Access Statistics for Gorkem Celik

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	5
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures	0	0	0	36	2	2	4	149
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion	0	0	0	126	0	0	0	432
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism	0	0	1	68	0	1	2	155
Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision	0	0	0	174	1	1	3	642
Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints	0	1	1	90	0	1	3	432
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation	0	0	0	178	0	0	0	426
Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider	0	0	1	4	2	2	3	12
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design	0	0	0	43	0	0	1	116
Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation	0	0	0	33	0	0	1	61
Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation	0	0	0	84	0	0	1	199
To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes	0	0	0	79	0	0	0	275
Total Working Papers	0	1	3	935	5	7	18	2,904

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	5
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	80
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism	0	0	0	22	0	0	3	78
Implementation by Gradual Revelation	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	48
Mechanism design with collusive supervision	0	0	0	46	0	1	1	184
Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints	0	0	0	27	0	0	0	125
On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	90
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation	0	0	0	52	0	0	5	155
Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	11
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	41
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	71
Total Journal Articles	0	0	1	179	0	3	15	895

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

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Statistics updated 2024-09-04