reply to Vilks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| Reply to ‘Social Cost and Groves Mechanisms’ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
20 |
| Set-Theoretic Equivalence of Extensive-Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
98 |
| Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
131 |
| The Logic of Belief Persistence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
74 |
| The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
42 |
| The Logical Representation of Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
146 |
| The coverability problem in input-output systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
69 |
| Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
356 |
| Vertical Separation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
365 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
1,292 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
1 |
6 |
1,548 |
11 |
39 |
471 |
7,711 |
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