| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A "Pencil Sharpening" Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
| A "Pencil-Sharpening" Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
| Can the culture of honor lead to inefficient conventions ? experimental evidence from India |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
24 |
| Competition and Public Information: A Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
44 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
20 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
81 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
30 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
61 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
50 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
73 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
47 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
77 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
62 |
| First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
| Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
| Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
71 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
80 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
| Revenue Guarantee Equivalence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
52 |
| Revenue Guarantee Equivalence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
54 |
| Search, Information and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
32 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
92 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
24 |
| Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
107 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
104 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
180 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
469 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
331 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
74 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
198 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
2 |
51 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
241 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
2 |
10 |
1,245 |
7 |
43 |
110 |
3,109 |
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