Access Statistics for Olivier Bos

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction 0 0 0 21 0 2 2 97
Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 36
All-Pay Auctions with Endogenous Rewards 0 0 1 90 0 1 2 196
All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards 0 0 0 21 1 1 1 42
All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 69
Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure 0 6 6 6 0 6 7 7
Auctions with Signaling Concerns 0 0 0 33 0 0 2 80
Auctions with Signaling Concerns 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 33
Auctions with prestige motives 0 0 0 26 0 0 2 46
Auctions with prestige motives 0 0 1 47 0 0 1 148
Auctions with signaling concerns 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Charitable asymmetric bidders 0 0 0 51 0 0 1 96
Charitable asymmetric bidders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 50
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few 0 0 0 31 0 3 3 193
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few 0 0 0 59 0 0 3 181
Charity auctions for the happy few 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 5
Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling 0 0 1 10 1 1 3 12
Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 43
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 27
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 13
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
How lotteries outperform auctions 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 25
How lotteries outperform auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
How lotteries outperform auctions for charity 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 88
Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders 0 0 1 16 0 0 3 36
Optimal auctions with signaling bidders 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 12
Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 37
Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Risk pooling in redistributive agreements 0 0 0 18 0 1 2 111
Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 49 0 0 1 183
Signaling in auctions: experimental evidence 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 32
Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 74
Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 23
Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3
Wars of Attrition with Stochastic Competition 0 0 0 51 0 0 1 166
Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition 0 0 0 67 0 1 2 106
Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 37
Total Working Papers 0 6 10 819 4 22 51 2,347

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 41
All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 42
Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 2
Auctions with signaling concerns 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 13
Charitable asymmetric bidders 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 15
Charity auctions for the happy few 0 0 0 5 2 2 2 41
Effets de réputation dans les enchères: l’inégalité des perdants 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 7
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling 0 1 3 4 0 1 4 10
How lotteries outperform auctions 0 0 0 40 1 2 3 109
L'enchère à offres payantes. Un mécanisme aux applications diverses 0 0 0 19 0 1 3 90
Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 67
Signalling in auctions for risk-averse bidders 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 22
Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition 0 0 0 26 0 0 2 116
Total Journal Articles 0 2 4 119 5 13 29 576

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2025-08-05