Access Statistics for Daniel Cardona

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules 0 0 0 55 1 2 8 164
Beating Coase at Monopoly 0 0 0 41 1 4 10 86
Block sourcing 0 0 0 17 2 4 15 106
Buying from the Fringe (too) 0 0 0 2 3 9 16 21
Cost-Based Models of Economic Growth 0 0 0 62 1 5 11 306
Environmental policy instruments and strategic restraint: caps versus taxes 0 0 1 9 1 4 12 41
Group-contests with endogenous claims 0 0 0 17 5 6 15 85
Investments in managerial skills and bargaining over inputs 0 0 0 13 0 1 6 65
Investments, positive externalities and majority bargaining 0 0 0 34 0 0 8 47
Lottery versus share contests under risk aversion 0 0 1 34 0 2 10 64
MULTI-ISSUE BARGAINING UNDER BUDGET-CONSTRAINTS 0 0 0 24 3 3 6 111
On the optimality of bargaining outcomes in the Collective-Particularistic multilateral bargaining game 0 0 0 21 2 3 6 77
Polarization or Moderation? Intra-group heterogeneity in endogenous-policy contest 0 0 0 41 5 6 14 113
Strategic Sourcing in Procurement 0 0 0 32 4 6 18 96
The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution? 0 0 0 98 3 6 12 622
The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution? 0 0 0 40 2 7 14 255
Union Power, Minimum Wage Legislation, Endogenous Labor Supplies and Production 0 0 0 133 2 3 14 917
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 673 35 71 195 3,176
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment 0 0 0 12 1 3 8 77
Bargaining one-dimensional social choices 0 0 0 25 2 5 10 138
Block sourcing plus 0 0 0 3 3 3 12 17
Demand bargaining in legislatures 0 0 0 35 5 13 21 511
Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes 0 1 2 22 1 5 19 81
Firms’ operational costs, market entry and growth 0 0 0 10 1 1 6 76
Group-contests with endogenous claims 0 0 0 3 5 10 19 58
Investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities 0 0 0 3 4 4 15 61
Investments, Positive Externalities, and Majority Bargaining 0 0 0 3 0 2 6 33
Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 21
Multilevel Mediation in Symmetric Trees 0 0 0 23 0 1 9 95
On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods 0 0 0 8 2 5 12 50
Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members 0 0 1 5 0 1 15 29
Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification 0 0 0 4 2 5 9 51
Super-Majorites, One-Dimensional Policies, and Social Surplus 0 0 0 0 2 6 10 38
Super-majorites and collective surplus in one-dimensional bargaining: Numerical simulations 0 0 1 26 0 1 7 131
Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining 0 0 0 3 1 2 6 36
Union Bargaining in Economies with Constant Returns to Scale 0 0 0 13 1 2 6 64
Unions, qualification choice, and output 0 0 0 16 2 3 9 163
Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules 0 0 0 14 2 3 10 103
Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function 0 0 0 22 0 0 3 148
Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol 0 0 0 2 2 2 8 58
Total Journal Articles 0 1 4 253 37 78 230 2,039

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06