Access Statistics for Arup Daripa

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Mechanism and Surplus Extraction Under Ambiguity 0 0 0 57 0 1 1 255
A Dynamic Mechanism and Surplus Extraction Under Ambiguity 0 0 0 34 0 0 2 158
A Theory of Treasury Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 381
Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk 0 0 1 288 0 0 1 1,105
Contracting with Type-Dependent Naïveté 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 49
Eliciting Ambiguous Beliefs Under alpha-Maxmin Preference 0 0 0 36 0 1 3 65
Eliciting Second-Order Beliefs 0 0 0 28 0 0 6 88
Enforcing Repayment: Social Sanctions versus Individual Incentives 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 69
Equilibrium in Contracts with Competing Agencies 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 452
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Regulation of Bank Capital 0 0 0 167 0 0 3 779
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Regulation of Bank Capital 0 0 0 113 0 1 3 584
Ex Ante versus Ex Post Regulation of Bank Capital 0 0 0 21 0 1 1 130
Firm Ownership and the Macroeconomics of Incentive Leakages 0 0 2 2 1 1 17 17
Firm ownership and the macroeconomics of incentive leakages 0 0 3 3 0 1 14 14
How (Not) to Sell Money 0 0 0 121 1 2 3 604
How (Not) to Sell Money 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 182
Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm? 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 198
Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm? 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 467
Labour's Record on Financial Regulation 0 0 0 64 0 1 3 226
Market Allocation and the Impossibility of Provision of Costly Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 260
Monitoring versus Gatekeeping 0 0 0 38 1 1 2 281
Multi-Unit Auctions Under Proprietary Information: Information Free Rides and Revenue Banking 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 184
Optimal Collective Contract Without Peer Monitoring 0 0 0 56 0 1 3 314
Optimal Collective Contract Without Peer Monitoring 0 0 0 33 1 1 3 193
Optimal Sale: Auctions with a Buy-Now Option 0 0 0 116 0 0 3 387
Pricing on the Internet 0 0 0 1,039 0 0 7 3,318
Shills and Shipes 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 92
Shills and Snipes 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 93
Subsidizing Inventory: A Theory of Trade Credit and Prepayment 0 0 0 239 1 1 1 762
Too Unexpected to Fail: Bail-Out Policy and Sudden Freezes 0 0 0 39 0 1 1 44
Uninformative Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions 0 0 0 32 0 0 2 257
Total Working Papers 0 0 6 2,713 5 16 89 12,008

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity 0 0 1 63 0 4 6 205
A theory of treasury auctions 0 0 0 71 0 0 3 184
Eliciting ambiguous beliefs using constructed ambiguous acts: Alpha-maxmin 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 9
Eliciting second-order beliefs 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 8
Ensuring Sales: A Theory of Inter-firm Credit 0 0 0 54 0 0 2 247
Labour’s record on financial regulation 0 1 1 13 0 2 3 80
Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring 0 0 0 12 0 3 4 86
Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option 0 0 0 38 0 2 2 129
Pricing on the Internet 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 219
Shills and snipes 0 0 0 7 0 1 3 57
Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation 0 0 1 210 0 1 7 564
Total Journal Articles 0 1 3 473 3 17 36 1,788

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
EX-ANTE VERSUS EX-POST REGULATION OF BANK CAPITAL 1 1 1 5 1 2 2 20
Total Chapters 1 1 1 5 1 2 2 20

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06