Access Statistics for Tilman Börgers

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 23 0 0 10 152
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 17 0 1 21 129
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 74 2 4 21 369
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types 0 0 0 38 0 1 12 202
An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly 0 0 0 34 0 1 15 101
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 2 0 1 9 15
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 8 0 0 15 63
Auction theory for auction design 0 0 0 3 0 0 12 55
Costly Voting 0 0 0 23 0 0 17 126
Costly Voting 0 0 0 126 0 0 15 322
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 21 0 1 9 85
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 60 1 2 8 214
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 47 0 0 6 170
Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence 0 0 0 31 1 1 15 144
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 58
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 9 0 0 9 63
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 84 0 1 11 415
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 23 2 2 10 152
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 1 2 2 93 1 2 17 320
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 0 3 675 0 5 49 2,356
Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration 0 0 0 204 0 5 24 954
Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations 0 2 2 17 0 4 20 80
On The Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 0 0 442 0 0 8 1,591
Perfect Equilibrium Histories of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.47, No.1, (1989), pp.218-227.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 89
RATIONALITY ALONE DOES NOT ALLOW PLAYERS TO SOLVE ALL GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 164
Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: the Case of the UK Auction 0 0 0 62 1 2 6 268
Revealed Relative Utilitarianism 0 0 1 14 0 1 12 57
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 34 1 2 22 118
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 116 0 0 12 395
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 25 0 0 15 55
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 1 16 0 1 12 41
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 40 0 0 9 102
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 0 0 21 1 1 6 77
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes 0 0 0 26 0 0 14 110
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes? 0 0 1 21 0 1 15 80
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 0 41 0 1 19 178
Total Working Papers 1 4 10 2,470 10 40 504 9,870

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 172
(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) 0 0 4 39 1 2 15 138
A counterexample to Dhillon (1998) 0 0 0 6 0 1 9 37
A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types 0 0 1 30 0 3 12 156
An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly 0 0 0 14 1 1 6 58
Awarding telecom licences: the recent European experience 0 0 0 37 0 0 6 157
Costly Voting 0 0 0 240 1 4 13 578
Efficient compromising 0 0 0 71 0 1 11 273
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 76 1 1 11 453
Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games 0 0 2 54 0 0 8 176
Is Internet Voting a Good Thing? 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 555
Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model 0 0 0 146 0 0 6 916
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 3 5 491 2 7 29 1,198
Letter from the editors 0 0 0 7 0 1 5 39
Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations 0 0 0 84 0 5 16 362
On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 0 0 29 0 2 7 160
On the dominance solvability of large cournot games 0 0 0 22 0 1 12 164
Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games 0 0 0 48 0 0 7 109
Pure Strategy Dominance 0 0 1 106 0 0 7 452
Recent Books on Evolutionary Game Theory 1 1 1 2 1 3 14 34
Recent Textbooks on Game Theory: Review Article 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 109
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 23 0 0 15 195
Robustly Ranking Mechanisms 0 0 0 32 0 1 12 167
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 103 0 0 8 488
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 6 0 0 14 73
Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes 0 1 1 62 0 2 7 263
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 0 0 81 0 0 4 215
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 2 50 1 5 14 214
Total Journal Articles 1 5 17 1,859 10 44 293 7,911

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 5 16 77 1,011
Total Books 0 0 0 0 5 16 77 1,011

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Complexity Constraints and Adaptive Learning: An Example 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11