Access Statistics for Eloisa Campioni

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Proof Without Words and a Maximum without Calculus 0 0 0 67 0 0 10 194
Born to Run: Adaptive and Strategic Behavior in Experimental Bank-Run Games 0 0 1 20 2 2 16 49
Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness 0 0 0 47 0 0 14 136
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples 0 0 0 12 0 1 10 30
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples 0 0 0 35 0 0 19 70
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples 0 0 0 6 0 1 13 34
Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle 0 0 0 42 0 0 16 152
Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals 0 0 1 16 1 1 11 18
Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals 0 0 0 15 7 7 12 16
Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 8
Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis 0 0 4 76 0 0 13 118
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 46 0 1 17 160
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 0 10 14 41 0 11 29 64
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 0 0 4 9 0 0 17 24
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 0 0 5 5 2 3 13 13
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 16
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 1 21 0 0 12 33
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms 0 0 0 6 0 1 10 31
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 32 0 0 11 195
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 76 0 0 8 303
Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market 0 0 0 10 0 0 8 88
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 0 59 0 0 15 73
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 0 39 0 1 21 82
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 0 42 2 2 17 65
On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 4 1 2 18 39
On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 33 0 1 11 73
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 35
On multiple agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 28 0 0 4 104
Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 19 3 5 17 60
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents: a comment 0 0 0 18 0 0 10 94
Total Working Papers 0 10 30 824 20 41 394 2,377

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness 0 0 0 13 0 1 10 84
Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples 0 0 0 5 0 2 15 38
Coordination failure in experimental banks of different sizes 0 0 0 0 0 2 18 21
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume 0 1 1 232 0 1 8 648
Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy 0 0 0 52 1 2 8 175
Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 21
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 39 0 0 14 206
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition 0 0 0 7 0 0 12 72
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 65 0 0 12 234
Private communication in competing mechanism games 0 0 0 5 1 2 15 53
Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games 0 0 0 24 0 0 10 136
Total Journal Articles 0 1 1 443 2 10 132 1,688

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10