| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Activism and Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
75 |
| Activism and takeovers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
| Activist Funds, Leverage, and Procyclicality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
86 |
| Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
789 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
2,153 |
| Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
436 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
1,321 |
| Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
21 |
| Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
| Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
27 |
| Block Premia in Transfers of Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
180 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
476 |
| Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
344 |
| Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
307 |
| Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
271 |
| Club enlargement: early versus late admittance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
126 |
| Club-in-the-club: reform under unanimity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
8 |
8 |
32 |
| Competition for flow and and short-termism in activism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Equity Issue Methods and dilution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Equity issuance methods and dilution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
| European takeover regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
11 |
12 |
39 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
389 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
1,066 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
457 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
1,273 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
573 |
3 |
8 |
8 |
1,768 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
217 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
720 |
| Family firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
72 |
| Family firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
97 |
| In-Kind Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
316 |
| In-Kind Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
275 |
| In-kind finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
| In-kind finance: a theory of trade credit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
147 |
| Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers |
0 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
104 |
| Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
107 |
| Legal investor protection and takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
37 |
| Minority Blocks And Takeover Premia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
353 |
| Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
295 |
| Minority blocks and takeover premia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
48 |
| Minority blocks and takeover premia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
24 |
| One Share - One Vote: The Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
244 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
640 |
| One share - one vote: the theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
80 |
| Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
92 |
| Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
143 |
| Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
9 |
| Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
31 |
| Security Voting Structure and Bidder Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
41 |
| Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
182 |
| Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
217 |
| Security-voting structure and bidder screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
27 |
| Security-voting structure and bidder screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
41 |
| Signaling in Tender Offer Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
135 |
| Signaling in Tender Offer Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
90 |
| Signalling in tender offer games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
| Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
44 |
| Smart Buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
65 |
| Smart Buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
78 |
| Smart buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
| Smart buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
8 |
10 |
| Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
266 |
4 |
8 |
10 |
537 |
| The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
| What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
159 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
675 |
| What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
138 |
| Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
90 |
| Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
69 |
| Why is hedge fund activism procyclical? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
220 |
| Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
529 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
2,544 |
| Widening and deepening: reforming the European Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
36 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
1 |
10 |
5,314 |
112 |
250 |
340 |
18,526 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Activism and Takeovers |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
20 |
| Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control |
1 |
1 |
3 |
85 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
275 |
| Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
547 |
| Club-in-the-club: Reform under unanimity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
| Competition for Flow and Short-Termism in Activism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
| Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
15 |
| European takeover regulation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
162 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
599 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
82 |
| In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit |
0 |
0 |
2 |
594 |
3 |
5 |
17 |
2,326 |
| Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests |
0 |
0 |
2 |
168 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
490 |
| Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm |
0 |
2 |
11 |
166 |
3 |
11 |
31 |
1,990 |
| Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
108 |
| Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
271 |
| One Share - One Vote: the Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
303 |
| Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
150 |
| Security-voting structure and bidder screening |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
139 |
| Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
114 |
| Smart Buyers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
57 |
| What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts |
0 |
1 |
5 |
105 |
5 |
8 |
26 |
489 |
| Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
| Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
357 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
910 |
| Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union |
0 |
0 |
1 |
134 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
553 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
6 |
32 |
2,145 |
39 |
85 |
206 |
9,536 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.