| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A "Pencil Sharpening" Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
35 |
| A "Pencil-Sharpening" Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
45 |
| Can the culture of honor lead to inefficient conventions ? experimental evidence from India |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
35 |
| Competition and Public Information: A Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
63 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
56 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
93 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
29 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
44 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
62 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
77 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
77 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
30 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
79 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
3 |
24 |
70 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
85 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
86 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
76 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
50 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
62 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
97 |
| First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
67 |
| Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
57 |
| Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
102 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
2 |
2 |
13 |
35 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
68 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
99 |
| Revenue Guarantee Equivalence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
60 |
| Revenue Guarantee Equivalence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
62 |
| Search, Information and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
51 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
34 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
31 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
103 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
43 |
| Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
118 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
266 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
345 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
122 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
6 |
15 |
47 |
245 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
180 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
493 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
88 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1,249 |
23 |
68 |
631 |
3,740 |
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