Access Statistics for Steven J. Brams

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm 0 0 0 17 0 6 8 47
A Generic Negotiation Game 0 0 0 63 1 3 7 543
A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem 0 0 0 44 0 5 9 225
A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game 0 0 0 12 1 16 20 37
A Procedure for Divorce Settlements 0 0 0 99 0 5 8 982
A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices 0 0 0 10 1 5 8 84
A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices 0 0 1 57 0 6 14 169
A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share 0 0 0 28 1 2 3 73
APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE 0 0 0 25 0 2 5 266
ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS 0 0 0 20 1 4 10 312
ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS 0 0 0 10 0 4 6 193
Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games 0 0 0 22 0 6 6 70
An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm 0 0 0 89 1 4 6 684
An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items 0 0 1 24 0 4 12 98
Approval Voting in Practice 0 0 0 13 0 3 5 165
Arbitration Procedures 0 0 0 13 0 3 4 261
Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal? 0 0 0 51 0 5 8 726
Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem 0 0 0 138 1 10 13 980
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best 0 0 0 28 0 2 5 292
COALITION VOTING 0 0 0 38 0 5 7 379
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM 0 0 0 20 0 1 4 336
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD 0 0 0 21 0 8 10 280
Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair? 0 0 0 91 0 4 6 466
Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power 0 0 0 118 0 3 9 1,748
Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates 0 0 1 2 1 3 10 24
Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive 0 0 0 19 2 6 14 50
Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive 0 0 0 10 0 3 11 34
Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting 0 0 0 24 0 1 4 74
Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009 0 0 0 21 0 7 10 94
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 0 0 0 67 1 6 14 278
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 235
Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake 0 0 0 51 1 7 17 174
Cycles of Conflict 0 0 0 65 0 2 3 487
Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case 0 0 0 46 2 3 7 1,807
Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars 0 0 0 54 0 2 6 206
Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 16 0 7 8 69
Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 6 1 6 8 42
Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm 0 0 0 25 2 4 8 256
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System 0 0 0 58 1 7 10 185
Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system 0 0 1 67 0 8 10 246
Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? 0 0 0 22 0 5 9 112
Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration 0 0 0 24 1 2 4 127
Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium 0 0 0 24 1 4 13 57
Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness 0 0 0 18 1 5 6 223
Fair Division and Politics 0 0 0 23 0 2 9 176
Fair Division by Point Allocation 0 0 0 55 1 4 7 253
Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity 0 0 0 81 3 6 10 1,143
Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy 0 0 0 149 0 4 10 740
Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black 0 0 0 7 2 8 17 47
Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black 0 0 1 8 1 5 11 54
Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule 0 0 0 10 2 9 16 36
Fallback Bargaining 0 0 0 88 0 4 12 663
Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict 0 0 0 16 0 4 7 36
Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus 0 0 0 12 1 4 5 123
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters 0 0 0 29 2 7 9 160
Game Theory and Emotions 0 0 0 269 0 4 13 1,050
Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round 0 0 0 84 1 6 10 858
Games Theory and Literature 0 0 0 184 0 1 6 775
How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 21 1 4 9 64
How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted? 0 0 0 9 0 3 5 241
How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games 0 0 1 122 1 6 15 183
How to divide things fairly 0 0 0 50 0 5 7 144
Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes 0 0 0 25 3 16 22 219
Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement 0 0 0 40 0 1 5 311
Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 60
Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 0 0 0 1 1 2 12 48
Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation 0 0 0 28 1 5 8 99
Making Tennis Fairer: The Grand Tiebreaker 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 3
Making the Rules of Sports Fairer 0 0 1 56 3 10 16 89
Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience 0 0 0 95 0 2 5 385
Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items 0 0 0 58 0 2 7 62
Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games 0 0 0 24 0 4 6 306
Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership 0 0 0 26 2 5 10 120
Modeling Free Choice in Games 0 0 0 41 0 1 5 336
Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach 0 0 1 57 4 15 31 146
Multi-Tier Tournaments: Matching and Scoring Players 0 0 1 18 3 5 9 17
N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division 0 0 0 46 2 11 16 106
Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule 0 0 1 16 1 3 8 59
National Security Games 0 0 0 37 0 3 8 294
New Chairman Paradoxes 0 0 0 13 1 4 5 58
Nonmyoptic Equilibria 0 0 0 17 1 4 6 58
Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 16 1 7 10 71
OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF 0 0 0 18 0 2 4 409
Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes 0 0 0 18 1 5 5 166
Optimal Deterrence 0 0 0 17 0 2 5 67
Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries 0 0 0 12 0 2 3 54
Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections 0 0 0 9 0 3 5 33
Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 49 0 4 12 325
Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures 0 0 0 11 0 6 9 81
Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options 0 0 0 28 1 3 7 223
Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control 0 0 0 7 1 4 7 110
Rational De-Escalation 0 0 0 14 0 3 4 308
Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach 0 0 0 307 1 10 12 1,711
SEQUENTIAL ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 0 0 0 22 0 5 5 391
Satisfaction approval voting 1 3 6 40 4 16 57 273
Sequential Arbitration Procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 407
Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases 0 0 0 36 3 4 11 53
Stabilizing Power Sharing 0 0 0 43 0 1 6 127
Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games 0 0 0 19 4 11 13 41
THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH? 0 0 0 145 0 4 6 834
The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition 0 0 0 19 0 0 3 298
The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes 0 0 1 26 1 5 10 94
The Instability of Power Sharing 0 0 0 37 0 8 10 99
The Paradox of Grading Systems 0 0 0 32 0 1 5 58
The Paradox of Multiple Elections 0 0 0 81 0 3 13 352
The Path to Stable Deterrence 0 0 0 22 0 4 4 137
The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability 0 0 0 16 0 3 5 187
The Probability of Nuclear War 0 0 0 70 1 5 12 420
The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves 0 0 0 103 0 1 4 332
The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen 0 0 0 34 1 2 5 152
The Truel 0 0 0 98 0 5 10 392
The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 43 0 6 9 171
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items 0 0 0 44 1 7 14 196
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples 0 0 0 543 0 1 4 2,139
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 43 2 4 7 197
Threat Power in Sequential Games 0 0 0 45 0 4 9 142
Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar 0 0 0 139 1 2 6 713
To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises 0 0 0 85 0 4 12 1,062
Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies 0 0 0 37 0 6 8 184
Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse 0 0 0 48 1 8 9 371
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible 0 0 0 10 1 5 11 24
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm 0 1 1 62 0 5 11 202
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties 1 1 1 7 2 9 12 17
Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal 0 0 0 29 1 4 10 64
Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts 0 0 0 49 1 3 7 87
Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts 0 0 0 26 1 7 11 92
UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES 0 0 0 16 0 1 1 170
Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 7 1 3 4 37
Voting Procedures 0 0 0 151 2 8 12 748
Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions 0 0 0 58 1 3 12 295
Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too 0 0 1 30 1 7 10 89
When does approval voting make the "right choices"? 0 0 0 29 0 2 7 69
When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions 0 0 0 31 0 6 9 115
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? 0 0 0 23 0 2 11 494
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 0 8 1 3 6 62
Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting? 0 0 0 57 0 6 8 1,962
Yes-No Voting 0 0 0 29 1 4 4 222
Total Working Papers 2 5 20 6,520 97 642 1,221 41,847

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Generic Negotiation Game 0 0 0 3 0 6 9 31
A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game 0 1 1 4 1 3 10 35
A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices 0 0 0 3 1 4 8 22
A minimax procedure for electing committees 0 0 0 28 0 3 9 166
A nail-biting election 0 0 0 22 1 6 7 261
A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share 0 0 0 8 1 8 12 75
AGREEMENT THROUGH THREATS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE 0 0 0 7 0 2 7 25
An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies* 0 0 0 0 0 4 11 16
Another Solution 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 21
Approval Voting 3 6 17 52 9 23 55 166
Approval Voting in Practice 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 216
Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections 0 0 0 4 0 4 7 38
Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Deutsch Karl W.. (New York: John Wileu & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.) 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 10
Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem 0 0 1 9 1 4 7 43
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best 0 0 1 6 1 2 11 43
CATCH-22 AND KING-OF-THE-MOUNTAIN GAMES 0 0 0 2 3 7 16 31
Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond 0 0 0 29 1 7 10 151
Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair? 0 0 0 11 0 1 3 37
Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009 0 0 0 3 1 3 5 44
Comment on Mayer's “A Note on ‘An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’” 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 8
Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958) 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 8
Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 6
Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College” 0 0 0 1 1 5 8 18
Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Play†0 0 0 1 0 5 5 20
Competitive Fair Division 0 2 6 236 1 10 20 824
Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board 0 0 2 7 1 6 13 27
Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? 0 0 1 44 0 5 11 160
Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election 0 0 0 7 1 5 13 76
Deception in 2 × 2 Games 0 0 1 6 0 2 6 29
Dividing the Indivisible 0 0 0 6 0 3 6 27
Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 20
Efficient Fair Division 0 0 1 8 1 3 8 27
Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence 0 0 1 13 5 8 14 63
Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium 0 0 0 1 1 5 9 19
FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS 0 0 0 65 1 6 9 190
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity 0 0 0 65 2 15 27 287
Fallback Bargaining 0 0 0 6 0 1 8 66
Final-offer arbitration with a bonus 0 0 0 20 0 3 7 109
Forming stable coalitions: The process matters 0 0 0 20 0 5 9 135
GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS 0 0 1 15 2 7 10 81
Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95 0 0 3 27 1 3 9 78
Game Theory and Literature 1 1 2 428 1 6 14 1,335
Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations 2 2 3 344 8 13 22 834
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting 0 1 1 49 2 6 14 191
Intransigence in Negotiations 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 30
Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation 0 0 0 5 0 13 19 52
Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 9
Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods 0 0 0 11 1 4 8 33
Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences 0 0 1 3 0 3 8 27
Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items 0 0 0 5 1 1 3 40
Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems 0 0 1 14 1 10 17 85
Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games 0 0 0 0 2 7 12 2,498
Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach 0 0 0 4 1 7 13 41
Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule 0 0 0 1 0 5 5 35
Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 7 2 8 9 55
Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games 0 0 0 5 0 4 9 27
Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges 0 1 3 7 3 7 17 29
Optimal Threats 0 0 1 4 0 1 2 22
Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries 0 0 0 7 0 2 6 39
Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states 0 0 0 2 1 7 14 50
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) 0 0 0 2 1 7 10 31
Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) 0 0 0 1 0 2 7 16
Proportional Representation 0 0 2 5 0 3 9 46
Proportional pie-cutting 0 0 0 30 0 4 12 159
Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 17
Rejoinder to Niemi 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6
Replies 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 9
Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Response to Rabow 0 0 0 3 2 5 6 20
Response to Randall Stone 0 0 0 1 1 6 9 28
Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings 0 0 0 10 0 3 4 64
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions 0 0 0 4 2 5 8 36
The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning* 0 0 1 15 1 7 15 56
The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 9
The Paradox of Vote Trading* 0 0 4 11 0 7 15 43
The Probability of Nuclear War 0 0 1 8 0 3 8 32
The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes 0 0 1 6 3 8 18 38
The normative turn in public choice 0 0 0 25 0 4 4 94
The paradox of grading systems 0 0 0 4 2 5 6 32
The paradox of multiple elections 0 0 3 109 2 8 12 647
The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen 0 0 0 3 0 3 8 27
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items 0 0 0 10 1 7 8 64
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples 0 0 0 11 2 3 5 44
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis 1 1 1 6 4 4 8 24
Transaction Flows in the International System* 0 0 0 4 0 5 6 19
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible 0 0 0 1 1 6 8 12
Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case 0 0 0 2 0 3 10 23
When is Size a Liability? 0 0 0 4 1 6 9 26
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? 0 0 1 6 1 7 10 24
When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 13
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 12
Total Journal Articles 7 15 62 1,919 89 449 857 10,818

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible 0 0 0 0 7 16 32 417
Fair Division 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 130
Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds 0 0 0 0 2 6 9 233
Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 92
Total Books 0 0 0 0 9 25 53 872

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures 0 0 0 58 1 4 8 202
Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting 0 0 0 0 0 1 14 24
How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 27
How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 8
Peter Fishburn 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 33
Satisfaction Approval Voting 0 0 0 0 1 7 17 60
The Instability of Power Sharing 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference 0 0 0 1 0 6 8 17
Voting procedures 0 2 4 109 2 13 21 423
Voting procedures 4 8 14 455 5 18 57 6,039
Total Chapters 4 10 18 623 10 61 156 6,838
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Statistics updated 2026-04-09