Access Statistics for Steven J. Brams

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm 0 0 0 17 0 0 13 52
A Generic Negotiation Game 0 0 0 63 0 0 10 546
A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem 0 0 0 44 0 1 12 229
A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game 0 0 0 12 0 1 25 43
A Procedure for Divorce Settlements 0 0 0 99 0 0 7 982
A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices 0 0 0 10 0 0 11 88
A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices 0 0 0 57 0 0 14 172
A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share 0 0 0 28 0 0 9 79
APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE 0 0 0 25 1 2 9 270
ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS 0 0 0 20 0 0 11 314
ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS 0 0 0 10 0 0 6 193
Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games 0 0 0 22 0 0 9 73
An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm 0 0 0 89 0 0 6 684
An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items 0 0 1 24 0 0 17 104
Approval Voting in Practice 0 0 0 13 0 0 6 166
Arbitration Procedures 0 0 0 13 0 0 6 263
Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal? 0 0 0 51 1 1 11 730
Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem 0 0 0 138 1 1 15 983
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best 0 0 0 28 1 2 9 296
COALITION VOTING 0 0 0 38 1 2 10 382
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM 0 0 0 20 0 0 6 339
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD 0 0 0 21 1 2 12 283
Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair? 0 0 0 91 1 2 9 469
Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power 0 0 0 118 1 3 12 1,753
Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates 0 0 0 2 0 2 12 28
Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive 0 0 0 19 1 2 16 53
Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive 0 0 0 10 0 1 9 36
Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting 0 0 0 24 0 1 7 77
Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009 0 0 0 21 0 1 11 95
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 0 0 0 0 1 1 12 238
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 0 0 1 68 0 0 18 286
Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake 0 0 0 51 1 1 14 179
Cycles of Conflict 0 0 0 65 0 0 3 487
Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case 0 0 0 46 0 0 8 1,808
Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars 0 0 0 54 1 1 9 209
Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 16 0 1 12 73
Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 6 0 0 9 43
Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm 0 0 0 25 0 1 15 264
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System 0 0 0 58 0 1 13 188
Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system 0 0 1 67 0 0 15 251
Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? 0 0 0 22 0 1 12 115
Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration 0 0 0 24 0 0 5 128
Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium 0 0 0 24 0 3 17 62
Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness 0 0 0 18 0 0 7 224
Fair Division and Politics 0 0 0 23 0 1 12 180
Fair Division by Point Allocation 0 0 0 55 1 1 8 255
Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity 0 0 0 81 0 0 13 1,147
Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy 0 0 0 149 0 0 13 745
Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black 0 0 1 8 1 2 16 60
Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black 0 0 0 7 0 1 20 54
Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule 0 0 0 10 0 2 23 44
Fallback Bargaining 0 0 0 88 0 2 13 666
Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict 0 0 0 16 0 1 12 41
Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus 0 0 0 12 0 0 6 124
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters 0 0 0 29 0 0 9 160
Game Theory and Emotions 0 0 0 269 0 1 16 1,054
Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round 0 0 0 84 0 0 10 859
Games Theory and Literature 0 0 0 184 1 2 10 780
How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 1 3 24 0 2 14 70
How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted? 0 0 0 9 1 1 9 245
How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games 0 0 0 122 1 1 15 187
How to divide things fairly 0 0 0 50 0 0 8 145
Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes 0 0 0 25 0 0 27 226
Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement 0 0 0 40 1 1 6 312
Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 52
Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 0 0 0 36 0 11 11 71
Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation 0 0 0 28 1 3 14 106
Making Tennis Fairer: The Grand Tiebreaker 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 5
Making the Rules of Sports Fairer 0 0 0 56 0 0 18 97
Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience 0 0 0 95 0 0 10 390
Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items 0 0 0 58 1 1 10 67
Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games 0 0 0 24 1 2 11 311
Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership 0 0 0 26 0 0 16 126
Modeling Free Choice in Games 0 0 0 41 0 0 5 338
Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach 0 0 1 57 1 1 33 150
Multi-Tier Tournaments: Matching and Scoring Players 0 0 1 18 0 1 12 22
N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division 0 0 0 46 0 1 24 114
Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule 0 2 2 18 1 4 11 64
National Security Games 0 0 0 37 0 0 8 296
New Chairman Paradoxes 0 0 0 13 0 0 5 59
Nonmyoptic Equilibria 0 0 0 17 0 0 7 60
Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 16 1 1 10 72
OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF 0 0 0 18 0 0 6 411
Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes 0 0 0 18 0 0 9 170
Optimal Deterrence 0 0 0 17 1 1 7 70
Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries 0 0 0 12 1 1 4 55
Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections 0 0 0 9 0 0 5 33
Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 49 2 2 14 327
Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures 0 0 0 11 0 0 10 83
Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options 0 0 0 28 0 1 11 228
Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control 0 0 0 7 1 1 8 112
Rational De-Escalation 0 0 0 14 0 0 7 311
Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach 0 0 0 307 1 1 13 1,712
SEQUENTIAL ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 0 0 0 22 0 0 5 391
Satisfaction approval voting 2 2 8 44 5 7 59 295
Sequential Arbitration Procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 408
Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases 0 0 0 36 1 1 13 58
Stabilizing Power Sharing 0 0 0 43 0 0 8 132
Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games 0 0 0 19 0 0 18 48
THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH? 0 0 0 145 0 0 9 837
The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition 0 0 0 19 0 0 6 301
The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes 1 1 2 27 1 3 16 102
The Instability of Power Sharing 0 0 0 37 0 0 11 101
The Paradox of Grading Systems 0 0 0 32 0 0 7 60
The Paradox of Multiple Elections 0 0 0 81 0 0 14 356
The Path to Stable Deterrence 0 0 0 22 0 0 5 138
The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability 0 0 0 16 0 0 7 189
The Probability of Nuclear War 0 0 0 70 1 2 14 424
The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves 0 0 0 103 2 2 7 335
The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen 0 0 0 34 1 1 8 155
The Truel 0 0 0 98 0 0 11 394
The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 43 0 1 13 176
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items 0 0 0 44 0 2 21 206
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples 0 0 0 543 2 2 8 2,143
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 43 0 1 14 204
Threat Power in Sequential Games 0 0 0 45 0 0 9 143
Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar 0 0 0 139 1 1 7 715
To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises 0 0 0 85 2 3 17 1,067
Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies 0 0 0 37 2 2 10 187
Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse 0 0 0 48 2 2 12 374
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible 0 0 0 10 0 0 13 28
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm 0 0 1 62 0 0 16 208
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties 0 0 1 7 0 0 14 20
Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal 0 0 0 29 1 2 15 69
Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts 0 0 0 49 0 0 10 92
Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts 0 0 0 26 0 1 13 96
UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES 0 0 0 16 0 0 3 172
Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 7 1 1 5 38
Voting Procedures 0 0 0 151 0 2 12 750
Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions 0 0 0 58 0 0 13 297
Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too 0 0 0 30 1 1 11 92
When does approval voting make the "right choices"? 0 0 0 29 0 2 13 77
When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions 0 0 0 31 0 0 11 118
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? 0 0 0 23 0 0 10 495
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 8 0 0 5 62
Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting? 0 0 0 57 0 0 11 1,965
Yes-No Voting 0 0 0 29 1 1 7 225
Total Working Papers 3 6 23 6,531 54 125 1,567 42,346

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Generic Negotiation Game 0 1 1 4 0 1 11 33
A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game 0 0 1 4 0 1 12 39
A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices 0 0 0 3 0 1 12 26
A minimax procedure for electing committees 0 0 0 28 0 1 11 170
A nail-biting election 0 0 0 22 0 1 9 263
A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share 0 0 0 8 0 0 10 75
AGREEMENT THROUGH THREATS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE 0 0 0 7 0 0 8 27
Another Solution 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 26
Approval Voting 3 7 25 65 5 20 106 229
Approval Voting in Practice 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 220
Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections 0 0 0 4 0 3 13 44
Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 44
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best 0 0 0 6 0 0 15 48
CATCH-22 AND KING-OF-THE-MOUNTAIN GAMES 0 0 0 2 0 0 18 34
Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond 0 0 0 29 1 2 14 156
Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair? 0 0 0 11 0 0 6 41
Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 45
Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958) 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 12
Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346) 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 9
Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College” 0 0 0 1 0 1 10 20
Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Play†0 0 0 1 0 0 6 21
Competitive Fair Division 0 0 3 236 0 5 25 833
Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board 0 0 1 7 0 1 15 31
Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? 0 0 0 44 0 2 15 167
Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 76
Deception in 2 × 2 Games 0 0 1 6 0 1 9 32
Dividing the Indivisible 0 0 0 6 0 0 8 30
Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting 0 0 0 0 1 1 12 24
Efficient Fair Division 0 0 1 8 0 0 12 31
Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence 0 1 2 14 0 4 20 71
Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium 0 0 0 1 1 1 11 21
FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS 0 0 0 65 0 0 13 194
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity 0 0 0 65 1 3 36 301
Fallback Bargaining 0 3 3 9 0 6 18 77
Final-offer arbitration with a bonus 0 0 0 20 2 2 8 112
Forming stable coalitions: The process matters 0 0 0 20 0 0 11 139
GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS 0 0 1 15 1 3 21 92
Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95 0 0 1 27 1 3 11 82
Game Theory and Literature 1 2 5 431 2 7 23 1,346
Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations 0 1 4 346 0 40 74 889
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting 0 0 1 49 0 1 15 195
Intransigence in Negotiations 0 0 0 1 1 2 13 41
Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation 0 0 0 5 1 1 20 56
Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 13
Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods 0 0 0 11 1 1 13 38
Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences 0 0 1 3 1 1 10 31
Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 42
Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games 0 0 0 0 15 15 29 2,517
Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach 0 0 0 4 0 1 18 48
Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule 0 0 0 1 1 1 7 37
Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma 0 1 1 8 0 1 20 66
Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games 0 0 0 5 0 0 9 28
Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges 0 0 2 7 1 2 17 33
Optimal Threats 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 24
Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries 0 0 0 7 0 1 6 40
Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states 0 0 0 2 0 1 17 55
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) 0 0 0 2 0 0 11 32
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) 0 0 0 1 1 2 10 20
Proportional Representation 0 0 1 5 0 1 12 51
Proportional pie-cutting 0 0 0 30 0 2 10 161
Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 21
Rejoinder to Niemi 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 11
Replies 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 10
Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9
Response to Rabow 0 0 0 3 1 1 7 21
Response to Randall Stone 0 0 0 1 1 1 14 33
Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings 0 0 0 10 1 2 8 68
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions 0 0 0 4 1 2 10 39
The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule 0 0 0 2 0 2 10 15
The Probability of Nuclear War 0 0 1 8 3 4 13 37
The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes 0 0 1 6 0 0 20 41
The normative turn in public choice 0 0 0 25 0 1 9 99
The paradox of grading systems 0 0 1 5 0 0 11 37
The paradox of multiple elections 0 0 1 109 0 0 12 649
The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen 0 0 1 4 0 2 8 31
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items 0 0 0 10 0 2 14 70
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples 0 0 0 11 1 1 9 48
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis 0 0 2 7 0 2 14 31
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 14
Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case 0 0 0 2 2 2 12 26
When is Size a Liability? 0 0 1 5 1 1 13 30
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? 0 0 0 6 0 0 14 29
When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 17
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs 1 1 1 1 2 3 12 18
Total Journal Articles 5 17 64 1,904 51 182 1,171 11,062
7 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible 0 0 0 0 1 1 49 438
Fair Division 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 132
Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds 0 0 0 0 0 3 17 242
Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 96
Total Books 0 0 0 0 1 5 82 908

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures 0 2 2 60 0 2 12 207
Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 34
How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 30
How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 9
Peter Fishburn 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 37
Satisfaction Approval Voting 0 0 0 0 2 4 17 69
The Instability of Power Sharing 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference 0 0 0 1 0 1 14 23
Voting procedures 0 1 4 110 0 1 20 425
Voting procedures 0 1 11 457 0 6 48 6,056
Total Chapters 0 4 17 628 2 17 161 6,896
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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Statistics updated 2026-10-11