Access Statistics for Mike Burkart

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Activism and Takeovers 0 0 1 23 2 6 12 79
Activism and takeovers 0 0 1 6 0 2 4 20
Activist Funds, Leverage, and Procyclicality 0 0 0 21 1 3 7 88
Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 5
Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality 0 0 0 6 3 6 6 86
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection 0 0 0 789 0 6 7 2,156
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection 0 0 0 436 0 6 9 1,324
Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control 0 0 0 0 3 8 11 28
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 0 0 0 0 10 12 33
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 0 0 8 1 5 5 66
Block Premia in Transfers of Corporate Control 0 0 1 180 1 4 5 479
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 98 1 6 8 349
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 54 0 1 2 308
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 43 0 3 3 274
Club enlargement: early versus late admittance 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 5
Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity 0 0 0 38 0 2 4 127
Club-in-the-club: reform under unanimity 0 0 0 0 1 14 15 39
Competition for flow and and short-termism in activism 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4
Equity Issue Methods and dilution 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 7
Equity issuance methods and dilution 0 0 0 11 0 6 10 13
European takeover regulation 0 0 0 5 1 4 13 41
Family Firms 0 0 0 217 1 10 15 728
Family Firms 0 0 0 0 2 12 18 20
Family Firms 0 0 0 389 3 7 11 1,071
Family Firms 0 0 0 457 0 5 8 1,276
Family Firms 0 0 0 573 2 8 13 1,773
Family firms 0 0 0 7 0 7 11 75
Family firms 0 0 0 3 0 5 7 100
In-Kind Finance 0 0 0 66 0 5 9 279
In-Kind Finance 0 0 0 78 0 4 5 320
In-kind finance 0 0 0 5 0 6 7 60
In-kind finance: a theory of trade credit 1 2 2 20 2 12 17 157
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 1 32 2 3 8 107
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 24 0 6 8 112
Legal investor protection and takeovers 0 0 0 1 1 4 8 39
Minority Blocks And Takeover Premia 0 0 0 103 0 9 12 359
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 1 87 7 11 17 304
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 25
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 3 1 7 10 53
One Share - One Vote: The Theory 0 0 0 244 0 9 15 647
One share - one vote: the theory 0 0 1 10 1 11 16 89
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 20 3 8 16 150
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 20 0 4 14 96
Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers 0 0 0 8 0 5 6 34
Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers 0 0 0 0 1 9 12 14
Security Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 41
Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 0 1 38 3 12 20 227
Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 0 0 30 2 8 11 188
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 30
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 45
Signaling in Tender Offer Games 0 0 0 25 0 8 11 140
Signaling in Tender Offer Games 0 0 0 9 0 5 8 95
Signalling in tender offer games 0 0 1 1 0 3 5 7
Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control 0 0 0 7 1 7 9 49
Smart Buyers 0 0 0 17 0 6 9 70
Smart Buyers 0 0 0 10 2 9 10 84
Smart buyers 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 44
Smart buyers 0 0 0 0 3 14 16 18
Takeovers 0 0 0 266 0 5 10 538
The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control 0 0 0 10 0 4 6 23
What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts 0 0 1 159 1 5 11 679
What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts 0 0 1 31 1 4 9 141
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law 0 1 1 57 1 8 10 95
Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders 0 0 0 6 0 4 7 72
Why is hedge fund activism procyclical? 0 0 0 32 1 5 8 224
Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union 0 0 0 529 1 5 8 2,547
Widening and deepening: reforming the European Union 0 0 0 2 1 6 10 40
Total Working Papers 1 3 13 5,317 59 402 608 18,816

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Activism and Takeovers 0 0 2 8 1 4 9 23
Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control 0 1 2 85 2 8 14 281
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 0 0 140 1 9 13 554
Club-in-the-club: Reform under unanimity 0 0 0 13 0 3 4 71
Competition for Flow and Short-Termism in Activism 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 13
Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution 0 0 0 1 1 3 11 16
European takeover regulation 0 0 1 162 2 5 10 602
Family Firms 0 0 1 11 1 8 25 88
In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit 1 1 2 595 2 14 24 2,337
Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests 0 0 2 168 1 4 8 493
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 2 4 12 170 6 13 36 2,000
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 12 0 11 16 119
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 0 63 1 6 12 275
One Share - One Vote: the Theory 0 0 0 88 1 5 10 308
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 3 0 4 4 152
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 1 13 0 6 7 142
Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control 0 0 0 12 1 3 8 116
Smart Buyers 0 0 1 7 4 7 10 61
What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts 1 1 3 106 5 17 31 501
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law 0 0 0 3 2 6 10 21
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders 0 0 1 357 1 4 9 913
Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union 0 0 0 134 1 6 11 558
Total Journal Articles 4 7 28 2,151 33 147 283 9,644

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04