Access Statistics for Tilman Börgers

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 142
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 74 0 0 4 348
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 108
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types 0 0 0 38 2 2 3 190
An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly 0 0 0 34 0 3 5 86
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 48
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6
Auction theory for auction design 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 43
Costly Voting 0 0 0 126 0 5 8 307
Costly Voting 0 0 0 23 0 0 3 109
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 76
Efficient Compromising 0 1 1 47 0 1 2 163
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 60 0 0 1 205
Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence 0 0 1 31 2 3 6 129
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 54
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 45
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 84 1 2 3 404
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 142
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 0 1 672 0 5 15 2,304
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 0 0 91 0 0 9 303
Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration 0 0 0 204 0 1 3 930
Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations 0 1 1 15 0 1 3 60
On The Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 0 1 442 1 1 2 1,583
Perfect Equilibrium Histories of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.47, No.1, (1989), pp.218-227.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80
RATIONALITY ALONE DOES NOT ALLOW PLAYERS TO SOLVE ALL GAMES 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 155
Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: the Case of the UK Auction 0 0 0 62 0 0 1 262
Revealed Relative Utilitarianism 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 45
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 34 0 1 4 96
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 116 0 0 3 383
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 40
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 29
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 93
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 0 0 21 0 1 2 71
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes 0 0 1 26 0 0 2 96
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes? 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 64
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 0 40 0 0 3 158
Total Working Papers 0 2 6 2,459 9 31 108 9,357

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 163
(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) 0 0 4 34 1 1 7 122
A counterexample to Dhillon (1998) 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 28
A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types 0 0 0 29 1 3 5 144
An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly 0 0 0 14 0 1 3 52
Awarding telecom licences: the recent European experience 0 0 1 37 0 0 2 151
Costly Voting 1 1 1 240 1 2 6 560
Efficient compromising 0 0 1 71 0 2 6 260
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 76 1 3 3 442
Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games 0 0 2 52 0 0 2 168
Is Internet Voting a Good Thing? 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 546
Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model 0 0 0 146 0 3 4 909
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 0 8 486 0 2 25 1,169
Letter from the editors 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 34
Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations 0 0 0 84 0 1 2 346
On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 0 1 29 0 2 5 153
On the dominance solvability of large cournot games 0 0 0 22 1 2 5 152
Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games 0 0 0 48 0 1 1 102
Pure Strategy Dominance 0 0 1 105 1 3 6 445
Recent Books on Evolutionary Game Theory 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 20
Recent Textbooks on Game Theory: Review Article 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 102
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 180
Robustly Ranking Mechanisms 0 0 1 32 1 3 4 155
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 103 0 1 1 480
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 1 6 0 2 5 59
Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 256
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 1 1 81 1 2 2 211
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 0 48 1 3 10 200
Total Journal Articles 1 2 22 1,841 9 42 114 7,609

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 6 15 113 933
Total Books 0 0 0 0 6 15 113 933

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Complexity Constraints and Adaptive Learning: An Example 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4

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Statistics updated 2025-09-05