Access Statistics for Mike Burkart

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Activism and Takeovers 0 0 1 23 0 4 12 79
Activism and takeovers 0 0 1 6 2 4 5 22
Activist Funds, Leverage, and Procyclicality 0 0 0 21 0 2 7 88
Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5
Activist funds, leverage, and procyclicality 0 0 0 6 0 6 6 86
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection 0 0 0 436 1 4 10 1,325
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection 0 0 0 789 1 4 8 2,157
Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control 0 0 0 0 0 7 11 28
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 0 0 8 2 6 7 68
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 0 0 0 0 2 8 14 35
Block Premia in Transfers of Corporate Control 0 0 1 180 0 3 5 479
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 43 0 3 3 274
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 54 0 1 2 308
Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance 0 0 0 98 0 5 8 349
Club enlargement: early versus late admittance 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5
Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity 0 0 0 38 0 1 4 127
Club-in-the-club: reform under unanimity 0 0 0 0 0 7 15 39
Competition for flow and and short-termism in activism 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 5
Equity Issue Methods and dilution 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 7
Equity issuance methods and dilution 0 0 0 11 1 5 11 14
European takeover regulation 1 1 1 6 2 4 15 43
Family Firms 0 0 0 0 0 11 18 20
Family Firms 0 0 0 389 0 5 11 1,071
Family Firms 0 0 0 457 0 3 8 1,276
Family Firms 0 0 0 217 0 8 14 728
Family Firms 1 1 1 574 1 6 14 1,774
Family firms 0 0 0 3 0 3 6 100
Family firms 0 0 0 7 0 3 10 75
In-Kind Finance 0 0 0 78 1 5 6 321
In-Kind Finance 0 0 0 66 0 4 8 279
In-kind finance 0 0 0 5 0 6 7 60
In-kind finance: a theory of trade credit 0 2 2 20 0 10 17 157
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 1 32 0 3 8 107
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 24 1 6 9 113
Legal investor protection and takeovers 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 40
Minority Blocks And Takeover Premia 0 0 0 103 0 6 12 359
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 1 87 0 9 17 304
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 25
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 3 0 5 10 53
One Share - One Vote: The Theory 1 1 1 245 4 11 18 651
One share - one vote: the theory 0 0 0 10 2 11 17 91
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 20 0 4 9 96
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 20 3 10 19 153
Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers 0 0 0 0 0 5 12 14
Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers 0 0 0 8 0 3 6 34
Security Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 41
Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 1 1 1 31 1 7 12 189
Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening 0 0 1 38 1 11 21 228
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 0 0 1 5 8 46
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 31
Signaling in Tender Offer Games 0 0 0 25 0 5 11 140
Signaling in Tender Offer Games 0 0 0 9 0 5 8 95
Signalling in tender offer games 0 0 1 1 3 5 8 10
Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control 0 0 0 7 2 7 11 51
Smart Buyers 0 0 0 17 2 7 11 72
Smart Buyers 0 0 0 10 1 7 11 85
Smart buyers 0 0 0 0 1 9 17 19
Smart buyers 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 46
Takeovers 0 0 0 266 0 1 10 538
The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control 0 0 0 10 0 3 6 23
What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts 0 0 1 159 3 7 14 682
What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts 0 0 1 31 0 3 9 141
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law 0 1 1 57 0 5 10 95
Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders 0 0 0 6 1 4 8 73
Why is hedge fund activism procyclical? 0 0 0 32 0 4 8 224
Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union 0 0 0 529 0 3 8 2,547
Widening and deepening: reforming the European Union 0 0 0 2 0 4 10 40
Total Working Papers 4 7 16 5,321 44 334 640 18,860

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Activism and Takeovers 0 0 2 8 2 5 11 25
Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control 0 0 2 85 0 6 14 281
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection 1 1 1 141 1 8 14 555
Club-in-the-club: Reform under unanimity 0 0 0 13 0 3 4 71
Competition for Flow and Short-Termism in Activism 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 13
Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution 0 0 0 1 2 3 12 18
European takeover regulation 0 0 1 162 1 4 10 603
Family Firms 0 0 1 11 0 6 23 88
In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit 1 2 3 596 2 13 25 2,339
Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests 0 0 0 168 1 4 7 494
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 1 5 13 171 5 15 39 2,005
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 12 1 12 17 120
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 0 63 1 5 13 276
One Share - One Vote: the Theory 0 0 0 88 4 9 13 312
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 152
Security-voting structure and bidder screening 0 0 1 13 0 3 7 142
Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control 0 0 0 12 1 3 9 117
Smart Buyers 0 0 1 7 1 5 11 62
What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts 0 1 3 106 5 17 35 506
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law 0 0 0 3 0 4 9 21
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders 0 0 1 357 1 4 10 914
Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union 0 0 0 134 0 5 11 558
Total Journal Articles 3 9 29 2,154 28 136 299 9,672

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09