Access Statistics for Gorkem Celik

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures 1 1 1 38 2 6 11 162
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures 0 0 0 20 0 5 8 15
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion 0 0 0 126 0 4 6 439
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism 0 0 0 69 0 5 9 165
Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition 3 15 132 144 7 42 463 477
Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision 0 0 1 176 1 8 16 660
Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints 0 0 0 90 1 8 11 445
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation 0 0 0 178 2 5 9 435
Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider 1 1 1 5 2 3 3 16
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 43 2 11 11 127
Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation 0 0 0 33 2 6 19 80
Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation 0 0 0 84 9 17 34 233
Selling Certification of Private and Market Information 0 0 5 22 0 6 17 29
To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes 0 0 0 79 1 6 8 284
Total Working Papers 5 17 140 1,107 29 132 625 3,567

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures 0 1 1 1 1 6 8 14
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties 0 0 0 6 1 4 6 86
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism 0 0 0 24 1 4 6 87
IDEAL DEFAULT FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES EFFICIENTLY 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 10
Implementation by Gradual Revelation 0 0 0 4 0 2 8 56
Mechanism design with collusive supervision 0 0 0 47 2 10 13 201
Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints 0 0 0 27 0 2 5 130
On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers 0 0 0 13 0 4 6 99
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation 1 1 2 54 2 5 11 167
Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider 1 1 1 3 1 4 8 20
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 16
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design 0 0 0 5 0 7 11 52
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation 0 0 0 2 1 6 14 85
Total Journal Articles 2 3 4 186 10 60 110 1,023

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04