Access Statistics for Tilman Börgers

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 23 0 1 10 152
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 17 1 10 18 126
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types 0 0 0 74 5 7 17 365
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types 0 0 0 38 2 4 13 201
An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly 0 0 0 34 1 6 14 97
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 2 3 4 8 14
Auction Theory for Auction Design 0 0 0 8 2 3 15 62
Auction theory for auction design 0 0 0 3 3 3 11 53
Costly Voting 0 0 0 126 0 2 19 321
Costly Voting 0 0 0 23 5 10 19 126
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 60 2 4 7 212
Efficient Compromising 0 0 0 21 0 0 5 81
Efficient Compromising 0 0 1 47 1 1 7 169
Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence 0 0 1 31 2 4 17 141
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 0 1 3 16 58
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence 0 0 0 9 4 4 9 63
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 84 7 7 12 414
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 23 1 1 8 150
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 0 0 91 3 4 15 318
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 1 1 2 674 6 16 50 2,347
Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration 0 0 0 204 8 9 18 947
Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations 0 0 1 15 7 8 15 74
On The Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 0 0 442 0 0 9 1,591
Perfect Equilibrium Histories of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.47, No.1, (1989), pp.218-227.) 0 0 0 0 3 3 9 89
RATIONALITY ALONE DOES NOT ALLOW PLAYERS TO SOLVE ALL GAMES 0 0 0 0 3 3 10 164
Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: the Case of the UK Auction 0 0 0 62 2 3 4 266
Revealed Relative Utilitarianism 0 0 1 14 3 4 11 56
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 34 3 7 17 112
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 116 3 6 11 394
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 1 16 2 2 11 39
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 40 2 3 9 102
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 25 4 8 15 55
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 0 0 21 2 2 6 76
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes 0 0 0 26 4 4 14 110
When are Signals Complements or Substitutes? 0 0 0 20 1 2 11 75
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 1 41 5 9 17 175
Total Working Papers 1 1 8 2,464 101 167 477 9,795

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 171
(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) 1 3 4 38 2 6 11 132
A counterexample to Dhillon (1998) 0 0 0 6 3 4 9 36
A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types 0 0 0 29 2 4 10 151
An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly 0 0 0 14 1 2 6 57
Awarding telecom licences: the recent European experience 0 0 1 37 3 4 7 157
Costly Voting 0 0 1 240 1 2 15 573
Efficient compromising 0 0 0 71 0 4 13 270
Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules 0 0 0 76 1 1 12 451
Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games 0 0 2 54 0 0 8 176
Is Internet Voting a Good Thing? 0 0 0 0 3 4 9 554
Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model 0 0 0 146 5 5 10 916
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics 0 0 0 486 4 8 21 1,186
Letter from the editors 0 0 0 7 0 1 4 38
Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations 0 0 0 84 1 4 10 355
On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory 0 0 0 29 3 3 8 158
On the dominance solvability of large cournot games 0 0 0 22 2 5 13 163
Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games 0 0 0 48 1 2 8 109
Pure Strategy Dominance 0 0 2 106 0 1 11 452
Recent Books on Evolutionary Game Theory 0 0 0 1 2 4 12 31
Recent Textbooks on Game Theory: Review Article 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 106
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules 0 0 0 23 3 4 14 194
Robustly Ranking Mechanisms 0 0 0 32 1 6 13 165
Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 103 1 3 6 485
Strategically Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 6 1 3 13 70
Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes 0 0 0 61 0 1 5 261
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge 0 0 1 81 1 1 6 215
When are signals complements or substitutes? 0 0 2 50 3 3 14 208
Total Journal Articles 1 3 13 1,850 45 87 282 7,840

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 13 27 71 983
Total Books 0 0 0 0 13 27 71 983

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Complexity Constraints and Adaptive Learning: An Example 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 7
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 7

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06