Access Statistics for Yeon-Koo Che

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Revolving Doors" and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 170
A Dynamic Theory of Holdup 0 0 4 113 3 6 32 436
A dynamic theory of holdup 0 0 0 89 3 5 13 372
Adverse Selection in Class Action Suits 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 138
An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets 0 0 0 11 1 1 2 43
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment 0 0 1 69 1 2 15 269
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms 0 1 1 96 1 2 10 480
Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result 0 1 3 43 3 4 12 340
Bailout Stigma 0 0 1 46 3 5 18 131
Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 672
Caps on Political Lobbying 0 1 6 510 5 24 83 3,592
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply 0 0 0 15 0 1 4 78
Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms 0 0 0 58 1 1 13 145
Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 323
Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective 1 1 2 142 9 32 52 596
Contractual remedies to the holdup problem: a dynamic perspective 0 0 0 32 5 9 14 195
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting 1 1 3 249 2 4 12 809
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson 0 0 0 1 0 5 16 841
Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods 0 0 0 0 1 6 18 230
Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation 0 0 0 55 2 2 7 224
Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 467
Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions 0 0 1 109 0 0 4 397
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 15
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets 0 0 2 20 4 6 15 71
Expanding "Choice" in School Choice 0 0 1 16 1 2 7 117
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice 0 0 1 21 2 3 11 165
Expanding “Choice” in School Choice 0 0 1 30 2 4 9 110
Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer 0 0 0 33 1 1 1 115
Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach 1 4 4 59 1 4 7 165
How to Divide the Possession of a Football? 0 0 0 8 0 2 2 148
Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 612
Know thy enemies: knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions 0 0 0 33 1 1 3 186
Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure 0 0 0 22 0 1 2 172
Legal Advice and Evidence with Bayesian and non-Bayesian Adjudicators 0 0 0 28 0 1 5 37
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership 0 0 0 25 1 2 7 176
Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp 0 0 3 32 1 4 25 82
Notes on the Microfoundations of Monetary Economics 0 0 3 3 0 1 14 580
Opinion as Incentives 0 0 0 50 2 3 6 157
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions 0 0 0 67 0 0 3 168
Optimal Design for Social Learning 1 1 2 16 1 2 5 55
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 0 2 219 0 0 11 678
Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention 0 0 9 48 1 2 31 58
Optimal Use of Information Litigation: Should Regulatory Information be Withheld to Deter Frivolus Suits? 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 108
Optimal incentives for teams 0 0 0 391 1 1 10 1,059
Pandering to Persuade 0 0 0 24 1 3 18 171
Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 13 1 1 4 31
Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 14
Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation 0 1 3 87 3 6 18 58
Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation 0 1 2 88 0 4 13 107
Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation 0 2 4 91 1 3 11 113
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 3 1 2 5 61
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 16 1 1 4 104
Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance 0 0 0 54 1 1 4 664
Section 365: mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuation 0 0 0 50 1 2 8 408
Strategic Judgment Proofing 0 0 0 5 1 3 4 94
Strategic Judgment Proofing 0 0 0 17 2 4 8 174
The Economic Consequences of Data Privacy Regulation: Empirical Evidence from GDPR 4 5 55 55 9 15 91 91
The Economics of Collective Negociation: Consolidation of Claims by Multiple Plaintiffs 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 185
The Hold-up Problem 5 9 33 978 7 20 105 3,641
The Optimal Mechanism For Selling To Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 9
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 702
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 1 4 10 102
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 1 5 8 150
The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 223
Weak Monotone Comparative Statics 0 0 32 32 0 0 11 11
Total Working Papers 13 28 179 4,274 95 241 889 23,095

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Theory of Holdup 0 0 1 175 4 9 19 721
An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 27
Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents 0 0 2 25 1 3 19 127
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions 0 0 0 32 1 3 9 112
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment 0 0 1 65 1 7 25 276
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms 0 1 2 35 2 3 13 156
Bidding with Securities: Comment 0 0 0 30 2 2 8 147
Brave New World of Market Design 0 0 1 17 0 1 14 77
Buy-in through goldplating: The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 100
Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition 0 0 0 18 0 0 6 182
Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999) 0 0 0 24 0 0 2 88
Caps on Political Lobbying 3 3 15 133 3 4 42 449
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply 0 0 0 16 1 6 10 130
Competitive Procurement with Corruption 0 0 0 4 1 5 20 961
Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments 0 0 0 75 0 2 6 578
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting 1 1 4 379 2 6 33 1,305
Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 104
Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods 0 1 3 98 0 2 10 523
Decentralized College Admissions 1 1 8 45 4 12 60 219
Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation 0 0 2 106 0 1 7 475
Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions 2 2 17 590 5 13 49 1,251
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications 0 1 1 48 1 9 17 251
Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions 1 1 1 82 1 1 4 163
Disclosure and Legal Advice 0 0 2 5 0 1 6 37
Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover? 0 0 0 27 0 0 3 110
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets 0 0 4 4 2 5 37 37
Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents 0 0 0 13 0 0 5 57
Efficient assignment with interdependent values 0 0 3 9 0 0 7 56
Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Care through Liability and Regulation 0 0 2 7 0 2 11 33
Equilibrium formation of class action suits 0 0 0 93 0 1 6 425
Expanding "Choice" in School Choice 0 0 1 23 2 4 10 156
Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints 1 3 6 150 1 4 17 369
Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer 0 0 0 37 1 1 3 175
Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network‐Flow Approach 0 0 1 25 0 1 15 122
How to divide the possession of a football? 0 0 0 15 0 1 3 78
Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending 0 0 0 226 0 3 11 746
Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 0 0 0 25 0 0 3 113
Opinions as Incentives 0 0 1 156 2 4 14 532
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 1 2 136 2 5 23 491
Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention 0 2 21 27 5 13 132 160
Optimal Incentives for Teams 0 0 7 504 3 5 35 1,278
Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Should Regulatory Information Be Withheld to Deter Frivolous Suits? 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 169
Optimal collusion-proof auctions 0 0 2 85 0 0 8 257
Pandering to Persuade 0 1 1 46 0 1 12 239
Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets 0 0 0 2 2 2 10 21
Performance-Based Pricing for Nucleaer Power Plants 0 0 0 9 0 0 6 67
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 65
Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning 2 8 21 37 4 16 69 128
Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained 1 1 1 59 1 1 5 170
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered 0 0 0 71 2 2 17 251
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types 0 0 0 48 0 5 7 211
Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion 0 1 6 114 2 6 21 496
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation 0 0 0 92 1 2 9 359
Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 790
Stable Matching in Large Economies 0 1 2 6 4 5 22 44
Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders 1 6 15 366 3 14 46 923
Strategic judgment proofing 0 0 0 14 2 4 11 149
The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 267
The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games 0 0 1 24 0 7 13 107
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer 1 1 1 70 1 3 6 208
The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 303
The role of lockups in takeover contests 0 0 0 1 2 4 8 15
Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions 0 0 1 5 1 2 15 29
Total Journal Articles 14 36 159 4,647 74 220 1,018 18,665

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Statistics updated 2020-09-04