Access Statistics for Tilman Börgers

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 108
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 142
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 74 1 2 4 348
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types 0 0 0 38 0 1 1 188
An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly 0 0 0 34 0 0 2 83
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 47
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6
Auction theory for auction design 0 0 0 3 0 2 5 42
Costly Voting 0 0 0 126 0 0 3 302
Costly Voting 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 107
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 60 1 1 1 205
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 46 0 1 1 162
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 76
Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence 0 0 0 30 0 1 1 124
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 54
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 42
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 142
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 84 0 1 2 402
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 0 0 91 2 3 10 303
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 1 2 672 1 4 9 2,297
Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration 0 0 0 204 0 2 2 929
Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations 0 0 0 14 0 1 3 59
On The Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 0 1 442 0 0 3 1,582
Perfect Equilibrium Histories of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.47, No.1, (1989), pp.218-227.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80
RATIONALITY ALONE DOES NOT ALLOW PLAYERS TO SOLVE ALL GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 154
Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: the Case of the UK Auction 0 0 0 62 0 1 1 262
Revealed Relative Utilitarianism 0 0 0 13 0 1 3 45
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 34 1 1 3 95
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 116 0 1 4 383
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 40
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 28
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 40 0 1 4 93
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 0 0 21 0 1 1 70
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes 0 0 1 26 0 1 2 96
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes? 0 0 0 20 0 1 1 64
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 0 40 0 1 3 158
Total Working Papers 0 1 4 2,456 6 31 81 9,318

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 161
(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) 0 2 5 34 1 3 13 121
A counterexample to Dhillon (1998) 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 27
A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 141
An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 51
Awarding telecom licences: the recent European experience 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 150
Costly Voting 0 0 0 239 0 0 7 558
Efficient compromising 0 1 2 71 0 1 5 257
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 439
Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games 0 1 2 52 0 1 2 168
Is Internet Voting a Good Thing? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 545
Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model 0 0 1 146 0 1 3 906
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 1 2 11 486 2 5 30 1,165
Letter from the editors 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 34
Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations 0 0 0 84 0 1 1 345
On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 1 1 29 0 1 2 150
On the dominance solvability of large cournot games 0 0 0 22 0 1 4 150
Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 101
Pure Strategy Dominance 0 0 2 104 1 1 5 441
Recent Books on Evolutionary Game Theory 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19
Recent Textbooks on Game Theory: Review Article 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 102
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 180
Robustly Ranking Mechanisms 0 0 1 32 0 0 2 152
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 479
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 1 6 0 1 3 57
Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes 0 0 3 61 0 0 3 256
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 209
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 0 48 0 1 4 194
Total Journal Articles 1 7 29 1,837 5 21 95 7,558

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 6 24 126 912
Total Books 0 0 0 0 6 24 126 912

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Complexity Constraints and Adaptive Learning: An Example 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4

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Statistics updated 2025-05-12