Access Statistics for Pierre Chaigneau

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 29
Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities 0 0 1 28 2 6 14 114
Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective 0 0 0 32 2 4 9 172
Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion 0 1 2 26 0 2 8 101
Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion 0 0 0 21 0 2 9 169
Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting 2 4 5 110 6 14 39 637
Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 9
The Generalized Informativeness Principle 0 0 0 30 5 9 31 76
The Generalized Informativeness Principle 0 0 0 41 2 2 5 85
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability 0 0 0 28 0 3 8 59
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability 0 0 0 19 0 2 5 30
The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation 0 0 0 19 0 0 10 111
The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 56
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting 0 0 1 24 1 3 9 37
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting 0 0 0 18 0 0 7 30
The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium 0 0 0 7 0 0 9 61
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises 0 0 1 36 2 2 6 153
Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises 0 0 2 40 1 2 11 95
Total Working Papers 2 5 12 494 21 53 188 2,024

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 14
Does improved information improve incentives? 0 0 8 23 1 8 37 105
Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion 0 0 0 8 1 2 5 64
Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques 0 0 0 6 1 6 9 49
Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors 0 0 2 5 0 2 9 24
Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts 0 1 2 5 0 4 8 23
Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 25
Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation 0 0 1 23 1 1 10 90
The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium 0 1 2 8 1 3 11 34
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach 1 2 3 3 1 3 5 11
The optimal timing of CEO compensation 0 0 0 4 1 1 12 31
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises 0 1 3 11 0 4 17 59
Total Journal Articles 1 5 21 104 7 37 129 529

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Statistics updated 2021-01-03