| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Activism and Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
29 |
| Activist Funds, Leverage, and Procyclicality |
1 |
2 |
3 |
18 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
52 |
| Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
41 |
| Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection |
0 |
0 |
1 |
788 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
2,130 |
| Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection |
0 |
0 |
2 |
431 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
1,291 |
| Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
| Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
| Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
34 |
| Block Premia in Transfers of Corporate Control |
1 |
1 |
2 |
173 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
430 |
| Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
260 |
| Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
331 |
| Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
298 |
| Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity |
0 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
115 |
| Club-in-the-club: reform under unanimity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
| European takeover regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
573 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
1,742 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
388 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
1,021 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
454 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
1,234 |
| Family Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
214 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
688 |
| Family firms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
36 |
| Family firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
74 |
| In-Kind Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
302 |
| In-Kind Finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
253 |
| In-kind finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
41 |
| In-kind finance: a theory of trade credit |
1 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
3 |
6 |
26 |
46 |
| Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
84 |
| Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
88 |
| Legal investor protection and takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
15 |
| Minority Blocks And Takeover Premia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
337 |
| Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
279 |
| Minority blocks and takeover premia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
| Minority blocks and takeover premia |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
33 |
| One Share - One Vote: The Theory |
0 |
1 |
3 |
234 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
579 |
| One share - one vote: the theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
23 |
| Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
65 |
| Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
120 |
| Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
15 |
| Security Voting Structure and Bidder Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
24 |
| Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
157 |
| Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
189 |
| Security-voting structure and bidder screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
30 |
| Security-voting structure and bidder screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
16 |
| Signaling in Tender Offer Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
63 |
| Signaling in Tender Offer Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
113 |
| Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
22 |
| Smart Buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
48 |
| Smart Buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
58 |
| Smart buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
12 |
| Takeovers |
0 |
0 |
3 |
256 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
507 |
| What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts |
1 |
2 |
2 |
140 |
3 |
10 |
22 |
532 |
| What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts |
2 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
5 |
8 |
23 |
57 |
| Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law |
1 |
2 |
3 |
47 |
1 |
7 |
16 |
49 |
| Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
19 |
| Why is hedge fund activism procyclical? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
2 |
6 |
27 |
118 |
| Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union |
0 |
4 |
6 |
524 |
2 |
18 |
48 |
2,487 |
| Widening and deepening: reforming the European Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
| Total Working Papers |
8 |
19 |
51 |
5,122 |
36 |
240 |
644 |
16,645 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.