Access Statistics for Estelle Cantillon

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice 0 0 0 147 0 0 12 582
A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice 0 0 0 152 0 0 10 841
A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 55
Auctioning bus routes: the London experience 0 0 3 67 0 0 18 185
Auctions for the Support of Renewables: When and How? 0 0 5 45 0 0 15 47
Broadening the market design approach to school choice 0 0 0 8 0 1 15 60
Chapter 2: Market Design for the Environment 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 4
Chapter 8: Designing and scaling up nature-based markets 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 6
Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions 0 0 1 190 0 3 16 568
Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions 0 0 0 24 0 1 9 130
Competition between Exchanges: A research Agenda 0 0 0 89 0 1 12 135
Competition between Exchanges: Lessons from the Battle of the Bund 2 2 5 71 4 6 26 276
Developments in Data for Economic Research 0 0 0 18 0 0 12 76
Economics without Borders: Economic Research for European Policy Challenges 0 0 0 61 0 0 16 173
Electoral Rules and the Emergence of New Issue Dimensions 0 0 0 93 0 0 3 376
Electoral Rules and the Emergence of New Issue Dimensions 0 0 0 27 1 1 9 132
Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions 0 0 0 81 0 1 15 234
How and when do markets tip? Lessons from the Battle of the Bund 0 0 0 54 0 0 9 286
Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement 0 0 0 12 0 1 18 41
Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement 0 0 0 18 0 1 8 60
Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement 0 0 0 12 0 4 10 62
Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement 0 0 0 6 1 2 12 47
Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions 0 0 0 36 0 2 10 229
Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions 0 0 0 206 0 1 14 743
Investment incentives in procurement auctions 0 0 0 21 0 1 20 139
La transition énergétique en Belgique: Etats des lieux 0 0 5 19 0 2 24 58
Le modèle social belge: quel avenir? Actes du 20ème congrès des économistes de langue française 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 64
Les nouvelles données de la transition énergétique 0 0 1 7 0 0 13 30
Market Design for the Environment 1 2 4 21 1 2 17 69
Market Design for the Environment 0 0 2 7 0 0 17 33
Mixité sociale: le rôle des inscriptions scolaires 0 0 0 8 0 0 13 44
Mobilizing private sector data for climate action 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 8
Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter 0 0 0 215 1 3 15 839
Phase-out policies 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 6
Price and quantity discovery without commitment 0 0 0 6 0 3 9 16
Procurement When Price and Quality Matter 0 0 0 112 0 1 11 283
Procurement when Price and Quality Matter 0 0 0 106 0 2 23 403
Procurement when price and quality matter 0 0 0 23 0 0 11 129
Properties of Scoring Auctions 0 0 1 129 0 0 11 350
Properties of Scoring Auctions 0 0 0 9 0 1 10 79
Properties of scoring auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 69
Quality Issues in Contracts - Great Britain 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 18
Quel enfant dans quelle école ?Réflexions sur les inscriptions scolaires en Belgique 0 0 0 12 0 0 6 49
Regulating School Choice in Brussels 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 31
Respecting Priorities versus Respecting Preferences In School Choice: When is there a Trade-off? 0 0 1 7 0 0 13 39
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ? 0 0 1 30 0 1 12 73
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a tradeoff? 0 0 4 4 0 2 7 7
Réussir la transition vers une économie zéro carbone 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 17
School admissions in England: The rules schools choose on which pupils to admit 0 1 9 55 1 5 35 129
Strategic Behavior in Multi-unit Assignment Problems: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocations 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions 0 0 0 234 0 2 8 689
The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenues 0 0 0 39 0 0 6 163
The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard 0 0 3 18 2 2 23 99
The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard 0 0 0 46 1 3 30 189
The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard 0 0 0 44 0 0 5 306
The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions 0 0 0 13 0 1 19 82
What support mechanism is needed for flexible capacity in Belgium? 0 0 0 13 0 1 3 44
Total Working Papers 3 5 45 2,620 14 63 695 9,904

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice 0 0 0 56 0 0 8 215
Broadening the market design approach to school choice 0 0 0 16 0 0 17 79
Competition between exchanges: A research agenda 0 0 2 82 3 3 30 243
Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement 0 0 1 19 1 4 12 79
Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions 0 0 1 156 0 0 27 566
Procurement when price and quality matter 0 0 4 109 3 6 38 365
Properties of scoring auctions 0 0 4 92 1 3 38 294
The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard 0 0 1 61 0 1 16 370
The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions 0 0 1 66 1 3 22 206
Total Journal Articles 0 0 14 657 9 20 208 2,417

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Market Design for the Environment 0 0 2 11 1 2 23 49
Total Chapters 0 0 2 11 1 2 23 49

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07