| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "The Museum Pass Game and its Value" Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| "The Museum Pass Game and its Value" Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
| A Bargaining Set Based on External and Internal Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| A Bargaining Set Based on External and Internal Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
31 |
| A Composite Run-to-the-Bank Rule for Multi-Issue Allocation Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
| A Composite Run-to-the-Bank Rule for Multi-Issue Allocation Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games: Multipurpose Resource Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games: Multipurpose Resource Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
43 |
| A Concede-and-Divide Rule for Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
54 |
| A Concede-and-Divide Rule for Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
483 |
| A Game of Influence on Opinion Formation - Precision Targeting in the Modern Information Space |
0 |
1 |
11 |
11 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
9 |
| A Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Ready Times |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
| A Geometric Characterisation of the Compromise Value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| A Geometric Characterisation of the Compromise Value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
| A New Relative Skill Measure for Games with Chance Elements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| A New Relative Skill Measure for Games with Chance Elements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
82 |
| A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
| A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
| A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
372 |
| A Note on Passepartout Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
| A Note on Shapley Ratings in Brain Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
| A Note on Shapley Ratings in Brain Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
| A Note on the Balancedness and the Concavity of Highway Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
| A Note on the Balancedness and the Concavity of Highway Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
| A Silent Battle over a Cake |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
| A Silent Battle over a Cake |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
| A Strategic Approach to Bankruptcy Problems Based on the TAL Family of Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| A Strategic Approach to Bankruptcy Problems Based on the TAL Family of Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
| A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
| A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| A Stroll with Alexia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| A Stroll with Alexia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| A Taxonomy of Best-Reply Multifunctions in 2x2x2 Trimatrix Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
| A Taxonomy of Best-Reply Multifunctions in 2x2x2 Trimatrix Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| A Unifying Model for Matching Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| A Unifying Model for Matching Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| A classification of 2x2 bimatrix games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
| A composite run-to-the-bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
| A cooperative game-theoretic approach to ALOHA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
101 |
| A game theoretic approach to problems in telecommunication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
| A geometric-combinatorial approach to bimatrix games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
17 |
| A new relative skill measure for games with chance elements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
| A note on NTU-convexity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
| A note on games corresponding to sequencing situations with due dates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| A note on games corresponding to sequencing situations with due dates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| A note on the characterization of the compromise value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| A note on the characterization of the compromise value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| A note on the characterizations of the compromise value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| A perfectness concept for multicriteria games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
| A perfectness concept for multicriteria games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
| A perfectness concept for multicriteria games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| A silent battle over a cake |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
| A taxonomy of best-reply multifunctions in 2x2x2 trimatix games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
| Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
| An Allocation Rule for Graph Machine Scheduling Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
| An Allocation Rule for Graph Machine Scheduling Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
| An Iterative Procedure for Evaluating Digraph Competitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
| An Iterative Procedure for Evaluating Digraph Competitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
| An amalgamation of games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
64 |
| An iterative procedure for evaluating digraph competitions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
| Axiomatic Characterizations of a Proportional Influence Measure for Sequential Projects with Imperfect Reliability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Axiomatic Characterizations of a Proportional Influence Measure for Sequential Projects with Imperfect Reliability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
| Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Axiomatizations of Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
| Bankruptcy and the Per Capita Nucleolus |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
56 |
| Bankruptcy and the Per Capita Nucleolus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
| Batch Sequencing and Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| Batch Sequencing and Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
26 |
| Cash and Tournament Poker: Games of Skill? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
| Characterizations of Network Power Measures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
198 |
| Characterizations of Solutions in Digraph Competitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
8 |
| Characterizations of Solutions in Digraph Competitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
17 |
| Characterizations of the beta- and the degree network power measure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
| Characterizing Cautious Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| Characterizing Cautious Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Characterizing cautious choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
| Communications and Cooperation in Public Network Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
8 |
| Communications and Cooperation in Public Network Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
| Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 1) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
33 |
| Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 1) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 2) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
| Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 2) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 2) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
30 |
| Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 2) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
16 |
| Competitive Environments and Protective Behaviour |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Competitive Environments and Protective Behaviour |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| Compromise Solutions Based on Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
32 |
| Compromise Solutions Based on Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| Compromise Solutions for Bankruptcy Situations with References |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Compromise Solutions for Bankruptcy Situations with References |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
| Compromise Stable TU-Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| Compromise Stable TU-Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
| Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
| Congestion Network Problems and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
| Congestion Network Problems and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
| Congestion games and potentials reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
| Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
| Congestion network problems and related games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Contracts and Coalition Formation based on Individual Deviations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
| Contracts and Insurance Group Formation by Myopic Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
| Contracts and Insurance Group Formation by Myopic Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Convexity in Stochastic Cooperative Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Convexity in Stochastic Cooperative Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Convexity in stochastic cooperative situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
34 |
| Cooperation and Competition in Linear Production and Sequencing Processes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Cooperation and Competition in Linear Production and Sequencing Processes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| Cooperation and communication restrictions: A survey |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
| Cooperation and communication restrictions: A survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Cooperation and communication restrictions: A survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Cooperation and competition in inventory games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
| Cooperation in Capital Deposits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Cooperation in Capital Deposits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| Cooperation in capital deposits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
| Cooperative Games with Stochastic Payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
395 |
| Cooperative Games with Stochastic Payoffs: Determanistic Equivalents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Cooperative Games with Stochastic Payoffs: Determanistic Equivalents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
| Cooperative Situations: Representations, Games and Cost Allocations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Cooperative Situations: Representations, Games and Cost Allocations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
| Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
23 |
| Core Implementation in Modified Strong and Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
159 |
| Core implementation in modified strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Core implementation in modified strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
| Cost Allocation Rules for Elastic Single-Attribute Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
33 |
| Cost Allocation Rules for Elastic Single-Attribute Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| Cost Allocation in CO2 Transport for CCUS Hubs: A Multi-Actor Perspective |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
| Cost Allocation in CO2 Transport for CCUS Hubs: A Multi-Actor Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
14 |
| Cost Sharing Methods for Capacity Restricted Cooperative Purchasing Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
| Cost Sharing Methods for Capacity Restricted Cooperative Purchasing Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Cost allocation and communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Cost allocation and communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Cost allocation and communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Cost allocation in the Chinese postman problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Decentralization and mutual liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
| Decentralization and mutual liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
| Decomposable effectivity functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
14 |
| Decomposition of Network Communication Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
| Decomposition of Network Communication Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Decomposition of network communication games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| Deposit Games with Reinvestment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
| Deposit Games with Reinvestment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Digraph competitions and cooperative games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
42 |
| Digraph competitions and cooperative games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
| Digraph competitions and cooperative games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
| Drop Out Monotonic Rules for Sequencing Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
| Drop Out Monotonic Rules for Sequencing Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
| Drop out monotonic rules for sequencing situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| Duality in Financial Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Duality in Financial Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
| Dynamic Stability of Cooperative Investment under Uncertainty |
1 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
23 |
| Dynamic Stability of Cooperative Investment under Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
| Economic Lot-Sizing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
628 |
| Economic lot-sizing games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
| Economic lot-sizing games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
| Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Effectivity functions and associated game correspondences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Effectivity functions and associated game correspondences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
50 |
| Entangled Equilibria for Bimatrix Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Entangled Equilibria for Bimatrix Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
| Extensions of the t-value to NTU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Extensions of the t-value to NTU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Externalities and Compensation: Primeval Games and Solutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
| Externalities and Compensation: Primeval Games and Solutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Externalities and Compensation:Primeval Games and Solutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,504 |
| Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
| Fall Back Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Fall Back Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Fall Back Equilibrium for 2 x n Bimatrix Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
| Fall Back Equilibrium for 2 x n Bimatrix Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
| Fall back proper equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
16 |
| Family Sequencing and Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Family Sequencing and Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
| Good and Bad Objects: Cardinality-Based Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
31 |
| Good and Bad Objects: Cardinality-Based Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Good and bad objects: The symmetric difference rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
43 |
| Induced Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems: Towards Merge-Proofness and Coalitional Stability |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
12 |
| Induced Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems: Towards Merge-Proofness and Coalitional Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
| Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
| Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
17 |
| Information types: A comparison |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
| Informationally Robust Equlibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
| Informationally Robust Equlibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Insinking: A Methodology to Exploit Synergy in Transportation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
| Insinking: A Methodology to Exploit Synergy in Transportation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
58 |
| Interactive Purchasing Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Interactive Purchasing Situations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
| Inventory Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
61 |
| Inventory Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Inventory games |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
27 |
| Job Scheduling, Cooperation and Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Job Scheduling, Cooperation and Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
| Joint Hub Network Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
| Joint Hub Network Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
| Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and Technology |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
| Linear Transformation of Products: Games and Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| Linear Transformation of Products: Games and Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Linear production with transport of products, resources and technology |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Linear transformation of products: Games and economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
| Maximum likelihood equilibria of random games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
| Maximum likelihood equilibria of random games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
| Maximum likelihood equilibria of random games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
| Measuring Skill in More-Person Games with Applications to Poker |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
38 |
| Measuring Skill in More-Person Games with Applications to Poker |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
| Measuring skill in games: Several approaches discussed |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
| Minimal Exact Balancedness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
28 |
| Minimal Exact Balancedness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Minimal Overlap Rules for Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| Minimal Overlap Rules for Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Minimal exact balancedness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Spillover Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
159 |
| Multi-Issue Allocation Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
| Multi-Issue Allocation Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| Multiple Fund Investment Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
| Multiple Fund Investment Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Multiple fund investment situations and related games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| NTU-Bankruptcy Problems: Consistency and the Relative Adjustment Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
| NTU-Bankruptcy Problems: Consistency and the Relative Adjustment Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games with Identical Anonymous Best-Replies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games with Identical Anonymous Best-Replies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
| Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
64 |
| On 'informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
| On Convexity for NTU-Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
| On Convexity for NTU-Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| On Determining Leading Coalitions in Supply Chains: Methodology and Application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
| On Determining Leading Coalitions in Supply Chains: Methodology and Application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
| On Heterogeneous Covert Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| On Heterogeneous Covert Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
27 |
| On Interactive Sequencing Situations with Exponential Cost Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| On Interactive Sequencing Situations with Exponential Cost Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
29 |
| On Properness and Protectiveness in Two Person Multicriteria Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| On Properness and Protectiveness in Two Person Multicriteria Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
| On Solving Liability Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
| On Solving Liability Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
| On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
45 |
| On Three Shapley-Like Solutions for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
| On Three Shapley-Like Solutions for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| On Two New Social Choice Correspondences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| On Two New Social Choice Correspondences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
| On a Compromise Social Choice Correspondence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| On a Compromise Social Choice Correspondence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
24 |
| On a Measure of Skills for Games with Chance Elements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| On a Measure of Skills for Games with Chance Elements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
| On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
| On a compromise social choice correspondence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
| On a new class of parallel sequencing situations and related games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| On a relative measure of skill for games with chance elements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
| On constructing games with a convex set of equilibrium strategies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| On game theoretic models and solution concepts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
| On games corresponding to sequencing situations with ready times |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
27 |
| On games corresponding to sequencing situations with ready times |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
| On modifications of the concepts of perfect and proper equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
| On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| On strictly perfect sets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
| On the 1-Nucleolus for Classes of Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
| On the 1-nucleolus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
17 |
| On the Beta measure for digraph competitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| On the Convexity of Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Due Dates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| On the Convexity of Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Due Dates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
| On the Convexity of Step out - Step in Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
48 |
| On the Convexity of Step out - Step in Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| On the Core of Multiple Longest Traveling Salesman Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
| On the Core of Multiple Longest Traveling Salesman Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
31 |
| On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| On the Rule of Chance Moves and Information in Two-Person Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| On the Rule of Chance Moves and Information in Two-Person Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
| On the Unification of Centralized and Decentralized Clearing Mechanisms in Financial Networks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
| On the Unification of Centralized and Decentralized Clearing Mechanisms in Financial Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
| On the convexity of communication games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
| On the convexity of games corresponding to sequencing situations with due dates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| On the core of routing games with revenues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
| On the position value for communication situations |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
85 |
| On the structure of the set of perfect equilibria in bimatrix games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| One-Mode Projection Analysis and Design of Covert Affiliation Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| One-Mode Projection Analysis and Design of Covert Affiliation Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Operations Research Games: A Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
93 |
| Operations Research Games: A Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
| Operations research games: A survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
152 |
| Operations research, games and graphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
| Optimal Design of Pension Funds: A Mission Impossible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Optimal Design of Pension Funds: A Mission Impossible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
33 |
| Optimal design of pension funds: A mission impossible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Pareto equilibria in multiobjective games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
112 |
| Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
| Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
| Preparation Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
| Preparation Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Processing Games with Restricted Capacities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
| Processing Games with Restricted Capacities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Professor Stef Tijs (1937-2023) OBITUARY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Project Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
| Project Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
| Project games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
30 |
| Proportionality, Equality, and Duality in Bankruptcy Problems with Nontransferable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
50 |
| Proportionality, Equality, and Duality in Bankruptcy Problems with Nontransferable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
| Proportionate Flow Shop Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| Proportionate Flow Shop Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
| Protective Behavior in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
| Protective Behavior in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
| Protective behavior in games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
| Ranking Terrorists in Networks: A Sensitivity Analysis of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Attack |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Ranking Terrorists in Networks: A Sensitivity Analysis of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Attack |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
81 |
| Resource Allocation Problems with Concave Reward Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
64 |
| Resource Allocation Problems with Concave Reward Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
| Sequencing Games with Repeated Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
24 |
| Sequencing Games with Repeated Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
| Sequencing games with repeated players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
| Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
| Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
336 |
| Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
223 |
| Simple and Three-Valued Simple Minimum Coloring Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
| Simple and Three-Valued Simple Minimum Coloring Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
| Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Step out - Step in Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
121 |
| Step out - Step in Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Stochastic Cooperative Games in Insurance and Reinsurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| Stochastic Cooperative Games in Insurance and Reinsurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
| Stochastic cooperative games in insurance and reinsurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
| Stochastic cooperative games: Superadditivity, convexity and certainty equivalents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
| Stochastic cooperative games: Theory and applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
| Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
17 |
| Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maimizer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maimizer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
| Technology Selection with Peer-Based Network Effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
| Technology Selection with Peer-Based Network Effects |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
| Texas Hold’em: A Game of Skill |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| The Characterization of Clearing Payments in Financial Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
| The Characterization of Clearing Payments in Financial Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
| The Chineese Postman and Delivery Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,323 |
| The Compromise Value for NTU-Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
124 |
| The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
64 |
| The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
| The Constrained Equal Award Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Constrained Equal Award Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
41 |
| The Influence of Secrecy on the Communication Structure of Covert Networks |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
| The Influence of Secrecy on the Communication Structure of Covert Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
50 |
| The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
| The Myerson Value for Union Stable Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| The Myerson Value for Union Stable Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
| The Myerson value for union stable systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
| The Nucleolus and Inheritance of Properties in Communication Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| The Nucleolus and Inheritance of Properties in Communication Situations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
| The Procedural Egalitarian Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
| The Procedural Egalitarian Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
32 |
| The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
| The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
25 |
| The V L Value for Network Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
| The V L Value for Network Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| The chinese postman and delivery games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
| The compromise value for NTU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
29 |
| The compromise value for NTU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
| The compromise value for NTU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
| The compromise value for NTU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
33 |
| The consensus value: A new solution concept for cooperative games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
| The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
18 |
| The position value for union stable systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
| The position value for union stable systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
31 |
| The position value for union stable systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| The split core for sequencing games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
| The split core of sequencing games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
| The structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| Three-Valued Simple Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
44 |
| Three-Valued Simple Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
| Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
| Transfers, Contracts and Strategic Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Transfers, Contracts and Strategic Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
95 |
| Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Unilateral Support Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Unilateral Support Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
34 |
| Weakly strict equilibria in finite normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
| Total Working Papers |
4 |
7 |
36 |
1,826 |
269 |
366 |
608 |
14,215 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.