| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A "Pencil Sharpening" Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
| A "Pencil-Sharpening" Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
44 |
| Can the culture of honor lead to inefficient conventions ? experimental evidence from India |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
34 |
| Competition and Public Information: A Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
63 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
91 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
54 |
| Counterfactuals with Latent Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
29 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
44 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
61 |
| Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
75 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
76 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
28 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
77 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
85 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
47 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
8 |
21 |
67 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
6 |
16 |
61 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
8 |
22 |
84 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
5 |
26 |
74 |
| First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
8 |
21 |
96 |
| First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
66 |
| Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
5 |
31 |
101 |
| Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
56 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
33 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
6 |
19 |
99 |
| Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
67 |
| Revenue Guarantee Equivalence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
59 |
| Revenue Guarantee Equivalence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
62 |
| Search, Information and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
48 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
103 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
33 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
41 |
| Search, Information, and Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
30 |
| Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
116 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
180 |
1 |
6 |
20 |
488 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
121 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
345 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
86 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
2 |
11 |
34 |
230 |
| The Limits of Price Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
263 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,248 |
27 |
144 |
606 |
3,672 |
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