| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
| A Generic Negotiation Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
536 |
| A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
218 |
| A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
| A Procedure for Divorce Settlements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
977 |
| A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
77 |
| A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
159 |
| A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
71 |
| APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
261 |
| ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
304 |
| ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
187 |
| Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
| An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
678 |
| An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items |
1 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
89 |
| Approval Voting in Practice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
160 |
| Arbitration Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
257 |
| Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
720 |
| Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
968 |
| Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
288 |
| COALITION VOTING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
372 |
| CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
334 |
| CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
272 |
| Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
460 |
| Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
1,742 |
| Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
| Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
38 |
| Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
27 |
| Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
70 |
| Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
| Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
2 |
6 |
6 |
270 |
| Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
227 |
| Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
165 |
| Cycles of Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
484 |
| Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,800 |
| Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
203 |
| Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
61 |
| Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
| Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
249 |
| Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
175 |
| Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
236 |
| Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
104 |
| Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
124 |
| Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
46 |
| Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
217 |
| Fair Division and Politics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
168 |
| Fair Division by Point Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
247 |
| Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1,134 |
| Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
733 |
| Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
35 |
| Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
47 |
| Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
24 |
| Fallback Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
655 |
| Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
119 |
| Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
151 |
| Game Theory and Emotions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
269 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
1,040 |
| Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
849 |
| Games Theory and Literature |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
771 |
| How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
59 |
| How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
237 |
| How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
122 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
174 |
| How to divide things fairly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
137 |
| Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
200 |
| Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
307 |
| Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
41 |
| Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
| Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
92 |
| Making Tennis Fairer: The Grand Tiebreaker |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Making the Rules of Sports Fairer |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
79 |
| Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
381 |
| Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
58 |
| Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
300 |
| Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
112 |
| Modeling Free Choice in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
334 |
| Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach |
1 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
118 |
| Multi-Tier Tournaments: Matching and Scoring Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
| N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
| Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
53 |
| National Security Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
288 |
| New Chairman Paradoxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
| Nonmyoptic Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
| Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
407 |
| Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
161 |
| Optimal Deterrence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
65 |
| Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
| Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
| Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
315 |
| Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
74 |
| Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
217 |
| Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
104 |
| Rational De-Escalation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
304 |
| Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
307 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1,700 |
| SEQUENTIAL ARBITRATION PROCEDURES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
386 |
| Satisfaction approval voting |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
2 |
15 |
27 |
238 |
| Sequential Arbitration Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
407 |
| Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
45 |
| Stabilizing Power Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
124 |
| Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
30 |
| THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
828 |
| The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
295 |
| The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes |
1 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
87 |
| The Instability of Power Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
91 |
| The Paradox of Grading Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
53 |
| The Paradox of Multiple Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
342 |
| The Path to Stable Deterrence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
| The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
184 |
| The Probability of Nuclear War |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
411 |
| The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
330 |
| The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
148 |
| The Truel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
383 |
| The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
164 |
| The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
185 |
| Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
543 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2,136 |
| Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
190 |
| Threat Power in Sequential Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
134 |
| Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
708 |
| To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1,051 |
| Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
178 |
| Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
362 |
| Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
| Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
192 |
| Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
58 |
| Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
84 |
| Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
84 |
| UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
| Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
| Voting Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
738 |
| Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
287 |
| Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
81 |
| When does approval voting make the "right choices"? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
65 |
| When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
107 |
| When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
485 |
| Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
58 |
| Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,954 |
| Yes-No Voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
218 |
| Total Working Papers |
4 |
6 |
17 |
6,512 |
94 |
164 |
379 |
40,873 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Generic Negotiation Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
24 |
| A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
27 |
| A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
| A minimax procedure for electing committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
160 |
| A nail-biting election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
254 |
| A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
| AGREEMENT THROUGH THREATS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
21 |
| An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Another Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| Approval Voting |
1 |
1 |
9 |
41 |
4 |
7 |
30 |
127 |
| Approval Voting in Practice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
213 |
| Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
33 |
| Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Deutsch Karl W.. (New York: John Wileu & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
| Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
| CATCH-22 AND KING-OF-THE-MOUNTAIN GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
17 |
| Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
142 |
| Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
35 |
| Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
| Comment on Mayer's “A Note on ‘An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
| Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Play†|
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Competitive Fair Division |
1 |
1 |
4 |
234 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
810 |
| Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
18 |
| Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
154 |
| Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
| Deception in 2 × 2 Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| Dividing the Indivisible |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
| Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
15 |
| Efficient Fair Division |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
| Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
52 |
| Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
183 |
| Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
266 |
| Fallback Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
61 |
| Final-offer arbitration with a bonus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
105 |
| Forming stable coalitions: The process matters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
129 |
| GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
71 |
| Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
27 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
74 |
| Game Theory and Literature |
0 |
0 |
0 |
426 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,324 |
| Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
342 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
815 |
| Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
180 |
| Intransigence in Negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
28 |
| Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
| Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
| Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
| Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
71 |
| Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2,488 |
| Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
| Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
| Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
21 |
| Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
| Optimal Threats |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
| Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
| Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
39 |
| Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
| Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
| Proportional Representation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
| Proportional pie-cutting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
152 |
| Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Rejoinder to Niemi |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Replies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
| Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Response to Rabow |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
| Response to Randall Stone |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
| The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning* |
0 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
44 |
| The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| The Paradox of Vote Trading* |
1 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
32 |
| The Probability of Nuclear War |
1 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
| The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
23 |
| The normative turn in public choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
| The paradox of grading systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
| The paradox of multiple elections |
1 |
2 |
3 |
109 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
639 |
| The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
24 |
| The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
| Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
41 |
| Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
| Transaction Flows in the International System* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
| Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
| When is Size a Liability? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
| When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
| Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Total Journal Articles |
8 |
15 |
53 |
1,890 |
68 |
102 |
271 |
10,136 |
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