Access Statistics for Mike Burkart

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Activism and Takeovers 0 0 1 23 0 2 14 81
Activism and takeovers 0 0 1 6 0 3 6 23
Activist Funds, Leverage, and Procyclicality 0 0 0 21 1 9 16 97
Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 8
Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality 0 0 0 6 0 3 9 89
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection 0 0 0 436 0 5 14 1,329
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection 0 0 0 789 0 2 9 2,158
Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control 0 0 0 0 1 2 13 30
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 0 0 8 0 4 9 70
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 0 0 0 0 5 17 38
Block Premia in Transfers of Corporate Control 1 1 2 181 1 5 10 484
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 98 0 2 10 351
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 43 0 4 7 278
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 54 0 3 5 311
Club enlargement: early versus late admittance 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 8
Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity 0 0 0 38 0 3 7 130
Club-in-the-club: reform under unanimity 1 1 1 1 1 3 18 42
Competition for flow and and short-termism in activism 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 6
Equity Issue Methods and dilution 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 8
Equity issuance methods and dilution 0 0 0 11 0 3 12 16
European takeover regulation 0 1 1 6 0 7 20 48
Family Firms 0 1 1 574 0 3 16 1,776
Family Firms 0 0 0 217 0 2 16 730
Family Firms 0 0 0 457 2 2 10 1,278
Family Firms 0 0 0 389 1 4 15 1,075
Family Firms 0 0 0 0 0 1 19 21
Family firms 0 0 0 3 0 3 9 103
Family firms 0 0 0 7 1 2 12 77
In-Kind Finance 0 0 0 66 1 6 14 285
In-Kind Finance 0 2 2 80 0 6 11 326
In-kind finance 0 0 0 5 0 3 10 63
In-kind finance: a theory of trade credit 0 0 2 20 1 7 24 164
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 24 2 5 12 117
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 1 32 1 4 11 111
Legal investor protection and takeovers 0 0 0 1 1 6 14 45
Minority Blocks And Takeover Premia 0 0 0 103 2 7 19 366
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 1 87 0 3 20 307
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 1 0 3 6 28
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 3 1 2 12 55
One Share - One Vote: The Theory 0 2 2 246 0 6 20 653
One share - one vote: the theory 0 0 0 10 0 5 20 94
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 20 0 1 9 97
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 20 1 6 21 156
Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers 0 0 0 8 1 1 7 35
Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers 0 0 0 0 1 4 15 18
Security Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 43
Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 1 1 31 1 3 14 191
Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 0 1 38 2 7 27 234
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 33
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 0 0 0 4 11 49
Signaling in Tender Offer Games 0 0 0 9 0 3 11 98
Signaling in Tender Offer Games 0 0 0 25 0 1 12 141
Signalling in tender offer games 0 0 0 1 0 5 9 12
Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control 0 0 0 7 0 6 15 55
Smart Buyers 0 0 0 10 1 5 15 89
Smart Buyers 0 0 0 17 1 6 15 76
Smart buyers 0 0 0 0 1 9 25 27
Smart buyers 0 0 0 1 2 5 7 49
Takeovers 0 1 1 267 0 3 13 541
The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control 0 0 0 10 0 1 7 24
What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts 0 0 1 159 1 6 17 685
What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts 0 0 0 31 1 8 13 149
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law 0 0 1 57 0 4 13 99
Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders 0 0 0 6 0 6 13 78
Why is hedge fund activism procyclical? 0 0 0 32 0 5 13 229
Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union 0 0 0 529 0 1 9 2,548
Widening and deepening: reforming the European Union 0 0 0 2 1 4 14 44
Total Working Papers 2 10 20 5,327 32 263 846 19,079

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Activism and Takeovers 0 0 2 8 1 5 14 28
Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control 0 0 1 85 0 0 11 281
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 1 1 141 1 5 17 559
Club-in-the-club: Reform under unanimity 0 0 0 13 0 1 4 72
Competition for Flow and Short-Termism in Activism 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 14
Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution 0 0 0 1 0 5 13 21
European takeover regulation 0 0 1 162 0 1 10 603
Family Firms 1 1 2 12 1 3 23 91
In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit 0 1 2 596 5 8 27 2,345
Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests 0 0 0 168 0 2 8 495
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 1 3 13 173 6 16 45 2,016
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 12 0 3 18 122
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 0 63 0 2 14 277
One Share - One Vote: the Theory 0 0 0 88 1 7 15 315
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 3 1 6 10 158
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 1 13 0 6 13 148
Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control 0 0 0 12 0 5 12 121
Smart Buyers 0 0 1 7 0 1 11 62
What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts 1 2 5 108 4 21 45 522
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law 0 0 0 3 0 3 10 24
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders 0 0 0 357 0 2 9 915
Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union 0 0 0 134 0 1 12 559
Total Journal Articles 3 8 29 2,159 20 104 343 9,748

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04