Access Statistics for Gorkem Celik

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures	0	0	0	20	0	1	3	8
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures	0	0	1	37	1	1	3	152
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion	0	0	0	126	1	1	2	434
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism	0	0	1	69	0	0	1	156
Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition	5	26	107	107	8	47	392	392
Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision	1	1	2	176	2	3	5	647
Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints	0	0	0	90	0	0	3	435
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation	0	0	0	178	0	2	3	429
Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	13
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	116
Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation	0	0	0	33	2	7	8	69
Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation	0	0	0	84	4	7	9	208
Selling Certification of Private and Market Information	1	3	20	20	2	6	19	19
To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes	0	0	0	79	1	1	3	278
Total Working Papers	7	30	131	1,066	21	76	452	3,356

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	80
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism	0	0	2	24	0	1	4	82
IDEAL DEFAULT FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES EFFICIENTLY	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Implementation by Gradual Revelation	0	0	0	4	0	2	3	51
Mechanism design with collusive supervision	0	0	1	47	1	3	7	191
Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints	0	0	0	27	0	0	1	126
On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers	0	0	0	13	0	0	3	93
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation	0	0	1	53	2	2	4	159
Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider	0	0	0	2	1	1	2	13
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	11
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design	0	0	0	5	1	3	3	44
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation	0	0	0	2	1	4	4	75
Total Journal Articles	0	0	4	183	6	16	39	934

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

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Statistics updated 2025-09-05