Access Statistics for Kangsik Choi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly 0 0 0 41 2 6 8 241
Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly 0 0 0 78 3 8 14 177
Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly revisited 0 0 1 68 5 17 21 231
Cournot-Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly 0 0 0 80 3 7 8 293
Endogenous Choice of Price or Quantity Contract with Upstream R&D Investment: Linear Pricing and Two-part Tariff Contract with Bargaining 0 0 1 14 3 8 9 50
Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization 0 0 0 21 1 2 2 98
Government's Preference and Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting: Perspectives on Privatization and Mixed Duopoly 0 0 0 26 1 6 10 142
Indirect Taxation and Privatization in a Model of Government's Preference 0 0 0 40 0 4 9 108
Privatization, Government's Preference and Unionization Structure: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach 0 0 0 52 4 11 13 247
Reverse First-mover and Second-mover Advantage in a Vertical Structure 0 0 0 47 4 14 20 234
Strategic Budget Constraints of Public Firm under Bertrand Competition of Unionized Mixed Duopoly 0 0 0 32 2 4 5 155
Strategic Subsidy Policies with Endogenous Choice of Competition Mode 0 0 0 27 1 8 14 102
Strategic Trade Policies in International Rivalry When Competition Mode is Endogenous 0 0 0 41 1 3 7 166
Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Choice of Competition Mode under a Vertical Structure 0 0 0 38 3 9 11 95
The Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting under Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly 0 0 0 24 0 7 11 118
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 629 33 114 162 2,457

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS PAYOFF MOTIVES AND ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY* 0 0 0 42 0 11 15 167
A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE 0 0 0 12 0 1 1 94
A NOTE ON ENVY AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY CONTRACTS 0 0 0 7 0 3 5 47
A NOTE ON PRICING OF PRODUCT QUALITY FOR STATUS CONCERNS 0 1 1 4 2 6 8 68
Conformism, peer pressure and adverse selection 0 0 0 22 0 3 5 109
Envy and pricing of quality in adverse selection 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 80
Envy, Inequity Aversion, and Optimal Income Taxation 0 0 1 47 1 5 7 158
Ex ante contracting with inequity aversion 0 1 1 51 0 5 7 140
Mixed Motives of Simultaneous-move Games in a Mixed Duopoly 0 1 1 3 1 8 9 87
Mixed Motives of Simultaneous-move Games in a Mixed Duopoly: Comments and Erratum 0 1 2 6 0 4 8 91
PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION IN A UNIONISED MIXED DUOPOLY: THE CASES OF SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS* 0 0 0 20 0 1 5 122
Privatization and Government's Preference under Mixed Oligopoly: A Generalization 0 1 1 43 0 5 10 180
STRATEGIC BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN A UNIONIZED MIXED OLIGOPOLY 0 0 0 5 1 4 5 63
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY WHEN COMPETITION MODE IS ENDOGENOUS 0 0 0 15 3 13 15 79
Unions, government's preference, and privatization 0 0 0 8 2 3 4 84
Welfare-improving vertical separation with network externality 0 0 0 18 0 6 9 69
Total Journal Articles 0 5 7 307 10 79 118 1,638

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04