Access Statistics for Pierre Chaigneau

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Fair CEO Pay 0 0 1 5 1 1 8 14
A theory of fair CEO pay 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7
Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 30
Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside 0 0 0 2 4 4 6 8
Does improved information improve incentives? 0 0 0 5 1 1 2 23
Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities 0 0 2 34 0 0 7 144
Downside risk neutral probabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Executive Compensation with Social and Environmental Performance 1 1 6 6 1 6 25 26
Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective 0 0 1 33 0 0 2 184
Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion 0 1 1 22 0 1 1 174
Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 106
Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts? 0 0 0 20 1 1 3 41
How should performance signals affect contracts? 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 4
Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting 0 0 0 115 0 0 0 720
Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence 0 0 0 1 1 3 6 12
Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 20
The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring 0 0 0 25 1 1 3 72
The Generalized Informativeness Principle 0 0 2 34 0 0 2 104
The Generalized Informativeness Principle 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 101
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 48
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability 0 0 0 29 0 0 2 69
The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation 0 0 0 19 0 1 3 151
The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 58
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 34
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting 0 0 0 25 0 0 3 46
The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 68
The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 12
The optimal timing of executive compensation 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
The value of informativeness for contracting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises 0 0 0 38 1 1 2 172
Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 104
Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 6
Total Working Papers 10 11 22 607 20 36 100 2,569

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Fair CEO Pay 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4
Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 20
Does improved information improve incentives? 0 0 0 32 3 3 6 151
Downside risk-neutral probabilities 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 16
Executive compensation with environmental and social performance 0 1 1 1 10 15 16 16
Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion 0 0 0 8 0 1 3 74
Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 52
How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts? 0 0 1 7 0 1 4 22
Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors 0 0 0 9 0 0 4 50
Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts 0 0 0 7 0 1 3 47
Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation 0 0 1 9 0 1 5 36
Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation 0 0 0 26 1 1 3 104
The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring 0 0 1 8 2 3 14 42
The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 45
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 29
The optimal timing of CEO compensation 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 65
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 103
Total Journal Articles 3 4 8 163 21 33 75 879

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2025-10-06