| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games |
1 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
133 |
| An Invitation to Market Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
237 |
| COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR IN TWO-PERSON GUESSING GAMES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY |
0 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
335 |
| Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,108 |
| Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
306 |
| Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
200 |
| Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
149 |
| Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
404 |
| Comparing Models of Strategic Thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Coordination Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
113 |
| Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
317 |
| Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
416 |
| Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
365 |
| Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
256 |
| Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
158 |
| Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
329 |
| Let’s Talk It Over: Coordination Via Preplay Communication With Level-k Thinking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
273 |
| Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
256 |
| Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
| Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
287 |
| Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
| Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts (Now published in American Economic Review, (1988).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
111 |
| Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
110 |
| Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
163 |
| Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
115 |
| New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
239 |
| Strategic Information Transmission |
1 |
1 |
5 |
271 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
586 |
| Strategic Thinking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
265 |
| The Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment Insurance Receipt: New Evidence from a Regression Kink Design in Missouri, 2003-2013 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
164 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
4 |
11 |
2,023 |
20 |
39 |
86 |
7,677 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Comment on Farber's Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| A Game of Fair Division |
0 |
1 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
290 |
| A Note on the Zeuthen-Harsanyi Theory of Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
345 |
| A Self-administered Solution of the Bargaining Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
146 |
| A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk |
0 |
1 |
2 |
255 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
828 |
| A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
194 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
481 |
| A dual Dutch auction in Taipei: the choice of numeraire and auction form in multi-object auctions with bundling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
178 |
| Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
245 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
938 |
| Adaptive Dynamics, Part II |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
| An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
313 |
| An invitation to market design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
183 |
| Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Labor-Management Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
590 |
| Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
200 |
| Bargaining, Strategic Reserves, and International Trade in Exhaustible Resources |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
| Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
226 |
| Boundedly Rational versus Optimization-Based Models of Strategic Thinking and Learning in Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
216 |
| Boundedly rational versus optimization-based models of strategic thinking and learning in games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
832 |
| Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
168 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
581 |
| Comparative statics at irregular extrema |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
42 |
| Comparative statics in matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
209 |
| Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
236 |
| Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining |
0 |
0 |
2 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
161 |
| Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
52 |
| Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
189 |
| Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
28 |
| Equilibrium without independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
214 |
| Erratum: Social Security and the Retirement Decision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Experiments on Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Relationships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
| Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
350 |
| Fair division with indivisible commodities |
0 |
0 |
3 |
75 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
163 |
| Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek" Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
338 |
| Introduction to Experimental Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
379 |
| Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers |
1 |
1 |
3 |
383 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
893 |
| Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes |
0 |
0 |
6 |
774 |
4 |
7 |
25 |
2,057 |
| John Nash and the analysis of strategic behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
300 |
| Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
303 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,349 |
| Learning behavior and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
363 |
| Learning the Optimal Strategy in a Zero-Sum Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
456 |
| Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level-k thinking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
47 |
| Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
337 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
1,041 |
| Long-term Relationships Governed by Short-term Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
109 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
517 |
| Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
220 |
6 |
6 |
11 |
835 |
| Maximin behavior and efficient allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability in Large and Finite Populations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
| New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
150 |
| New York City Cab Drivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income |
1 |
1 |
3 |
192 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
643 |
| On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
297 |
| Relationship-Specific Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
257 |
| Short-Term Contracting and Strategic Oil Reserves |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
188 |
| Social Security and the Retirement Decision |
0 |
0 |
2 |
155 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
558 |
| Strategic Information Transmission |
1 |
2 |
11 |
2,156 |
13 |
19 |
48 |
5,244 |
| Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
464 |
| The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
640 |
| The Theory of Contracts and Agency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
| What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
792 |
| “Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
| Total Journal Articles |
3 |
6 |
42 |
7,571 |
53 |
90 |
264 |
26,032 |
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