Access Statistics for Arup Daripa

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Mechanism and Surplus Extraction Under Ambiguity 0 0 0 57 0 1 8 262
A Dynamic Mechanism and Surplus Extraction Under Ambiguity 0 0 0 34 2 3 13 171
A Theory of Treasury Auctions 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 388
Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk 0 0 1 288 3 4 7 1,111
Contracting with Type-Dependent Naïveté 0 0 0 6 1 3 4 53
Eliciting Ambiguous Beliefs Under alpha-Maxmin Preference 0 0 0 36 3 8 14 78
Eliciting Second-Order Beliefs 0 0 0 28 4 8 15 102
Enforcing Repayment: Social Sanctions versus Individual Incentives 0 0 0 46 1 3 8 77
Equilibrium in Contracts with Competing Agencies 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 457
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Regulation of Bank Capital 0 1 2 169 1 5 15 794
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Regulation of Bank Capital 1 1 1 114 5 10 19 602
Ex Ante versus Ex Post Regulation of Bank Capital 0 0 0 21 0 1 10 139
Firm Ownership and the Macroeconomics of Incentive Leakages 0 0 0 2 4 5 16 31
Firm ownership and the macroeconomics of incentive leakages 0 0 0 3 4 9 31 41
How (Not) to Sell Money 0 0 0 121 1 2 19 620
How (Not) to Sell Money 0 0 0 43 3 4 6 188
Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm? 0 0 0 59 0 1 2 469
Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm? 0 0 0 17 1 2 8 206
Labour's Record on Financial Regulation 0 0 0 64 1 1 6 231
Market Allocation and the Impossibility of Provision of Costly Information 0 0 0 0 3 3 10 270
Monitoring versus Gatekeeping 0 0 0 38 1 2 6 286
Multi-Unit Auctions Under Proprietary Information: Information Free Rides and Revenue Banking 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 187
Optimal Collective Contract Without Peer Monitoring 0 0 0 33 0 1 9 200
Optimal Collective Contract Without Peer Monitoring 0 0 0 56 2 4 10 322
Optimal Sale: Auctions with a Buy-Now Option 0 0 0 116 2 2 8 395
Pricing on the Internet 0 0 0 1,039 0 0 7 3,325
Shills and Shipes 0 0 0 9 2 2 5 96
Shills and Snipes 0 0 0 7 2 5 19 111
Subsidizing Inventory: A Theory of Trade Credit and Prepayment 0 0 0 239 1 1 8 769
Too Unexpected to Fail: Bail-Out Policy and Sudden Freezes 0 0 1 40 2 2 5 48
Uninformative Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions 0 0 0 32 3 3 5 262
Total Working Papers 1 2 5 2,717 55 98 310 12,291

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity 0 0 0 63 2 4 18 219
A theory of treasury auctions 0 0 0 71 1 3 6 188
Eliciting ambiguous beliefs using constructed ambiguous acts: Alpha-maxmin 0 0 0 1 2 3 10 15
Eliciting second-order beliefs 0 0 0 3 1 5 12 19
Ensuring Sales: A Theory of Inter-firm Credit 0 0 1 55 2 8 17 263
Labour’s record on financial regulation 0 0 1 13 1 2 8 86
Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring 0 0 0 12 0 2 7 90
Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option 0 0 0 38 0 3 8 135
Pricing on the Internet 0 0 0 1 2 4 14 233
Shills and snipes 0 0 0 7 1 2 16 72
Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation 0 0 0 210 4 5 13 576
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 474 16 41 129 1,896

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
EX-ANTE VERSUS EX-POST REGULATION OF BANK CAPITAL 0 0 1 5 3 6 14 32
Total Chapters 0 0 1 5 3 6 14 32

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06