Access Statistics for Agustín G. Bonifacio

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games 0 0 0 8 0 3 14 43
Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities 0 0 3 3 0 0 11 11
Core and Stability Notions in Many-to-one Matching Markets with Indifferences 0 0 0 10 0 3 16 39
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences 0 0 0 11 4 7 15 41
Counting Steps for Re-Stabilization in a Labor Matching Market 0 0 0 0 1 4 12 15
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 10
Cycles to Compute the Full Set of Many-to-many Stable Matchings 0 0 0 6 0 2 9 22
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 0 0 0 4 0 3 9 16
Lattice Operations for the Stable Set in Substitutable Matching Markets via re-equilibration Dynamics 0 0 0 5 1 6 13 21
Lattice operations for the pairwise stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics 0 0 0 5 0 2 10 12
Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem 0 0 0 6 0 5 20 26
Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games 0 0 0 9 1 4 16 33
Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences 0 1 5 5 0 3 4 4
Not Obviously Manipulable Allotment Rules 0 0 0 2 0 3 11 15
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules 0 0 0 5 0 2 7 14
Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules 0 0 0 12 0 0 9 20
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules 0 0 0 6 0 1 10 17
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules 0 0 0 14 0 0 3 8
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 7
On Strategy-Proofness and Semilattice Single-Peakedness 0 0 0 6 0 3 10 37
On Voting Rules Satisfying False-Name-Proofness and Participation 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 9
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness 0 0 1 28 1 2 10 62
On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 9
On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation 0 0 1 4 0 4 13 18
Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economies with multidimensional single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 2 0 1 9 10
Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains 0 0 0 5 0 2 26 36
Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains 0 0 0 14 0 0 17 37
Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules 0 0 0 10 1 6 18 39
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules 0 0 0 8 0 1 9 18
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules 0 0 2 8 0 3 12 18
Stable Decompositions of Coalition Formation Games 0 0 0 15 1 6 16 29
The Lattice of Envy-Free Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts 0 0 0 4 1 1 14 24
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 0 0 6 0 1 9 23
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 22
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 3 1 4 11 22
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 5 3 6 12 34
Trade-off between Manipulability and Dictatorial Power: a Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem 0 0 0 7 0 2 6 20
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 7
Variable Population Manipulations of Reallocation Rules in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences 0 0 0 4 0 2 10 22
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 9 0 1 12 18
Total Working Papers 0 1 12 263 15 102 436 888

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games 0 0 0 1 0 5 17 22
Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 9 1 1 9 65
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences 0 0 1 2 0 2 16 24
Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238] 0 0 0 3 0 0 12 21
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 0 0 0 1 0 3 12 17
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules 0 0 0 0 0 1 29 29
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules 0 0 1 1 0 1 9 16
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule 0 0 0 0 0 3 15 15
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness 0 0 0 2 0 5 19 34
Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 11
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 13
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 1 0 2 9 16
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 4 11 11
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 17
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 20 1 31 188 311

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Statistics updated 2026-07-10