| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adapt or Optimize? The Psychology and Economics of Rules of Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
23 |
| Anti-Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
49 |
| Anti-Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
204 |
| Anti-Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
9 |
23 |
120 |
| Anti-Sharing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
212 |
| Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
44 |
| Chaos, Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
23 |
| Charity, Publicity, and the Donation Registry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
83 |
| Clearings and Thickets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
62 |
| Commodifying Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
| Decreasing Liability Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalizing Legal Values |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
57 |
| Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
| Expressive Law and Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
54 |
| Expressive Law and Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
164 |
| Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
184 |
| Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
96 |
| Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
8 |
29 |
| Federalism with Two Languages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
| Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
53 |
| Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
31 |
| Law and Growth Economics: A Framework for Research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
81 |
| Law and the Poverty of Nations - Giving Credit to Credit |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
97 |
| Law and the Poverty of Nations - The Double Trust Problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
116 |
| Law, Information, and the Poverty of Nations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
37 |
| Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries than Others |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
243 |
| Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad Man" of Holmes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
62 |
| Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
61 |
| Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
278 |
| Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
50 |
| Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from Damages? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
28 |
| The Donation Registry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
| The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law: Economic Analysis of the Internal Viewpoint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
41 |
| The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
47 |
| The Optimal Number of Governments for Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
| The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
95 |
| Total Liability for Excessive Harm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
28 |
| Treating Yourself Instrumentally: Internalization, Rationality and Law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
28 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
259 |
| Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
96 |
| Who Gets On Top in Democracy? Elections as Filters |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
32 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
3 |
10 |
573 |
13 |
109 |
332 |
3,316 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Closed Model of Careers in a Simple Hierarchy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
96 |
| A Disruption Mechanism for Bribes |
0 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
91 |
| A new expenditure function |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
35 |
| An Economic Model of Legal Discovery |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
405 |
| Anti-insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
337 |
| Charity, Publicity, and the Donation Registry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
237 |
| Comparative judicial discretion: An empirical test of economic models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
228 |
| Conference on the constitutional law and economics of the European Union Saarbrucken, Germany September 1995 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
67 |
| Decreasing-Liability Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
43 |
| Disgorgement Damages for Accidents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
41 |
| Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
212 |
| Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution |
0 |
0 |
7 |
477 |
2 |
8 |
35 |
1,225 |
| Economic Theories of Legal Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
5 |
22 |
306 |
| Economic analysis in civil law countries: Past, present, future |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
144 |
| Editors' introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
42 |
| Expressive Law and Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
498 |
| How the law circumvents Starrett's nonconvexity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
71 |
| Lapses, conflict, and akrasia in torts and crimes: Towards an economic theory of the will |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
270 |
| Liability Rules and Risk Sharing in Environmental and Resource Policy: Discussion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
| Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
341 |
| Optimal Income Taxation for Transfer Payments Under Different Social Welfare Criteria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
175 |
| Optimal Tax Schedules and Rates: Mirrlees and Ramsey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
248 |
| Personal versus impersonal trade: The size of trading groups and contract law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
183 |
| Political Economy of a Public Corporation: Pricing Objectives of BART |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
176 |
| Political economy of a public corporation: Pricing objectives of BART |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
96 |
| Rawls's Lexical Orderings Are Good Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
36 |
| Reply to I. M. D. Little's Comment [Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
183 |
| Sharing and anti-sharing in teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
160 |
| Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
201 |
| Structural adjudication and the new law merchant: A model of decentralized law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
257 |
| The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
190 |
| The New Economic Freedom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
33 |
| The Secret of Growth Is Financing Secrets: Corporate Law and Growth Economics |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
157 |
| The logic of power in the emerging European constitution: Game theory and the division of powers |
0 |
0 |
2 |
208 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
482 |
| The theory of market modernization of law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
86 |
| Total Liability for Excessive Harm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
82 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
106 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
184 |
| Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
161 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
440 |
| Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change." |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
166 |
| Workshop on Law and Economic Development, Hamburg, Germany, January 2004 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
152 |
| Total Journal Articles |
0 |
2 |
19 |
1,895 |
7 |
108 |
396 |
8,490 |
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